

Editorial Screening when Science is Cheap

NIC FISHMAN, Department of Statistics, Harvard University, USA

GABRIEL SEKERES, Department of Economics, Cornell University, USA

We build a constrained, auditable agentic workflow that constructs a pre-run specification surface for each paper and then executes the robustness universe it admits, and we apply it to 103 empirical studies published in AEA journals. Comparing our automated runtime to a conservative human benchmark, we estimate a roughly 170-fold decline in the marginal cost of running observational specifications. We study the resulting shift in behavior as a commitment equilibrium of a screening game, where journals commit *ex ante* to acceptance rules and researchers sequentially search over dependent specifications, stop strategically, and selectively disclose evidence. The induced true- and false-positive acceptance rates trace out a purity-throughput frontier. We prove a universal information-theoretic bound on this frontier, governed by the total likelihood-ratio information a researcher can accumulate before optimally stopping. We verify that the current *de facto* practice in observational research, requiring a set of robustness checks, is an optimal mechanism; but we prove that screening collapses as testing becomes cheap unless the required number of robustness checks scales at least linearly in the inverse cost of each test. We then document, using audited pre-run specification surfaces and the robustness universes they induce, that observational social science has indeed entered a cheap-testing regime. The theory implies that to maintain conventional purity at fixed throughput, the number of qualifying robustness checks must grow at least proportionally with the cost decline; under our empirical calibration the implied disclosure requirement is on the order of 7,000 checks. This raises a serious issue for observational work going forward, and we argue for the need to develop methods to interpret sets of many specifications simultaneously, as opposed to current interpretative practice, which focuses on a handful of main specifications and a small set of robustness checks.

Additional Key Words and Phrases: editorial screening; robustness checks; specification search; selective disclosure; effective sample size; false discovery rate

1 INTRODUCTION

Empirical research in economics increasingly turns on specification choices. In observational work, scrutinizing a result rarely means collecting new data; it means re-running the analysis under a different control set, sample restriction, functional form, or inferential approach. Recent progress in large language models and automated coding agents changes this premise. The marginal cost of constructing an analysis pipeline and exploring a broad robustness universe has fallen quickly. This has two mirrored effects: it makes *p*-hacking easier, but it also makes demanding extensive robustness checks practical.

We make this cost shift concrete by introducing a constrained, auditable empirical object: the specification surface. For each paper, the surface is a pre-run commitment that defines the claim under audit, fixes the executable universe of estimand-preserving variants, and records the constraints, budgets, and inference conventions under which exploration may proceed. Because it is keyed to the paper's revealed search space, the surface captures the minimum set of forks a reader can verify the authors had to navigate from the paper itself. It is therefore the empirical analogue of the *ex ante* commitment object in our theory: before any outcomes are observed, it says what counts as admissible evidence and what does not. Once the surface is approved, execution becomes mechanical: the agent may run only admitted specifications, must write contract-checked outputs, and is audited *ex post* against the same commitment object. We apply this workflow to a set of papers published in American Economic Association (AEA) journals and release the prompts, code, and intermediate artifacts so that a reader can reproduce the pipeline end-to-end. Appendix B.1 documents the contracts and verification artifacts. Running and varying an observational specification at scale is now feasible at extremely low marginal cost.

Cheap specification search changes the publication game. When running additional specifications is inexpensive and omissions are hard to verify, an author can search until she finds a favorable result and selectively disclose only that result. Robustness checks are the natural counterpart: rather than conditioning on the single best-looking specification, the editor conditions acceptance on sustained performance across many disclosed checks. This paper asks how editorial screening must adapt when running specifications becomes cheap. While our main application is observational specification search in economics, the same logic applies whenever the marginal cost of generating new results falls sharply in a correlated environment.

We study this question in a simple commitment model. A journal commits in advance to an acceptance rule that maps disclosed evidence into an accept/reject decision. A researcher generates a correlated evidence stream by sequentially exploring specifications, paying a per-test cost. Researchers' projects are either high or low quality, but the researcher only learns this through the sequential testing process. After seeing each result, she chooses whether to stop and what to disclose; because omission is free and impossible to verify, she may selectively disclose a subset of her realized evidence.

Editorial screening necessarily trades off quality and volume. Without any throughput objective or constraint, minimizing the false discovery rate is trivial (accept nothing), so the relevant object is the attainable tradeoff between throughput and false discoveries. We refer to this attainable quality–volume tradeoff as the screening frontier. Two distinct editorial levers move an operating point on this frontier in different ways. Tightening standards raises the bar for what counts as passing, while forcing disclosure makes acceptance contingent on sustained performance across many disclosed checks.

Our main theoretical message is that these two levers behave very differently in the cheap-testing limit. In the cheap testing limit, both tightening standards and forcing disclosure must induce a “race” where researchers actually run as many tests as they can. Tightening standards is wasteful because it achieves a strictly worse discrimination rate than disclosure. We first prove a mechanism-independent information bound on screening (Theorem 4.3) and show that, absent capacity-scale search, false discoveries cannot fall at an exponential rate as testing becomes cheap (Theorem 4.4). We then show that even when researchers do search extensively, short equilibrium reports cannot transmit the resulting information: with sublinear disclosure, false positives cannot fall at the dependence-adjusted exponential screening rate without collapsing recall (Theorem 4.5). Finally, we analyze a simple robustness-check policy class that conditions acceptance on many disclosed passes in a calibrated evidence window. These rules force disclosure at the natural testing-capacity scale and achieve exponential screening while sustaining throughput (Theorem 5.2); when the model's information and dependence primitives are comparable, the achieved rate matches the information bound up to constants (Corollary 5.3).

Beyond merely motivating our central question, our empirical analysis enables us to estimate the primitives that determine screening when specification search is cheap, including type heterogeneity, dependence across specifications (how quickly new variants generate genuinely new information), and a conservative calibration of the cost drop from automation. These estimates translate directly into counterfactual disclosure requirements: under our baseline calibration, restoring a conventional screening target after the cost shift requires increasing the number of disclosed robustness checks by more than two orders of magnitude (from 50 to roughly 7,000).

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related literatures. Section 3 presents the model, operating points, and the screening frontier. Section 4 states the universal frontier bound and the short-disclosure frontier collapse. Section 5 studies robustness-check mechanisms and characterizes achievable screening rates. Section 6 takes these theoretical predictions to the data, estimating primitives from audited specification surfaces and the runs they induce, and computing

counterfactual disclosure requirements under a cost shift. Section 7 discusses implications for robustness-check practice and the role of dependence, and concludes. The appendices collect proofs, auxiliary results, and empirical implementation details.

2 RELATED WORK

This paper studies editorial screening as a commitment problem when researchers can perform cheap, sequential specification search and can omit unfavorable analyses. It connects to four broad literatures: publication bias and specification search, sequential testing and optional stopping, multiple testing and selective/post-selection inference, and mechanism design and information disclosure in scientific communication.

A large empirical and theoretical literature documents selective reporting and publication bias and develops methods to detect and correct for it (e.g. Andrews and Kasy [2019], Elliott et al. [2022], Franco et al. [2014], Ioannidis [2005]). Recent metascience emphasizes that the publication process can act as a significance filter, distorting the published distribution even absent fraud (e.g. Abadie [2020], van Zwet and Cator [2021]). From an incentives perspective, “cheap tests” intensify these forces by expanding the set of defensible degrees of freedom and making specification search closer to an optimization problem; related formal discussions of selection pressures in science include Devezer et al. [2021], Hill and Stein [2025], McElreath and Smaldino [2015], Smaldino and McElreath [2016]. In economics, a central conceptual step is to treat specification choice as part of the data-generating and publication process rather than as a nuisance; Kasy [2021] is particularly close in spirit to our focus on how rules of the publication game shape the distribution of reported evidence.

Canonical early warnings about researcher degrees of freedom include Gelman and Loken [2014], Simmons et al. [2011]; econometric analogues include classical sensitivity and data-snooping concerns [Hansen, 2005, Leamer, 1983, Sala-i Martin, 1997, White, 2000]. Modern multiverse and specification-curve implementations include Simonsohn et al. [2020], Steegen et al. [2016]. Our contribution is to give these practices a mechanism-design rationale: when omissions are unverifiable, disclosure is not only a transparency norm but an incentive instrument that shifts the attainable quality–volume tradeoff faced by editors.

At the modeling level, researchers in our framework generate evidence sequentially and then choose a stopping time and a report. This directly relates to classical sequential analysis and optimal stopping (e.g. Snell [1952], Wald [1950]) and to the use of stopping-time arguments to control information accumulation. Our universal envelope is an information-theoretic analogue of the idea that sequential procedures can only extract bounded discrimination per unit time, and our constructions exploit large-deviation screening once disclosure scales with testing capacity.

A complementary statistical response treats specification search as a multiple-testing problem and seeks error control after data-dependent exploration. The foundational FDR framework is due to Benjamini and Hochberg [1995], with important extensions under dependence [Benjamini and Yekutieli, 2001, Storey, 2002]. Selective and post-selection inference develops valid inference conditional on a selection event; influential examples include Berk et al. [2013], Fithian et al. [2014], Lee et al. [2016] and, in the specification-search setting, Viviano et al. [2025]. Our focus is different: rather than repairing inference after endogenous selection, we design editorial acceptance rules that make selection and omission strategically unattractive (or at least informationally costly), and we emphasize the induced quality–volume tradeoff faced by editors under capacity.

A growing literature models scientific communication and publication as a mechanism-design problem with strategic behavior and congestion/capacity constraints (e.g. Andrews and Shapiro [2021], Carnehl and Schneider [2025], Frankel and Kasy [2022], Jagadeesan and Viviano [2025], McCloskey and Michailat [2024], Spiess [2025]). Our results complement this work by isolating

what is achievable when the editor sees only a selectively disclosed subset of an endogenously generated evidence stream. We follow especially closely Tetenov [2016]’s characterization of the screening problem inherent to statistical testing. This connects naturally to classic disclosure and persuasion foundations (e.g. Grossman [1981], Kamenica and Gentzkow [2011], Milgrom [1981]) and to models of endogenous information acquisition with selective disclosure [Di Tillio et al., 2017, Henry, 2009, Henry and Ottaviani, 2019, Herresthal, 2022]. In our setting, the core implementation question is how disclosure must scale, as testing becomes cheap, to maintain discrimination without collapsing volume.

3 A MODEL OF EDITORIAL SCREENING

This paper studies a simple tension. Editors want to publish papers that are truly high-impact. Researchers want acceptance, and can run additional analyses to improve their chances. When testing is cheap, the researcher can often search until she finds something that looks good and then selectively report it. The editor must therefore screen using only what is disclosed, knowing that omission is unverifiable.

Our theory is built around three objects: (i) a sequential evidence stream with per-test cost γ , (ii) a binary editorial decision (accept/reject) based on a selectively disclosed report, and (iii) two primitives that summarize what cheap testing can generate per unit cost: an *information* index κ_{KL} and an *effective-sample-size* index κ_{eff} .

3.1 A running example: correlated z -scores and p -values

It is useful to keep the following concrete picture in mind. A researcher observes a time series of (correlated) z -scores and converts them into one-sided p -values. Different underlying “types” correspond to different means.

Example 3.1. Fix $\phi \in [0, 1)$. Conditional on type $T = t$, the latent score $(Z_n)_{n \geq 1}$ follows the stationary Gaussian AR(1):

$$Z_{n+1} = \phi Z_n + (1 - \phi)\mu_t + \varepsilon_{n+1} \quad \varepsilon_{n+1} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, 1 - \phi^2) \text{ i.i.d.}$$

so $Z_n \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu_t, 1)$ marginally. The researcher observes p -values $P_n = 1 - \Phi(Z_n)$. The simplest specialization is two types $\mathcal{T} = \{0, H\}$ with $\mathcal{H} = \{H\}$ and $\mu_0 = 0 < \mu_H$.

When $\phi = 0$, tests are independent; when ϕ is close to 1, evidence is highly persistent. A key summary of dependence is an *effective sample size rate*. In this AR(1) example, one can take $n_{\text{eff}}(\theta) = 1 - \phi$ (Appendix A.2, Lemma A.25 and Appendix A.6, Lemma A.44), meaning that among n correlated tests there are only about $(1 - \phi)n$ effectively independent draws.

Focusing on a simple two-type model $T \in \{0, H\}$, we can consider a simple “one-test significance threshold” for acceptance: accept when a p -value is below 0.05. This creates a search problem: the researcher can keep drawing specifications until she observes a significant result and then report only that single p -value. Under the null type 0, the chance of finding a significant result is governed by the number of *effectively independent* tries, which in AR(1) is on the order of $(1 - \phi)n$. This is the basic reason dependence matters throughout the paper: it controls how much cheap testing expands the set of distinct opportunities to get lucky. Our more general model below allows much richer evidence processes. The point of the AR(1) example is to keep the economic forces visible.

3.2 Types: what the editor is trying to screen

A submission has an unobserved type T in a finite set \mathcal{T} , with common prior $\mathbb{P}(T = t) = \pi_t$. Types are partitioned into high-impact and non-high:

$$\mathcal{H} \subseteq \mathcal{T} \quad \mathcal{T}_0 \equiv \mathcal{T} \setminus \mathcal{H} \quad \pi_H \equiv \mathbb{P}(T \in \mathcal{H}) \quad \pi_0 \equiv 1 - \pi_H$$

Think of \mathcal{T}_0 as collecting distinct “failure modes” that produce publishable-looking noise with different patterns. The simplest case is the two-type setting we outlined above, where $\mathcal{T} = \{0, H\}$.

3.3 Evidence, cost, and the researcher’s two choices

At each step n , the researcher privately observes one new scalar piece of evidence $P_n \in (0, 1)$ and pays a per-test cost $\gamma > 0$. She chooses:

- (1) a stopping time τ (when to stop testing), and then
- (2) a report R (what to disclose).

The report R is a finite multiset of realized p -values drawn from $\{P_1, \dots, P_\tau\}$. We will write the number of disclosed values as $|R|$ (counting multiplicity). Crucially, the editor cannot see the non-disclosed evidence. After observing the entire history $P_{1:\tau}$, the researcher may submit any sub-multiset of realized values. This is the formal way we encode “omission is unverifiable.”

Because omission is free, once the researcher stops, she will disclose whatever subset gives her the highest chance at acceptance. This means her only real strategic choice is how long to search before stopping. In our AR(1) example above, the one-test significance threshold policy incentivizes searching for a rare significant result and then reporting only that result. Cheap testing (small γ) expands the feasible search horizon and amplifies the selection problem. The limit $\gamma \downarrow 0$ captures automation: the marginal analyst time per specification falls, feasible specification menus expand, and strategic stopping becomes easier.

3.4 The editorial policy and the two levers

The journal commits ex ante to an acceptance rule δ mapping reports to acceptance probabilities: $\delta : \mathcal{R} \rightarrow [0, 1]$. After seeing R , the journal accepts with probability $\delta(R)$.

Because omission is unverifiable, any policy δ is outcome-equivalent to its disclosure envelope (the upward-closed version that depends only on the best attainable subreport at each history). We therefore restrict attention to envelope (disclosure-monotone) policies without loss; the formal reduction is in Appendix A.2.

It is helpful to separate two conceptually distinct editorial levers. The first is *standards*: acceptance depends more steeply on favorable evidence. In the running example, a one-test policy might accept if and only if the report contains a p -value below 0.05. In the two-type AR(1) picture, tightening this cutoff without forcing disclosure mainly changes how hard a null researcher must search before she gets a lucky draw.

The second is *disclosure*: acceptance is conditioned on *multiple* disclosed checks, or on a structured disclosure requirement. For instance, instead of accepting on *one* significant p -value, the editor can require the report to contain *many* qualifying values (or a pre-specified block of tests). This limits how much the researcher can benefit from only showing the single best-looking draw. In the two-type AR(1) picture, requiring many significant results turns “get lucky once” into “get lucky many times,” with the relevant exponent governed by the effective number of draws.

A central message of the paper is that these levers are not symmetric under cheap testing. Tightening standards without inducing disclosure will force researchers to exhaustively search while failing to create enough information for optimal screening. Inducing disclosure is what allows the editor to convert effort into observable evidence.

3.5 Equilibrium, throughput and false discoveries

Our equilibrium concept is straightforward. The journal commits to a policy δ ; the researcher chooses a best-response stopping time, observes evidence, and then discloses an envelope-attaining report. Best responses need not be unique, so we adopt a selected best response: among optimal




Fig. 1. Screening frontier in (q_H, q_0) space (schematic; primitives held fixed). Each curve plots attainable operating points (q_H, q_0) under a disclosure regime as standards vary: tightening standards moves down-left along a frontier. With prior (π_H, π_0) , throughput is $\rho = \pi_H q_H + \pi_0 q_0$, so a fixed-capacity (fixed-throughput) constraint $\rho = \bar{\rho}$ is a straight line (dashed). Forcing disclosure shifts the frontier downward, allowing lower q_0 (hence lower FDR) at a given throughput.

stopping times, we select the earliest Snell-envelope optimizer (Appendix A.2; see also Shiryaev [1978, Ch. 2]). All impossibility bounds hold for any best response, while achievability results are stated for the selected best response (equivalently, for the existence of an equilibrium achieving the stated operating point).

A key question is how to actually evaluate an equilibrium. We let $A \in \{0, 1\}$ be the acceptance indicator induced by the researcher’s optimal response to δ . Define the two fundamental acceptance probabilities:

$$q_H(\delta) \equiv \mathbb{P}(A = 1 \mid T \in \mathcal{H}) \quad q_0(\delta) \equiv \mathbb{P}(A = 1 \mid T \in \mathcal{T}_0)$$

We interpret q_H as recall (true-positive rate) and q_0 as the false-positive rate. These determine:

$$\rho(\delta) \equiv \mathbb{P}(A = 1) = \pi_H q_H(\delta) + \pi_0 q_0(\delta) \quad \text{FDR}(\delta) \equiv \mathbb{P}(T \in \mathcal{T}_0 \mid A = 1) = \frac{\pi_0 q_0(\delta)}{\rho(\delta)}$$

Because accepting nothing trivially drives FDR to zero, meaningful screening problems hold either throughput up or FDR down—the journal’s goal must be to either (i) achieve $\rho(\delta) \geq \bar{\rho}$ while making FDR small, or (ii) achieve $\text{FDR}(\delta) \leq \varepsilon$ while keeping ρ as large as possible. Our lower bounds are stated in terms of (q_H, q_0) , and these two “slice” interpretations are exactly what Proposition 4.2 formalizes.

Figure 1 provides a schematic view of the screening frontier and of the standard fixed-capacity interpretation in (q_H, q_0) space.

3.6 Two scales that govern screening under cheap testing

The core of the screening problem is the evidence process. Two central primitives summarize it for our purposes: one governs the universal lower bound, and the other governs achievable screening rates.

For the universal lower bound, under our standing regularity condition (Appendix A.1.1), log-likelihood information accumulates at most linearly with time: there is a finite per-test bound $D_{\text{mix}}(\theta)$ and a finite constant offset C_v . This yields the information index

$$\kappa_{\text{KL}} \equiv \frac{D_{\text{mix}}(\theta)}{\gamma}$$

Heuristically, $1/\gamma$ is the testing-capacity scale, and κ_{KL} is the total likelihood-ratio budget available per unit cost. Its role in the paper is mechanism-independent: κ_{KL} governs the best screening any

editor could possibly achieve, because it upper bounds the amount of information the editor can elicit.

For achievable screening rates, dependence matters because repeated testing is not the same as repeated independent chances to get lucky. We summarize dependence by an effective-sample-size-rate primitive $n_{\text{eff}}(\theta) \in (0, 1]$. In the AR(1) example, $n_{\text{eff}}(\theta) = 1 - \phi$ (Appendix A.2, Lemma A.25 and Appendix A.6, Lemma A.44), so among n correlated tests there are only about $(1 - \phi)n$ effectively independent draws. This yields the effective-sample-size index

$$\kappa_{\text{eff}} \equiv \frac{n_{\text{eff}}(\theta)}{\gamma}$$

Its role in the paper is constructive: κ_{eff} is the exponent that appears when we build screening rules and derive their corresponding achievable rates.

In the AR(1) case (and for many other evidence processes) these two indices are comparable, in the sense that $\kappa_{\text{KL}} \asymp \kappa_{\text{eff}}$, which enables mechanisms that attain the optimal rate-scaling.

3.7 Assumptions

The formal standing assumptions are in Appendix A.1.1. In the main text, we only use their economic content:

- (1) *Bounded informativeness*: log-likelihood information per test is uniformly bounded ($D_{\text{mix}}(\theta) < \infty$), up to a fixed offset C_v .
- (2) *Effective sample size*: dependence reduces the effective number of independent draws to a $n_{\text{eff}}(\theta)$ fraction of attempted tests.
- (3) *Absolute continuity*: likelihood ratios are well-defined across types.

In addition to these mild regularity conditions, our main results impose three additional assumptions that rule out strong informativeness created by a vanishing number of tests. The core idea behind all these assumptions is that discrimination cannot be “too easy” (or else the editor can easily screen) and it cannot be “too hard” (because then we risk the researcher not learning their type in exponential draws). The short-disclosure bound requires a selection-control condition. Even when the report is short, endogenous stopping and selective disclosure can make the report informative beyond its marginal likelihood ratios by correlating disclosure decisions with unreported evidence. Appendix A.5 formalizes this additional contribution via an “extra information from selection” term. We derive a general condition on the type geometry that suffices for selection control in Assumption A.40: roughly, a “type sandwich” in which either all high types lie on one side of all non-high types, or high types are bracketed between two non-high extremes. This condition broadly holds in one-dimensional monotone families, including for the running Gaussian AR(1) example, as we demonstrate in Appendix A.6.5.

The other two additional assumptions involve the multiplicative change in posterior odds between high and non-high types (the Bayes factor). For any subset of observed tests J , write $P_J \equiv (P_j)_{j \in J}$ and define the Bayes factor,

$$\text{BF}_J \equiv \frac{\mathbb{P}(T \in \mathcal{H} \mid P_J)}{\mathbb{P}(T \in \mathcal{T}_0 \mid P_J)} \cdot \frac{\pi_0}{\pi_H}$$

Assumption A.6 is a short-report light-tail condition. It bounds the informativeness of any small subvector: the divergence between the high law and any non-high law of the evidence restricted to J grows at most linearly in $|J|$. This is really a “no smoking guns” condition, that there are no short reports from the high-type mixture of distributions that make discrimination easy for the editor. We take this as the “interesting” case: if discrimination is easy, then so is editorial screening, but that does not seem to have high fidelity to editorial practice. That is precisely what this assumption

rules out, and it is what allows us to precisely characterize a lower bound in the number of reported p -values.

Assumption A.8 is a long-horizon analogue. Under non-high types, trajectories on which the posterior probability of being high remains nontrivial after many observations are exponentially unlikely, with an exponent proportional to $n_{\text{eff}}(\theta) n$. This is a very mild condition stating essentially that researchers must be able to determine their own type essentially with certainty in the long horizon limit (so discrimination cannot be so hard that the researcher herself cannot tell her type), making their posterior-tail term negligible on the $n \asymp 1/\gamma$ horizons used in our robustness-check constructions.

Appendix A.1 states Assumptions A.6 and A.8 formally, and Appendix A.5 formalizes the selection term and states Assumption A.38. Appendix A.1.4 gives a primitive sufficient condition for Assumptions A.6 and A.8 in contractive location AR(1) models, and Appendix A.6 verifies this condition in the Gaussian running example.

When we construct explicit mechanisms (Section 5) we add one separability condition ensuring a calibrated “witness window” exists; the Gaussian location example illustrates this transparently.

4 FRONTIER BOUNDS

This section develops two lower bounds for how well a journal’s binary accept/reject decision can discriminate high from non-high submissions. For an acceptance policy δ , let (q_H, q_0) denote the induced operating point and recall

$$\rho(\delta) = \pi_H q_H(\delta) + \pi_0 q_0(\delta) \quad \text{FDR}(\delta) = \frac{\pi_0 q_0(\delta)}{\rho(\delta)}$$

Because acceptance is binary, the natural discrimination statistic is the Bernoulli Kullback–Leibler divergence

$$K(\delta) \equiv \text{KL}(\text{Bern}(q_H(\delta)) \parallel \text{Bern}(q_0(\delta)))$$

The organizing idea is simple: once we can upper-bound $K(\delta)$, exponential limits on screening follow immediately. The rest of the section (i) converts a bound on $K(\delta)$ into two operational statements about throughput and FDR, and then (ii) bounds $K(\delta)$ itself, first universally and then under short disclosure.

4.1 A Bernoulli–KL budget implies exponential slice laws

We begin with a simple inequality for the Bernoulli KL, which will enable us to convert bounds on the KL divergence into quantitative rates for throughput and FDR control.

LEMMA 4.1. *For any $(q_H, q_0) \in (0, 1] \times (0, 1)$,*

$$\text{KL}(\text{Bern}(q_H) \parallel \text{Bern}(q_0)) \geq q_H \log \frac{q_H}{q_0} - \frac{1}{e} \quad (1)$$

PROOF. This is the standard inequality $\text{KL}(q_H \parallel q_0) \geq q_H \log(q_H/q_0) - C(q_H)$ with $C(q_H) \equiv -(1 - q_H) \log(1 - q_H) \leq 1/e$ (Lemma A.31 in Appendix A.4.1). \square

Lemma 4.1 immediately connects to the dual screening constraints we described in Section 3: holding throughput up (capacity) *versus* targeting a purity level (FDR).

PROPOSITION 4.2. *Fix a policy δ and write $K \equiv K(\delta)$.*

- (i) *Fix $\bar{\rho} \in (0, \pi_H]$ and suppose $\rho(\delta) \geq \bar{\rho}$. Then there exist constants $c, C > 0$ depending only on $(\bar{\rho}, \pi_H, \pi_0)$ such that*

$$\text{FDR}(\delta) \geq c \exp(-C \cdot K) \quad (2)$$

In particular, at any nonvanishing throughput floor, the fastest possible purification scale is exponential in the Bernoulli-KL budget.

(ii) Fix $\varepsilon \in (0, 1)$ and define

$$\eta(\varepsilon) \equiv \frac{\pi_H}{\pi_0} \cdot \frac{\varepsilon}{1-\varepsilon} \quad L(\varepsilon) \equiv \log \frac{1}{\eta(\varepsilon)} = \log \left(\frac{\pi_0(1-\varepsilon)}{\pi_H \varepsilon} \right)$$

If $\text{FDR}(\delta) \leq \varepsilon$, then

$$\rho(\delta) \leq \frac{\pi_H}{1-\varepsilon} \cdot \frac{K+1/e}{L(\varepsilon)} \quad (3)$$

Equivalently, sustaining nonvanishing throughput while driving $\varepsilon \downarrow 0$ requires K to grow at least on the order of $L(\varepsilon) \asymp \log(1/\varepsilon)$.

PROOF. For (ii), $\text{FDR} \leq \varepsilon$ is equivalent to $q_0 \leq \eta(\varepsilon)q_H$, hence $\log(q_H/q_0) \geq L(\varepsilon)$. Applying Lemma 4.1 yields $K \geq q_H L(\varepsilon) - 1/e$, so $q_H \leq (K+1/e)/L(\varepsilon)$. On the slice $\text{FDR} \leq \varepsilon$ we also have $\pi_H q_H \geq (1-\varepsilon)\rho$, hence $\rho \leq \pi_H q_H / (1-\varepsilon)$, giving (3).

For (i), combine Lemma 4.1 with the identities $\rho = \pi_H q_H + \pi_0 q_0$ and $\text{FDR} = \pi_0 q_0 / \rho$. On the event $\text{FDR} \leq 1/2$, the constraint $\rho \geq \bar{\rho}$ forces q_H to be bounded below by a constant depending only on $(\bar{\rho}, \pi_H)$, and Lemma 4.1 then yields an exponential lower bound on q_0 and hence on FDR . On the complementary event $\text{FDR} > 1/2$ we have a constant lower bound. Appendix A.4 records the algebra and constants. \square

Proposition 4.2 isolates a basic rate statement we will use repeatedly: on any nonvanishing-throughput slice, FDR can improve at most exponentially in the available Bernoulli-KL budget $K(\delta)$. Conversely, we can fix an exponentially decreasing FDR schedule and achieve constant throughput. The remaining work is to understand how large $K(\delta)$ can be under strategic stopping and selective disclosure.

4.2 Universal information budget: a mechanism-independent benchmark

The first bound is mechanism-independent: acceptance is generated from a selectively disclosed report, so the divergence between acceptance under high and non-high types cannot exceed the total likelihood-ratio information the researcher can accumulate before optimally stopping in a fashion compatible with her incentives.

THEOREM 4.3. *There exists a constant $C_v < \infty$ from Assumption A.1 such that for every policy δ with selected best-response stopping time $\tau^*(\delta)$,*

$$K(\delta) = \text{KL}(\text{Bern}(q_H(\delta)) \parallel \text{Bern}(q_0(\delta))) \leq C_v + D_{\text{mix}}(\theta) \mathbb{E}_H[\tau^*(\delta)] \leq C_v + \frac{\kappa_{\text{KL}}}{\pi_H}$$

Combined with Proposition 4.2(i), Theorem 4.3 implies an information-theoretic limit on purification at any throughput floor: if $\rho(\delta) \geq \bar{\rho} > 0$, then necessarily $\text{FDR}(\delta) \geq \exp(-O(\kappa_{\text{KL}}))$ (with constants depending on $(\bar{\rho}, \pi_H, \pi_0)$). We have a symmetric statement for an exponentially decreasing FDR schedule. This is an outer envelope: it describes what would be possible if the editor could extract essentially all of the information the researcher can generate before stopping.

Theorem 4.3 is a data-processing bound. Any policy δ induces a binary experiment $A \in \{0, 1\}$ based on a selectively disclosed report, so the informativeness of acceptance is measured by the Bernoulli KL $K(\delta)$. In Blackwell terms, acceptance is a garbling of the underlying evidence experiment, so it cannot be more informative than what the researcher can generate before stopping. Because A is a (randomized) function of the disclosed report and the report is a function of the underlying evidence history, $K(\delta)$ cannot exceed the KL divergence available in the evidence stream

itself. The stopped-process KL chain rule then bounds that divergence by a per-test KL budget times the expected stopping time, yielding a universal information per unit cost benchmark.

This result lets us isolate a key implication of cheap testing: if a policy does not induce capacity-scale search, then it cannot generate capacity-scale separation.

THEOREM 4.4. *Fix θ and consider a sequence $\gamma \downarrow 0$. Let δ^γ be any sequence of policies with selected best-response stopping times τ^γ and induced operating points (q_H^γ, q_0^γ) . Assume $\liminf_{\gamma \downarrow 0} q_H^\gamma \geq c_H > 0$ (nonvanishing recall).*

If the researcher does not run a capacity-scale search under high types,

$$\mathbb{E}_H[\tau^\gamma] = o(1/\gamma) \tag{4}$$

then the induced Bernoulli–KL budget is subcapacity: $K(\delta^\gamma) = o(\kappa_{\text{KL}})$. Consequently, false positives cannot decay at the capacity-scale exponential rate:

$$-\log q_0^\gamma = o(\kappa_{\text{KL}}) \quad \text{equivalently} \quad q_0^\gamma = \exp(-o(\kappa_{\text{KL}}))$$

In particular, on any throughput-floor slice $\rho(\delta^\gamma) \geq \bar{\rho} > 0$,

$$\text{FDR}(\delta^\gamma) \geq \exp(-o(\kappa_{\text{KL}}))$$

If instead $\mathbb{E}_H[\tau^\gamma] = O(1)$, then there exists $\underline{q}_0 > 0$ such that $q_0^\gamma \geq \underline{q}_0$ for all sufficiently small γ (and hence $\text{FDR}(\delta^\gamma) \geq \underline{\text{FDR}} > 0$).

PROOF SKETCH. By the universal KL budget (Theorem 4.3),

$$K(\delta^\gamma) \leq C_v + D_{\text{mix}}(\theta)\mathbb{E}_H[\tau^\gamma]$$

By the Bernoulli–KL lower bound (Lemma 4.1),

$$K(\delta^\gamma) \geq q_H^\gamma \log \frac{q_H^\gamma}{q_0^\gamma} - \frac{1}{e}$$

Rearranging and using $q_H^\gamma \geq c_H$ yields

$$\log \frac{q_H^\gamma}{q_0^\gamma} \leq \frac{K(\delta^\gamma) + 1/e}{q_H^\gamma}$$

so $-\log q_0^\gamma \leq O(1) + O(K(\delta^\gamma))$ uniformly for small γ .

Under (4), Theorem 4.3 gives $K(\delta^\gamma) \leq C_v + o(\kappa_{\text{KL}}) = o(\kappa_{\text{KL}})$, so $-\log q_0^\gamma = o(\kappa_{\text{KL}})$. If instead $\mathbb{E}_H[\tau^\gamma] = O(1)$, then $K(\delta^\gamma) = O(1)$ and hence q_0^γ is bounded away from 0.

Finally, on any throughput floor $\rho(\delta^\gamma) \geq \bar{\rho} > 0$ we have $\text{FDR} = \pi_0 q_0 / \rho \geq (\pi_0 / \bar{\rho}) q_0$, giving the displayed slice implication. \square

This result is central to the dynamics of publication under cheap testing. As the cost of testing goes to zero, policies that do not induce capacity-scale search cannot deliver capacity-scale separation, and any constant-scale search leads to complete information-theoretic collapse. The bound is mechanism-independent, however, so it does not distinguish tightening standards from forcing disclosure. Next, we develop a bound that depends explicitly on the length of the equilibrium report, showing that disclosure is much more powerful for editorial discrimination and characterizing how disclosure must scale in γ to approach the information-theoretic benchmark described here.

4.3 Short disclosure: the frontier collapses below the universal benchmark

The universal bound above is stated in terms of the researcher’s total information capacity, but the editor observes only the disclosed report R . To compare tightening standards with increasing disclosure, we therefore need a bound that explicitly accounts for the length of what is disclosed. The key conclusion is that if disclosure is short, then the disclosed coordinates cannot transmit κ_{eff} -scale separation.

One subtlety is that the report can be informative not only through the likelihood ratio of the disclosed p -values, but also through the researcher’s stopping and disclosure decisions. For example, if a researcher stops only when the unreported evidence history looks unusually favorable, then the event “the report arrived now” can shift the editor’s posterior even when the report itself is short. Appendix A.5 formalizes this additional contribution as an “extra information from selection” term and imposes Assumption A.38, which requires it to be negligible on the κ_{eff} scale along the equilibrium sequence.

THEOREM 4.5. *Fix θ with $n_{\text{eff}}(\theta) > 0$ and consider $\gamma \downarrow 0$. Let δ^γ be any sequence of policies and let (q_H^γ, q_0^γ) be the induced operating points under the selected best response.*

Assume short disclosure: under the selected best response,

$$|R| \leq m(\gamma) \quad \text{a.s.} \quad m(\gamma) = o(1/\gamma)$$

Maintain Assumption A.6 for some $\alpha > 1$, and assume the extra information from selection is controlled as in Assumption A.38 (Appendix A.5).

Then, exponential FDR control at the effective-sample-size scale is impossible at nonvanishing recall: for every $c_H > 0$, if $\liminf_{\gamma \downarrow 0} q_H^\gamma \geq c_H$ then

$$-\log q_0^\gamma = o(\kappa_{\text{eff}}) \quad \text{equivalently} \quad q_0^\gamma = \exp(-o(\kappa_{\text{eff}}))$$

This result demonstrates that without forcing disclosure, tightening standards cannot translate the induced search race into observable discrimination at the effective-sample-size scale. In particular, under constant disclosure ($|R| \leq m_0$ a.s. for fixed m_0), false positives cannot decay at any fixed exponential rate $\exp(-c \cdot \kappa_{\text{eff}})$ at nonvanishing recall.

To summarize: the universal KL constraint gives an outer envelope in terms of the researcher’s total information capacity, while the short-disclosure bound shows that short reports cannot transmit comparable discrimination at the effective-sample-size scale. Section 5 constructs robustness-check rules with $m = \Theta(1/\gamma)$ that force disclosure at the natural testing-capacity scale and recover $\exp(-\Omega(\kappa_{\text{eff}}))$ screening; under comparability, this is optimal up to constants in the exponent.

5 A ROBUSTNESS CHECK MECHANISM

Section 4 showed that binary screening is governed by a single bottleneck: how much information the editor can extract from what is disclosed. In particular, absent long disclosure, tightening standards alone cannot deliver exponential purification on the effective-sample-size scale (Theorem 4.5). We consider two screening objectives. Under a throughput floor, the journal seeks policies with $\rho(\delta) \geq \underline{\rho}$ that minimize $\text{FDR}(\delta)$. Under an FDR target, it seeks policies with $\text{FDR}(\delta) \leq \varepsilon$ that maximize throughput $\rho(\delta)$. This section shows that a simple and transparent policy class achieves the optimal exponential rate in both cases. If the journal also faces a hard capacity constraint $\rho(\delta) \leq \bar{\rho}$, it can in addition ration among qualifiers; because rationing changes researchers’ incentives, we treat capacity clearing formally in Appendix A.3.4 and keep the main-text mechanism analysis focused on screening.

Fix a Borel set $B \subset (0, 1)$, interpreted as the editor’s preannounced evidentiary window for a single diagnostic. In our running two-type AR(1) example, we let $B = (0, 0.05)$. A disclosed check is significant if its p -value lies in B . Fix an integer $m \geq 1$.

Definition 5.1. Given a report R , let $N_B(R)$ be the number of disclosed significant results with respect to the significance region B :

$$N_B(R) \equiv \sum_{p \in R} \mathbf{1}\{p \in B\}$$

The robustness-check rule $\delta_{B,m}$ accepts if and only if the report contains at least m significant results:

$$\delta_{B,m}(R) \equiv \mathbf{1}\{N_B(R) \geq m\}$$

This policy class isolates the screening design: (B, m) determines what it means to qualify and forces disclosure at a prescribed scale.

Assumption A.2 provides a calibrated witness window B_0 on which high-impact types have a uniform likelihood-ratio advantage over every non-high type. Economically, B_0 is a region where seeing a significant result is genuinely diagnostic. In the two-type Gaussian case, B_0 can be any window of the form $(0, c)$, with $c < 1$. We can choose witness regions under more general, type structures by letting B be a “window” of z -scores centered around the high-types (see Lemma A.45).

Define the qualification event $Q \equiv \{N_{B_0}(R) \geq m\}$. Under $\delta_{B_0,m}$, acceptance occurs if and only if Q , so (q_H, q_0) are exactly the qualification probabilities:

$$q_H(\delta_{B_0,m}) = \mathbb{P}(Q \mid T \in \mathcal{H}) \quad q_0(\delta_{B_0,m}) = \mathbb{P}(Q \mid T \in \mathcal{T}_0)$$

THEOREM 5.2. *Maintain the standing assumptions (Appendix A.1.1), Assumption A.8, and suppose $n_{\text{eff}}(\theta) > 0$. Let B_0 be the witness window from Assumption A.2. Fix a constant c satisfying*

$$\frac{e^{-\ell_0}}{1 - e^{-\ell_0}} < c < p_H(B_0)$$

where $(\ell_0, p_H(B_0))$ are from Assumption A.2. Set

$$m(\gamma) \equiv \left\lceil \frac{c}{\gamma} \right\rceil$$

Then there exist constants $c_0 > 0$ and $c_H \in (0, 1]$ such that for all sufficiently small γ :

$$q_0(\delta_{B_0,m(\gamma)}) \leq \exp(-c_0 \kappa_{\text{eff}}) \quad q_H(\delta_{B_0,m(\gamma)}) \geq c_H$$

Consequently, $\text{FDR}(\delta_{B_0,m(\gamma)}) = \exp(-\Omega(\kappa_{\text{eff}}))$ and throughput is nonvanishing.

The proof controls the non-high qualification probability by decomposing it into two terms: a posterior-tail term, which captures histories on which a non-high submission nevertheless induces a high posterior belief, and a count-deviation term, which captures histories on which the non-high evidence stream produces at least m significant results in B_0 . Assumption A.8 controls the posterior-tail term, while the standing concentration bound controls the count-deviation term.

The main idea is that requiring $m(\gamma) = \Theta(1/\gamma)$ significant results in B_0 requires an upward deviation in the significant-result count. Under dependence, the relevant exponent is the number of effective draws, $n_{\text{eff}}(\theta) n$, so with $n \asymp 1/\gamma$ the deviation probability is exponentially small on the κ_{eff} scale. Appendix A.3 gives the formal argument and constants.

Theorem 5.2 delivers a concrete screening frontier point: it keeps recall bounded away from 0 while driving false positives down at rate $\exp(-\Omega(\kappa_{\text{eff}}))$. The constant in the exponent depends on the design choice c (and on the calibrated window B_0): larger c asks for more corroborating significant results and improves screening, but eventually violates feasibility under high types.

The universal KL constraint implies that, at any nonvanishing throughput floor, FDR cannot decay faster than $\exp(-O(\kappa_{\text{KL}}))$ (Proposition 4.2 combined with Theorem 4.3). Under comparability, $\kappa_{\text{KL}} = \Theta(\kappa_{\text{eff}})$, the achievability bound above therefore matches the information-theoretic envelope up to constants in the exponent.

COROLLARY 5.3. *Assume $D_{\text{mix}}(\theta) \asymp n_{\text{eff}}(\theta)$ so that $\kappa_{\text{KL}} = \Theta(\kappa_{\text{eff}})$. Then robustness-check policies with $m(\gamma) = \Theta(1/\gamma)$ attain the optimal purification scale on both slices:*

- (i) *on any nonvanishing-throughput slice, $\text{FDR} = \exp(-\Theta(\kappa_{\text{KL}}))$ is achievable and unimprovable up to constants in the exponent;*
- (ii) *on the fixed-FDR slice, sustaining nonvanishing throughput requires $\log(1/\varepsilon) = O(\kappa_{\text{KL}})$; conversely, there exists $c_\star > 0$ such that any target sequence satisfying $\log(1/\varepsilon) \leq c_\star \kappa_{\text{KL}}$ is attainable by an appropriate choice of $m(\gamma) = \Theta(1/\gamma)$ without collapsing throughput.*

6 SPECIFICATION SURFACES AND EMPIRICAL CALIBRATION

This section operationalizes the paper’s central empirical construct: the specification surface. A specification surface is a pre-run, paper-specific commitment that states what claim is being audited and what universe of estimand-preserving variants counts as admissible evidence about that claim. It is the empirical counterpart of the ex ante commitment object in the theory. We use this object in two steps. First, we demonstrate an auditable agentic workflow that reproduces published AEA-journal papers and replications of those papers at a fraction of the human-analyst cost reported in Brodeur et al. [2024] (currently an Institute for Replication working paper, henceforth I4R) and validate on a paired-replication sample of $n = 40$ papers (Sample A). Second, we use the resulting surface-defined specification sets from a broader sample of $n = 103$ recent AEA papers (Sample B) to estimate the primitives that govern screening when science is cheap: a three-type mixture over hypothesis quality, an effective dependence parameter, and a cost index. These ingredients deliver counterfactual operating points for editorial screening policies.

Implementation details, estimation procedures, and robustness checks are deferred to Appendix B. Here, we define the empirical objects and summarize the main validation and estimation results.

6.1 Specification surfaces and audited execution

A central question in any replication exercise is what, exactly, is being replicated. In experimental contexts, large-scale efforts distinguish “exact” replications from “conceptual” replications [Crandall and Sherman, 2016]: the latter vary implementation details while preserving the outcome concept, treatment concept, and intended estimand. For observational studies, the relevant object is closer to disciplined reanalysis. We do not bring in new data to test the same hypothesis in a new environment. Instead, we treat the paper’s replication package as a fixed computational object and ask whether its central claim is stable across defensible choices that preserve the underlying claim object. This is consistent with the Institute for Replication’s large-scale reanalysis protocol [Brodeur et al., 2024], which targets a standardized baseline and a structured menu of robustness checks.

We center that exercise on a single object: a per-paper specification surface constructed and reviewed before any models are run. The surface defines the baseline claim objects, records the paper’s canonical baseline specifications, and commits ex ante to the executable universe of estimand-preserving variants, together with explicit constraints, budgets, and a canonical inference choice for estimate rows. It is deliberately conservative. Keyed to the paper’s revealed search space, it captures the minimum set of forks a reader can verify from the paper itself, while keeping any protocol-added stress tests explicit and separable.

Once the surface is fixed, execution is mechanical. A runner executes only the specifications admitted by the surface and writes standardized, contract-checked outputs, while recording the




Fig. 2. Distributions of the evidence index $|t|$ for hypotheses (Sample A, verified-comparable subset). Gray histogram: original studies. Blue, left panel: I4R reanalyses. Red, center panel: automated reproductions (verified). Green, right panel: matched reproductions (within-paper specification matched to I4R reanalysis target).

surface hash and the software environment alongside the full coefficient vector. A post-run verifier then audits those realized outputs without running new regressions, flags invalid or drifted rows, and produces a conservative verified core used in all downstream estimation. Appendix B.1 provides the full contracts and implementation details.

6.2 Validation against a large scale replication effort

Our primary validation benchmark is the Institute for Replication’s (I4R) reanalysis protocol in Brodeur et al. [2024]. For each paper i in their AEA-journal sample, we target the same central hypothesis and run the automated workflow in Section 6.1 on the paper’s public replication package.¹ This yields an automated baseline reproduction with focal-coefficient t -statistic t_i^{auto} , directly comparable to the I4R benchmark t_i^{I4R} .

Because the theory’s evidence index is the absolute t -statistic, we validate using $|t|$. For hypothesis i , let t_i^{orig} denote the published t -statistic, t_i^{I4R} the I4R reanalysis, and t_i^{auto} our automated reproduction. We assess (i) distributional agreement of $|t^{\text{auto}}|$ with $|t^{\text{I4R}}|$ (Figure 2) and (ii) claim-by-claim agreement statistics (Appendix B.2).

We study 39 of the 41 AEA-journal papers from Brodeur et al. [2024].² For each paper we ingest the public replication package, target the I4R central hypothesis, and produce a paired hypothesis-level object: the benchmark t -statistic t_i^{I4R} and our reproduced baseline t -statistic t_i^{auto} .

Figure 2 reports the central distributional comparison. We plot the distribution of the evidence index $|t|$ for original published hypotheses, I4R reanalyses, and automated baseline reproductions, restricting to the verified-comparable subset of Sample A. We also plot a “matched reproduction” distribution, constructed by selecting (within each paper) the surface-approved specification that is closest to the I4R reanalysis target.

Two features matter. First, the automated distribution closely tracks the I4R benchmark distribution, supporting the claim that the workflow reproduces canonical reanalysis objects. Second, the

¹We used Anthropic’s Claude Opus 4.5 and Opus 4.6 through the Claude Code CLI. Any frontier model with agentic coding capabilities and access to the user’s computer would suffice, though naturally results would vary.

²We exclude Guerron-Quintana et al. [2023], a structural macroeconomics paper whose hypothesis is incompatible with the specification-search framework, and Cohen and Dechezleprêtre [2022], who used weather data from the Mexican national meteorological database that is available only on request.

gap between original and replicated distributions provides a compact summary of the selection and instability forces motivating the model: the original distribution reflects the equilibrium output of editorial and researcher incentives, while the replicated distributions approximate the underlying evidence conditional on a standardized analysis.

We emphasize that the I4R reanalysis is not ground truth—it reflects standardized execution choices that may differ from the original paper. We interpret it as a disciplined reference point under a transparent protocol. Importantly, the same automated system that executes our broader surface-defined specification universes also reproduces the I4R target specification when constrained to do so; this is the sense in which Figure 2 validates that the automated workflow is operating on the intended empirical object rather than producing arbitrary variation.

6.3 Estimating screening primitives from surface-defined specification sets

Having validated the automated workflow against I4R at the hypothesis level, we use the resulting surface-defined specification sets to estimate the evidence and dependence primitives that govern screening when testing is cheap. We then use these estimates to evaluate counterfactual disclosure requirements under a cost shift.

6.3.1 Replication artifacts and sample construction. For each paper, the pipeline produces (i) a baseline reproduction, (ii) a standardized specification-level table with one row per robustness run, and (iii) a verification map labeling the estimand-preserving core. These machine-readable artifacts let us fit the model to a large set of comparable specification traversals.

We run automated specification search on a random sample of all papers for which we can ingest the public replication package and construct and execute a standardized specification surface (103 papers total, including the I4R sample). For each paper i we obtain a set of surface-approved specifications $s = 1, \dots, S_i$ with a corresponding evidence index $|t_{is}|$ and verification labels that identify the estimand-preserving core. Sample B provides power for estimating the three-type mixture and dependence primitives.

6.3.2 A three-type model of empirical evidence. To map the data to the model primitives, we adopt a three-type statistical representation aligned with the theory. Let $|t_{is}|$ denote the absolute t -statistic under harmonized inference for specification (i, s) , so that $|t| = 0$ is a null and $|t| \approx 1.96$ corresponds to $p = 0.05$ (two-sided, normal approximation).

Types correspond to (i) null relationships (N), (ii) moderate relationships that are stable across defensible analyses but close to conventional thresholds (M), and (iii) extreme relationships that generate very large evidence indices (E). The goal is not to claim that any given paper is literally generated by a three-component mixture, but rather to pin down a prior over types and a disciplined mapping from observed evidence indices to screening primitives.

We model $|t|$ using a three-component mixture of folded Gaussians:

$$|t_{is}| \equiv \sum_{k \in \{N, M, E\}} \pi_k \cdot |X_k| \quad \text{for } X_k \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu_k, 1) \forall k \in \{N, M, E\}$$

so that $|t|$ is supported on $[0, \infty)$ by construction. The folded-normal family is natural here: if the latent test statistic is $X \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu_k, 1)$ and we observe only the absolute value, the induced density on $|X|$ is exactly the folded normal. Fixing $\sigma_k = 1$ for all components gives the model a unit-variance interpretation consistent with a well-calibrated t -statistic, and leaves $(\pi_k, \mu_k)_{k \in \{N, M, E\}}$ as the free parameters. Estimation is by maximum likelihood with 50 random initializations on the verified-core baseline specifications restricted to $|t| \leq 10$; components are labeled by sorting fitted means (See Appendix B.3 for details). The fitted components provide two objects used in




Fig. 3. Three-type evidence model: fitted folded-Gaussian mixture on the evidence index $|t|$ (Sample B, verified-core baseline specifications, $|t| \leq 10$). Component densities and total mixture density are overlaid on the histogram.

the counterfactuals: an estimated prior $(\hat{\pi}_N, \hat{\pi}_M, \hat{\pi}_E)$ and an implied diagnostic region on the index scale.

Figure 3 overlays the fitted mixture densities on the Sample B histogram of baseline specification $|t|$ values. The three-component structure captures the multimodality of the evidence distribution: a mass near zero (null hypotheses), a concentration around conventional significance thresholds (moderate), and a diffuse upper tail (extreme). Appendix B.3 reports parameter estimates, goodness-of-fit diagnostics (PP and QQ plots), model selection across $K \in \{2, 3, 4\}$ via AIC and BIC, robustness to alternative distributional families (truncated normal on $|t|$) and trimming.

The null component ($\hat{\mu}_N \approx 1.6$, comprising roughly 62% of specifications) has a latent mean below conventional significance, so that most realizations of $|t|$ from this type fall short of the 1.96 threshold. The moderate component ($\hat{\mu}_M \approx 3.9$, roughly 31% of specifications) concentrates above conventional significance thresholds; these are papers with real effects that reliably pass the $p = 0.05$ boundary but remain sensitive to the number of required passes. The extreme component ($\hat{\mu}_E \approx 7.9$, roughly 8% of specifications) captures relationships whose evidence indices are so large that they are essentially unchallenged by any reasonable reanalysis. Neither label carries a normative valence: a moderate paper may study an important effect that happens to be hard to detect, while an extreme paper may exploit a mechanical relationship. What matters for the counterfactual is the screening distinction—moderate-type papers are the ones whose qualification status responds to the number of required passes, whereas null and extreme types are largely inframarginal.

6.3.3 Dependence and effective sample size. The theory emphasizes that when testing is cheap, the screening-relevant quantity is not the number of attempted specifications but the number of effectively independent tests. We estimate an effective dependence primitive using an AR(1) model along the specification traversal from Sample B. Within each baseline group g with $n_g \geq 3$ specifications, we order the specifications according to a chosen ordering and regress $|t_{g,s+1}|$ on $|t_{g,s}|$ to obtain a group-level persistence coefficient $\hat{\phi}_g$. The pooled estimate is a weighted average across groups, with weights proportional to n_g .

Because the AR(1) estimate depends on how specifications are ordered, we estimate $\hat{\phi}$ under six orderings (document order, lexicographic path, breadth-first, depth-first, by verification category, and a random null) and select the ordering with the highest pooled R^2 (excluding the random null)

as the preferred estimate. The preferred ordering (by verification category) yields $\hat{\phi} = 0.151$. We define the effective-independence parameter $\widehat{\Lambda} \equiv 1 - \hat{\phi} = 0.849$. This maps directly to the Gaussian AR(1) example in Section 3, where $n_{\text{eff}}(\phi) = 1 - \phi$. Appendix B.4 reports all orderings with bootstrap confidence intervals and R^2 values, and all orderings enter the counterfactual sensitivity analysis.

6.3.4 Cost ratios and disclosure scale. Our counterfactuals vary only the marginal per-specification testing cost γ , holding fixed the evidence environment and dependence estimated from these surface-defined specification sets. The level of γ is not directly observed: omitted exploration is unreported, and replication time mixes large fixed costs (learning a codebase, debugging environments, resolving data-path and version issues) with the incremental cost of running additional specifications. We therefore discipline the cost shift with two observable inputs that map cleanly to the model.

The first is the cost ratio $\lambda \equiv \gamma^{\text{new}}/\gamma^{\text{old}}$, calibrated using a scope-aligned timing comparison between (i) the wall-clock time of our automated workflow to execute a standardized baseline replication object (including validation) and (ii) a conservative I4R benchmark. Under the I4R protocol, the average replication time was 13 days; to stay conservative we benchmark against the fastest completed I4R reanalysis reported in Brodeur et al. [2024], which was five working days (40 hours). In our automated workflow, the mean wall-clock time to complete the analogous baseline reproduction object is 14 minutes (across 44 successfully completed papers). This yields our baseline $\lambda = 1/172$.³

The second input is the pre-shift disclosure scale m^{old} , measured from the number of specifications reported by authors in the papers we study. The median of that set is 50, which we take as the baseline pre-automation disclosure requirement (Appendix B reports alternatives). This is the empirical counterpart of the disclosure requirement in the mechanism: it captures what editors can condition on under unverifiable omission, even if additional private exploration occurred off the record.

6.3.5 Counterfactual screening under a cost shift. We connect the estimated primitives to the model’s counterfactuals, holding the evidence environment fixed and varying only the marginal testing cost γ .

Let γ^{old} denote the pre-automation per-test cost and $\gamma^{\text{new}} = \lambda \gamma^{\text{old}}$ the post-automation cost. Because equilibrium horizons scale like $1/\gamma$, a reduction in γ increases the feasible disclosure scale and makes short-disclosure rules more vulnerable, exactly as in Sections 4–5.

We evaluate robustness-check rules as studied in Section 5. We fix the evidence window at $B = [1.96, \infty)$ on the $|t|$ scale, so that a specification “passes” if its absolute t -statistic exceeds the conventional significance threshold.⁴ For a required number of passes m , the type- k qualification probability is $Q_k(m) = \Pr(\text{Bin}(N_{\text{eff}}, p_k(B)) \geq m)$, where $N_{\text{eff}} \approx \widehat{\Lambda} n$ and $p_k(B) = F_k(z_h) - F_k(z_\ell)$. Under a fixed-capacity interpretation with throughput target $\bar{\rho}$, the editor accepts qualifying papers with probability $a = \bar{\rho}/\bar{Q}$ (when feasible). We define the false discovery rate with respect to the null type only: $\text{FDR}(m) = \pi_N Q_N(m)/\bar{Q}(m)$ treating extreme-type papers as true positives for the purpose of screening.

Figure 4 reports the headline comparison. We calibrate the old regime so that $m^{\text{old}} = 50$ qualifying robustness checks achieve a false discovery rate of exactly 0.05, then ask what disclosure is required after the cost shift. Panel A shows the disclosure multiplier $m^{\text{new}}/m^{\text{old}}$ for each baseline requirement: at $m^{\text{old}} = 50$ (highlighted), the new regime requires $m^{\text{new}} = 6,994$ —roughly a 140-fold increase. The

³In the most conservative alternative specification, we assume replicators spent two of those five days purely understanding the codebase and compare 14 minutes to 24 working hours, yielding $\lambda = 1/103$. Additional specifications and assumptions are reported in Appendix B.5; the qualitative results do not change.

⁴Results are essentially unchanged when we impose a finite upper bound (e.g. $B = [1.96, 10]$ or $[1.96, 15]$), because the extreme component’s pass probability is already near unity. Alternative specifications of B are reported in Appendix B.5.




Fig. 4. Counterfactual screening under a cost shift ($\lambda \approx 1/172$), calibrated so that $m^{\text{old}} = 50$ achieves $\text{FDR} = 0.05$ in the old regime. Panel A: disclosure multiplier $m^{\text{new}}/m^{\text{old}}$ for each baseline requirement; the highlighted bar at $m^{\text{old}} = 50$ shows a 140-fold increase. Panel B: FDR heatmap over m and cost ratio λ , zoomed around the baseline calibration point; star marks ($m^{\text{new}} = 6,994$, $\lambda \approx 1/172$).

multiplier grows with the baseline, approaching $1/\lambda \approx 172$ for large m^{old} . Panel B displays the implied FDR as a heatmap over m and the cost ratio λ , zoomed around the baseline calibration point ($m = 6,994$, $\lambda \approx 1/172$, marked by a star). The steep gradient shows that the FDR is sensitive to small changes in the required number of passes near the calibration point. Appendix B.5 reports the full disclosure-scaling schedule for different parameterizations of m^{old} and a sensitivity grid over λ , evidence windows, and mixture model variants.

7 DISCUSSION

Science has become cheap. This paper asks how editorial screening must adapt. In our commitment model, researchers sequentially search over a correlated specification space at per-test cost γ , stop strategically, and selectively disclose results; the editor observes only the disclosed report and applies an accept/reject policy. We characterize the attainable FDR–throughput frontier, prove a mechanism-independent information bound governed by a likelihood-ratio budget, and show a sharp asymmetry between tightening standards and forcing disclosure. In the cheap-testing limit, short equilibrium reports cannot transmit capacity-scale discrimination (the frontier collapses under sublinear disclosure), while simple robustness-check rules that force disclosure to scale with testing capacity recover exponential screening at a dependence-adjusted effective-sample-size rate.

Our empirical calibration makes the stakes of that asymmetry clear. Under conservative assumptions, we estimate a large cost shift from automation ($\lambda \approx 1/172$) and a substantial effective-independence rate in the resulting surface-defined specification sets ($\hat{\Delta} \approx 0.849$). When we ask what it would take to hold fixed a conventional screening target after this cost shift, the answer is on the order of 7,000 qualifying robustness checks (Figure 4). Taken literally, this is a daunting number: no editor can read that many checks, no author can narrate them, and no referee process can adjudicate them. Furthermore, there likely are not 7,000 reasonable specifications for a given study on a given dataset. Our point is not that journals should start demanding thousands of robustness tables. Rather, once testing capacity explodes, the unit of evidence itself has to change: rather than a small set of specifications and a set of robustness checks around that core narrative, the object of study must become the audited universe of specifications defined in advance.

Our empirical pipeline implements this shift by separating commitment from execution. For each baseline claim object, we construct and audit a pre-run specification surface that commits to an

executable universe of estimand-preserving variants together with explicit constraints, budgets, and a canonical inference choice. The surface is keyed to the paper’s revealed search space: the minimum set of forks a reader can confirm the authors had to navigate given what is disclosed in the main text and interpreted appendices. This conservative revealed-forks construction makes the specification surface the object the researcher plausibly optimized over, while keeping any protocol-added stress tests explicit and separable. Execution is then surface-driven, with contracted outputs and post-run verification yielding a conservative verified core used in estimation. This operationalization is closely related to the garden-of-forking-paths and multiverse perspectives, which emphasize that robustness is a property of the mapping from defensible choices to estimates rather than of a single *ex post* selected specification [Gelman and Loken, 2013, Kasy, 2021, Simonsohn et al., 2020, Steegen et al., 2016].

It may seem natural to move to requiring researchers to register pre-analysis plans [Banerjee et al., 2020, Kasy and Spiess, 2024, Olken, 2015]. This would not address the core issue of cheap specification search for observational studies – a large portion of observational studies use public data sources, and researchers could simply search for specifications before submitting their pre-analysis plans. Even if one expected all researchers to act in good faith, preregistration under cheap testing would only shift the level at which results are selectively reported from the researcher level to the field level, due to selective publication of significant findings [Gelman and Loken, 2013, Rosenthal, 1979]. Rather than restricting researchers further and further, the clearest path forward is to reconsider the object of interpretation itself.

Historically, the attraction of point estimates, single *t*-statistics, and a small handful of robustness tables was as much computational as statistical: in a world where each additional specification imposed real human cost, it was infeasible to enumerate the multiverse, so the researcher relied on sufficient statistics as a summary of a much larger set of choices. Cheap computation reverses that logic. When authors can search widely at low marginal cost, a single reported effect is precisely the object most distorted by endogenous exploration, stopping, and omission; it is the least reliable summary of the underlying evidentiary environment. Editors, therefore, should ask for evidence objects whose dimension grows with the feasible search space but whose interpretation is stable.

This presents a daunting interpretive challenge, but a burgeoning literature has begun to emerge examining exactly these questions. Specification-curve and multiverse analysis formalize the idea that what matters is the mapping from defensible choices of reasonable specifications and reasoned arguments about the effects across specification of particular choices (control inclusion/exclusion, functional forms, coding strategies) to estimates, rather than the estimates in the neighborhood of a single handpicked specification [Gelman and Loken, 2013, Simonsohn et al., 2020, Steegen et al., 2016, Young and Holsteen, 2017]. Our results give these practices a mechanism-design rationale: when omission is unverifiable, pointwise testing is strategically fragile, while curve-level disclosure is an incentive instrument.

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APPENDIX ROADMAP

The theoretical appendices (Appendix A) collect the technical constructions and proofs referenced in the main text. Appendix A.1 states standing assumptions, defines the primitives ($D_{\text{mix}}, n_{\text{eff}}$) and the report space, and gives a sufficient condition for the Bayes-factor tail assumptions in contractive location AR(1) models. Appendix A.2 develops envelope reduction, optimal-stopping tools, and reusable truncation inequalities. Appendix A.3 presents the robustness-check mechanism and proves Theorem 5.2. Appendix A.4 collects auxiliary inequalities and proves Theorem 4.3. Appendix A.5 develops the short-report divergence budget, isolates the information-from-selection term, and proves Theorem 4.5 and Corollary A.43. Appendix A.6 provides Gaussian-specific calculations, including posterior-tail control for robustness checks and verification routes for the AR(1) sufficient condition and the short-report selection-control bound. Appendix A.7 gives modular generalizations of the lower bound, short-report bound, and robustness-check achievability under weaker conditions.

The empirical appendix (Appendix B) documents the replication artifacts, verification protocol, and estimation procedures supporting Section 6. Appendix B.1 describes the surface-driven replication and specification-search pipeline, including typing and mechanical validation. Appendix B.2 defines the samples, inference harmonization, and validation statistics. Appendix B.3 reports estimation and diagnostics for the three-type evidence model. Appendix B.4 estimates within-paper dependence. Appendix B.5 reports the counterfactual disclosure-scaling analysis and robustness checks.

We use large language models as part of the replication-and-verification workflow described in Appendix B.1, primarily to read heterogeneous replication packages, draft and edit runner scripts, and produce structured configuration artifacts. We also used language models for proofreading, proof-checking, and general editing assistance during the development of the manuscript.

A THEORETICAL APPENDIX

A.1 Environment assumptions and primitives

This subsection states the regularity assumptions and primitives used in Sections 3 and 4, and fixes the report-space measurability conventions used throughout Appendix A.2 and Appendix A.5.

A.1.1 Formal standing assumptions and primitives. This appendix collects the full regularity conditions that underlie the main-text primitives. In the main text we emphasize the economic content (bounded informativeness, effective sample size, and no perfect revelation) and use the resulting indices κ_{KL} and κ_{eff} .

We briefly restate the environment and notation used throughout the paper. A submission has an unobserved type T in a finite set \mathcal{T} , with prior $\mathbb{P}(T = t) = \pi_t$. Types are partitioned into high-impact and non-high,

$$\mathcal{H} \subseteq \mathcal{T} \quad \mathcal{T}_0 \equiv \mathcal{T} \setminus \mathcal{H} \quad \pi_H \equiv \mathbb{P}(T \in \mathcal{H}), \quad \pi_0 \equiv 1 - \pi_H$$

and we write $\mathbb{P}_H(\cdot)$ and $\mathbb{P}_0(\cdot)$ for laws conditional on $T \in \mathcal{H}$ and $T \in \mathcal{T}_0$ respectively.

Assumption A.1. Fix θ . There is a Polish state space X , a measurable map $p : X \rightarrow (0, 1)$, and for each type $t \in \mathcal{T}$ a Markov kernel K_t^θ on X with stationary distribution ν_t such that

- (i) Conditional on $T = t$, the latent chain $(X_n)_{n \geq 1}$ is stationary with law ν_t and transition kernel K_t^θ , and for every type t , $\nu_t \circ p^{-1}$ is atomless on $(0, 1)$
- (ii) The observed p -values satisfy $P_n = p(X_n)$ for all n

- (iii) There exists $n_{\text{eff}}(\theta) \in (0, 1]$ and a universal constant $C_H > 0$ such that for every type $t \in \mathcal{T}$, every Borel set $B \subset (0, 1)$, every $n \geq 1$, and every $\varepsilon \in (0, 1)$,

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{P}_t\left(\frac{1}{n}S_n(B) \geq p_t(B) + \varepsilon\right) &\leq \exp(-C_H n_{\text{eff}}(\theta) n \varepsilon^2) \\ \mathbb{P}_t\left(\frac{1}{n}S_n(B) \leq p_t(B) - \varepsilon\right) &\leq \exp(-C_H n_{\text{eff}}(\theta) n \varepsilon^2)\end{aligned}$$

where $p_t(B) \equiv \mathbb{P}_t(P_1 \in B)$ and $S_n(B) \equiv \sum_{k=1}^n \mathbf{1}\{P_k \in B\}$.

- (iv) There exists a sigma-finite dominating measure λ such that $\nu_t \ll \lambda$ and $K_t^\theta(x, \cdot) \ll \lambda$ for all x
(v) For each high type $t_H \in \mathcal{H}$ and non-high type $t_0 \in \mathcal{T}_0$, we have $K_{t_H}^\theta(x, \cdot) \ll K_{t_0}^\theta(x, \cdot)$ for all x and $\nu_{t_H} \ll \nu_{t_0}$
(vi) Define the one-step KL envelope from a high type to a non-high type by

$$D(t_H \rightarrow t_0; \theta) \equiv \sup_{x \in X} \text{KL}\left(K_{t_H}^\theta(x, \cdot) \parallel K_{t_0}^\theta(x, \cdot)\right).$$

Let μ_0 denote the conditional law of T given $T \in \mathcal{T}_0$, and define

$$D_{\text{mix}}(\theta) \equiv \max_{t_H \in \mathcal{H}} \int D(t_H \rightarrow t_0; \theta) \mu_0(dt_0) < \infty. \quad (5)$$

Assume also there exists $C_\nu < \infty$ such that

$$\sup_{t_H \in \mathcal{H}} \sup_{t_0 \in \mathcal{T}_0} \text{KL}(\nu_{t_H} \parallel \nu_{t_0}) \leq C_\nu. \quad (6)$$

Stationarity in Assumption A.1(i) is a normalization. If the initial evidence state is not stationary, one can enlarge the type space \mathcal{T} to incorporate a finite set of initial conditions or allow a finite burn-in; this affects only additive constants (such as C_ν) and does not change the scaling results.

Assumption A.1(iii) is stated directly in terms of a concentration exponent that can be interpreted as an *effective number of independent draws*. It can be verified via many tools; for example, if each latent chain is reversible with a type-uniform L^2 spectral gap lower bound, then the standard spectral-gap concentration inequality (Appendix A.2, Lemma A.25) implies (iii) (up to constants).

We use Assumption A.1(iii) only for indicator functions of evidence windows, i.e. for $f = \mathbf{1}\{P \in B\}$.

Assumption A.2. Maintain Assumption A.1. There exist a Borel set $B_0 \subset (0, 1)$ and constants $\ell_0 > 0$ and $p_H(B_0) \in (0, 1]$ such that:

- (i) For every non-high type $t \in \mathcal{T}_0$,

$$\frac{d\mathcal{L}_H(P_1)}{d\mathcal{L}_t(P_1)}(p) \geq e^{\ell_0} \quad \text{for } \mathcal{L}_t(P_1)\text{-a.e. } p \in B_0$$

- (ii) For every high-impact type $t \in \mathcal{H}$,

$$\mathbb{P}_t(P_1 \in B_0) \geq p_H(B_0)$$

Definition A.3. Fix a strictly monotone continuous bijection $\psi : (0, 1) \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ and define the singleton index by

$$Z_n \equiv \psi(P_n)$$

We adopt the convention that larger Z_n corresponds to more favorable evidence; for p -values this means ψ is decreasing. In Example 3.1 we take $\psi(p) = \Phi^{-1}(1 - p)$ so that Z_n is the usual z-score.

Definition A.4. Maintain the standing regularity condition (Appendix A.1.1). Let $\mathcal{L}_H(P_1)$ and $\mathcal{L}_0(P_1)$ denote the induced one-test laws of the singleton report under $\mathbb{P}(\cdot \mid T \in \mathcal{H})$ and $\mathbb{P}(\cdot \mid T \in \mathcal{T}_0)$. By Assumption A.1(v) and finiteness of \mathcal{T}_0 , we have $\mathcal{L}_H(P_1) \ll \mathcal{L}_0(P_1)$, so the Radon–Nikodym derivative below is well-defined. Let

$$\ell(p) \equiv \log \left(\frac{d\mathcal{L}_H(P_1)}{d\mathcal{L}_0(P_1)}(p) \right)$$

denote a version of the singleton log-likelihood ratio. For $c \in \mathbb{R}$, define the LR superlevel set

$$B(c) \equiv \{p \in (0, 1) : \ell(p) \geq c\}$$

Definition A.5. Maintain the standing regularity condition (Appendix A.1.1). Let $n_{\text{eff}}(\theta) \in (0, 1]$ denote the effective-sample-size rate from Assumption A.1(iii). Let $D_{\text{mix}}(\theta)$ denote the per-test information bound defined in (5). Define the indices

$$\kappa_{\text{eff}} \equiv \frac{n_{\text{eff}}(\theta)}{\gamma} \quad \kappa_{\text{KL}} \equiv \frac{D_{\text{mix}}(\theta)}{\gamma}$$

Assumption A.6 (Subset Rényi growth). Fix $\alpha > 1$. There exists $d_\alpha(\theta) < \infty$ such that for every $n \geq 1$, every index set $J \subseteq \{1, \dots, n\}$, and every non-high type $t_0 \in \mathcal{T}_0$,

$$D_\alpha(\mathcal{L}_H(Z_J) \parallel \mathcal{L}_{t_0}(Z_J)) \leq |J| d_\alpha(\theta),$$

where D_α is the order- α Rényi divergence (Appendix A.4.1). In particular, since $\mathcal{L}_0(Z_J)$ is a mixture over $t_0 \in \mathcal{T}_0$, the same bound holds with \mathcal{L}_0 in place of \mathcal{L}_{t_0} (by Jensen’s inequality, using convexity of $x \mapsto x^{1-\alpha}$ for $\alpha > 1$).

Assumption A.6 controls how much H -vs-0 likelihood-ratio information can be carried by a short reported subset of coordinates, and it is the marginal input in the truncated-report Rényi budget (Appendix A.5).

A.1.2 Report space and measurability. We represent a report as a finite counting measure on $(0, 1)$. Let \mathcal{R} denote the space of finite counting measures on $(0, 1)$ equipped with the σ -field generated by evaluation maps $r \mapsto r(B)$ for Borel $B \subseteq (0, 1)$. We write $r \leq r'$ if r is a subreport of r' (equivalently, a submultiset), i.e. if $r(B) \leq r'(B)$ for every Borel set B .

For a measurable policy $\delta : \mathcal{R} \rightarrow [0, 1]$, define its *disclosure envelope* $\delta^\uparrow : \mathcal{R} \rightarrow [0, 1]$ by

$$\delta^\uparrow(r) \equiv \sup_{u \leq r} \delta(u)$$

In our setting reports are finite, so the supremum is a maximum.

LEMMA A.7. *If $\delta : \mathcal{R} \rightarrow [0, 1]$ is measurable, then its disclosure envelope δ^\uparrow is measurable (and hence is a valid acceptance policy).*

PROOF. For $n \geq 0$ let $\mathcal{R}_n \equiv \{r \in \mathcal{R} : r((0, 1)) = n\}$ denote the measurable subset of reports with total mass n . On \mathcal{R}_n , define the i th order statistic of a report by the quantile formula

$$p_{(i)}(r) \equiv \inf\{x \in (0, 1) : r((0, x]) \geq i\} \quad i = 1, \dots, n$$

This is measurable because for any $q \in (0, 1)$ we have $\{p_{(i)}(r) \leq q\} = \{r((0, q]) \geq i\}$, and $r \mapsto r((0, q])$ is an evaluation map. For each subset $I \subseteq \{1, \dots, n\}$, define the corresponding subreport $r_I \in \mathcal{R}$ by

$$r_I(B) \equiv \sum_{i \in I} \mathbf{1}\{p_{(i)}(r) \in B\} \quad B \subseteq (0, 1) \text{ Borel}$$

Then $r \mapsto r_I$ is measurable on \mathcal{R}_n , and every subreport $u \leq r$ is equal to r_I for some I (select the indices of the atoms included, counting multiplicity). Therefore on \mathcal{R}_n ,

$$\delta^\dagger(r) = \max_{I \subseteq \{1, \dots, n\}} \delta(r_I)$$

which is a finite maximum of measurable functions, hence measurable. Since $\mathcal{R} = \bigsqcup_{n \geq 0} \mathcal{R}_n$ is a measurable partition, δ^\dagger is measurable on all of \mathcal{R} . \square

A.1.3 Posterior tails for robustness checks. The robustness-check analysis requires a long-horizon tail bound for the Bayes factor (equivalently, for the posterior probability of being high under non-high data generating processes). We state it separately because it is only used in Appendix A.3 and related robustness-check arguments.

Assumption A.8 (Posterior tails). Fix $\alpha > 1$. For each $t \in \mathcal{T}_0$, write $\pi_t^0 \equiv \mathbb{P}(T = t \mid T \in \mathcal{T}_0)$ and let

$$\pi_{\min}^0 \equiv \min_{t \in \mathcal{T}_0} \pi_t^0 > 0.$$

Define the prior-dependent constant

$$C_{\pi, \alpha} \equiv |\mathcal{T}_0| \cdot \left(\frac{\pi_H}{\pi_0 \pi_{\min}^0} \right)^{(\alpha-1)/\alpha}.$$

There exists $C_\alpha(\theta) > 0$ such that for every $n \geq 1$ and every $\varepsilon \in (0, 1)$,

$$\mathbb{P}_0(\pi_n(H) > \varepsilon) \leq C_{\pi, \alpha} \varepsilon^{-(\alpha-1)/\alpha} \exp\left(-\frac{\alpha-1}{\alpha} C_\alpha(\theta) n_{\text{eff}}(\theta) (n-1)\right),$$

where $\pi_n(H) \equiv \mathbb{P}(T \in \mathcal{H} \mid \mathcal{F}_n)$ is the posterior probability that the submission is high after n observations.

Assumption A.8 controls how unlikely it is, under non-high data generating processes, for the posterior to place nontrivial mass on being high after many observations, and it closes the posterior-tail term in the robustness-check bound (Appendix A.3).

A.1.4 A sufficient condition in contractive location AR(1) models. Assumption A.6 is stated abstractly because it enters several arguments. In contractive location AR(1) models, Assumptions A.6 and A.8 follow from one-dimensional quadratic bounds for the innovation translate family. Proposition A.9 records one convenient sufficient condition. Appendix A.6 verifies its translate inequalities in the Gaussian example. Selection control is treated separately: Appendix A.5.2 gives a general sufficient condition for Assumption A.38, and Appendix A.6.5 verifies it in the Gaussian AR(1) example.

PROPOSITION A.9. *Consider a stationary mean-shift AR(1) evidence process of the form*

$$Z_{n+1} = \phi Z_n + (1 - \phi)\mu_t + \varepsilon_{n+1}, \quad \phi \in [0, 1),$$

where $(\varepsilon_n)_{n \geq 1}$ are i.i.d., independent of T , and their law does not depend on t . For $u \in \mathbb{R}$, write $F_u \equiv \mathcal{L}(\varepsilon_1 + u)$. Fix $\alpha > 1$ and write $\lambda \equiv (\alpha - 1)/\alpha$. Assume $\mathcal{H} = \{H\}$ is a singleton and denote the high-type mean by μ_H . Assume there exist constants $v_\alpha(\theta) \in (0, \infty)$ and $v_\lambda(\theta) \in (0, \infty)$ such that for all $u, v \in \mathbb{R}$,

$$D_\alpha(F_u \| F_v) \leq \frac{\alpha}{2v_\alpha(\theta)} (u - v)^2$$

$$\mathbb{E}_{X \sim F_v} \left[\left(\frac{dF_u}{dF_v}(X) \right)^\lambda \right] \leq \exp\left(-\frac{\lambda}{2\alpha v_\lambda(\theta)} (u - v)^2\right)$$

Then Assumption A.6 holds with

$$d_\alpha(\theta) \equiv \frac{\alpha}{2v_\alpha(\theta)} \Delta_{\max}^2 \quad \Delta_{\max} \equiv \max_{t_0 \in \mathcal{T}_0} |\mu_H - \mu_{t_0}|.$$

Moreover, define the minimum mean gap

$$\Delta_{\min} \equiv \min_{t_0 \in \mathcal{T}_0} |\mu_H - \mu_{t_0}|.$$

Then Assumption A.8 holds with

$$C_\alpha(\theta) = \frac{(1 - \phi)^2 \Delta_{\min}^2}{2\alpha v_\lambda(\theta) n_{\text{eff}}(\theta)}.$$

PROOF. We verify the two claims in turn.

Subset Rényi growth. Fix $n \geq 1$, fix $J \subseteq \{1, \dots, n\}$ with $J = \{j_1 < \dots < j_k\}$, and fix a non-high type $t_0 \in \mathcal{T}_0$. Write $\Delta \equiv \mu_H - \mu_{t_0}$. Let $P_J \equiv \mathcal{L}_H(Z_J)$ and $Q_J \equiv \mathcal{L}_{t_0}(Z_J)$ and write $L_J \equiv dP_J/dQ_J(Z_J)$. By definition,

$$\mathbb{E}_{t_0}[L_J^\alpha] = \exp((\alpha - 1)D_\alpha(P_J \| Q_J)).$$

We bound this α -moment by iterating along the Markov subsequence.

First consider Z_{j_1} . Under any type t , stationarity yields

$$Z_{j_1} = \mu_t + \varepsilon_{j_1} + \sum_{r=1}^{\infty} \phi^r \varepsilon_{j_1-r},$$

where the infinite sum is independent of ε_{j_1} and has a type-independent law. Therefore, by the data-processing inequality for Rényi divergence, adding the independent noise term $\sum_{r=1}^{\infty} \phi^r \varepsilon_{j_1-r}$ cannot increase D_α , hence

$$D_\alpha(\mathcal{L}_H(Z_{j_1}) \| \mathcal{L}_{t_0}(Z_{j_1})) \leq D_\alpha(F_{\mu_H} \| F_{\mu_{t_0}}) \leq \frac{\alpha}{2v_\alpha(\theta)} \Delta^2.$$

Next, for each $\ell \geq 2$ with gap $m = j_\ell - j_{\ell-1}$, write $c_m \equiv 1 - \phi^m$. The recursion yields

$$Z_{j_\ell} = \phi^m Z_{j_{\ell-1}} + c_m \mu_t + \sum_{r=0}^{m-1} \phi^r \varepsilon_{j_\ell-r},$$

so conditional on $Z_{j_{\ell-1}}$ the m -step transition differs across types only by the translate shift $c_m \Delta$. Writing $B_\ell \equiv \sum_{r=0}^{m-1} \phi^r \varepsilon_{j_\ell-r} = \varepsilon_{j_\ell} + W_\ell$ with W_ℓ independent of ε_{j_ℓ} , the same data-processing argument gives

$$D_\alpha(\mathcal{L}(B_\ell + c_m \mu_H) \| \mathcal{L}(B_\ell + c_m \mu_{t_0})) \leq D_\alpha(F_{c_m \mu_H} \| F_{c_m \mu_{t_0}}) \leq \frac{\alpha}{2v_\alpha(\theta)} c_m^2 \Delta^2 \leq \frac{\alpha}{2v_\alpha(\theta)} \Delta^2.$$

This bound is uniform in $Z_{j_{\ell-1}}$ because shifting both laws by $\phi^m Z_{j_{\ell-1}}$ does not change Rényi divergence.

Let $L_{j_1} \equiv d\mathcal{L}_H(Z_{j_1})/d\mathcal{L}_{t_0}(Z_{j_1})(Z_{j_1})$ and for each $\ell \geq 2$ let

$$L_{j_\ell} \equiv \frac{d\mathcal{L}_H(Z_{j_\ell} | Z_{j_{\ell-1}})}{d\mathcal{L}_{t_0}(Z_{j_\ell} | Z_{j_{\ell-1}})}(Z_{j_\ell}).$$

By the Markov property, $L_J = L_{j_1} \prod_{\ell=2}^k L_{j_\ell}$ almost surely under \mathbb{P}_{t_0} . Moreover, for each $\ell \geq 2$ the conditional moment satisfies

$$\mathbb{E}_{t_0}[L_{j_\ell}^\alpha | Z_{j_{\ell-1}}] = \exp\left((\alpha - 1)D_\alpha(\mathcal{L}_H(Z_{j_\ell} | Z_{j_{\ell-1}}) \| \mathcal{L}_{t_0}(Z_{j_\ell} | Z_{j_{\ell-1}}))\right),$$

and similarly $\mathbb{E}_{t_0}[L_{j_1}^\alpha] = \exp((\alpha - 1)D_\alpha(\mathcal{L}_H(Z_{j_1})\|\mathcal{L}_{t_0}(Z_{j_1})))$. Combining the divergence bounds above and iterating the tower property yields

$$\mathbb{E}_{t_0}[L_J^\alpha] \leq \exp\left((\alpha - 1)|J| \cdot \frac{\alpha}{2v_\alpha(\theta)} \Delta^2\right),$$

and taking logs gives

$$D_\alpha(\mathcal{L}_H(Z_J) \|\mathcal{L}_{t_0}(Z_J)) \leq |J| \cdot \frac{\alpha}{2v_\alpha(\theta)} \Delta^2 \leq |J| \cdot d_\alpha(\theta),$$

where the last inequality uses $|\Delta| \leq \Delta_{\max}$.

Posterior tails. Fix $n \geq 1$, $\varepsilon \in (0, 1)$, and $t_0 \in \mathcal{T}_0$. By Bayes' rule,

$$\pi_n(H) = \frac{\pi_H p_H(Z_{1:n})}{\pi_H p_H(Z_{1:n}) + \sum_{u \in \mathcal{T}_0} \pi_u p_u(Z_{1:n})} \leq \frac{\pi_H}{\pi_{t_0}} \cdot \frac{p_H(Z_{1:n})}{p_{t_0}(Z_{1:n})}.$$

Applying Markov's inequality with exponent λ yields

$$\mathbb{P}_{t_0}(\pi_n(H) > \varepsilon) \leq \left(\frac{\pi_H}{\pi_{t_0} \varepsilon}\right)^\lambda \mathbb{E}_{t_0} \left[\left(\frac{p_H(Z_{1:n})}{p_{t_0}(Z_{1:n})} \right)^\lambda \right].$$

Under t_0 , the likelihood ratio $p_H(Z_{1:n})/p_{t_0}(Z_{1:n})$ factors into a marginal term and $n - 1$ one-step transition terms. Write $L_1 \equiv p_H(Z_1)/p_{t_0}(Z_1)$ and $L_{t+1} \equiv p_H(Z_{t+1} | Z_t)/p_{t_0}(Z_{t+1} | Z_t)$ for $t \geq 1$, so $p_H(Z_{1:n})/p_{t_0}(Z_{1:n}) = L_1 \prod_{t=1}^{n-1} L_{t+1}$. Since $\lambda \in (0, 1)$, the map $x \mapsto x^\lambda$ is concave. Because $\mathbb{E}_{t_0}[L_1] = 1$, Jensen's inequality gives $\mathbb{E}_{t_0}[L_1^\lambda] \leq 1$. Conditional on Z_t , the $(t + 1)$ st transition compares the translate laws $F_{\phi Z_t + (1-\phi)\mu_H}$ and $F_{\phi Z_t + (1-\phi)\mu_{t_0}}$. Since their shift difference is $(1 - \phi)(\mu_H - \mu_{t_0})$, the translate-Chernoff bound gives

$$\mathbb{E}_{t_0} \left[L_{t+1}^\lambda | Z_t \right] \leq \exp\left(-\frac{\lambda}{2\alpha v_\lambda(\theta)} (1 - \phi)^2 (\mu_H - \mu_{t_0})^2\right).$$

The right-hand side is constant in Z_t , so iterating conditional expectations yields

$$\mathbb{E}_{t_0} \left[\left(\frac{p_H(Z_{1:n})}{p_{t_0}(Z_{1:n})} \right)^\lambda \right] \leq \exp\left(-\frac{\lambda}{2\alpha v_\lambda(\theta)} (1 - \phi)^2 (\mu_H - \mu_{t_0})^2 (n - 1)\right).$$

Finally, summing over $t_0 \in \mathcal{T}_0$ yields the \mathbb{P}_0 bound in Assumption A.8 with the minimum gap Δ_{\min} . \square

A.2 Equilibrium and stopping-time tools

This subsection records the equilibrium reduction, stopping-time inequalities, and monotonicity tools used in Section 3 and in the proofs of the frontier bounds (Appendices A.4–A.6). Appendix A.3 collects the mechanism-specific constructions and proofs used in Section 5. Throughout, ‘throughput’ refers to the journal’s expected acceptance rate, while $1/\gamma$ is the researcher’s testing-capacity scale.

A.2.1 Equilibrium selection and reporting. The researcher chooses a stopping time τ and a report $R \in \mathcal{R}$ (a finite multiset of realized p -values; Appendix A.1.2). Because omission is free, after stopping she discloses an envelope-attaining subreport. Lemma A.15 formalizes that, for any policy δ , the best-response problem reduces to an optimal stopping problem with payoff $M_\tau^\delta - \gamma\tau$, and Proposition A.16 provides an earliest optimal stopping-time tie-break.

A.2.2 Histories and down-sets. Recall the singleton index $Z_n = \psi(P_n)$ from Definition A.3. Write the length- n singleton history as $Z_{1:n} \equiv (Z_1, \dots, Z_n) \in \mathbb{R}^n$. We use the coordinatewise order on \mathbb{R}^n : for $x, y \in \mathbb{R}^n$, write $x \leq y$ if $x_i \leq y_i$ for all i .

Definition A.10. Fix $n \geq 1$. A measurable set $D \subseteq \mathbb{R}^n$ is a *down-set* if $x \in D$ and $y \leq x$ imply $y \in D$. Equivalently, D is coordinatewise decreasing. An *up-set* is a coordinatewise increasing set.

Definition A.11. Fix $n \geq 1$. A measurable set $E \subseteq \mathbb{R}^n$ is *two-sided monotone* if there exist a down-set D and an up-set U such that $E = D \cup U$.

In a one-dimensional “window” rule, continuation often occurs in either tail: e.g. $\{Z \notin [a, b]\} = \{Z \leq a\} \cup \{Z \geq b\}$ is two-sided monotone. More generally, if continuation is triggered by being outside an interval in a scalar statistic that is increasing in the history, then conditioning on any subvector preserves the two-sided monotone structure in the omitted coordinates.

LEMMA A.12. Fix $n \geq 1$ and an index set $J \subseteq \{1, \dots, n\}$. Let $S : \mathbb{R}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ be coordinatewise nondecreasing and fix $a \leq b$. For each realization $z_J \in \mathbb{R}^{|J|}$, define the induced event in omitted coordinates

$$E(z_J) \equiv \left\{ z_{-J} \in \mathbb{R}^{n-|J|} : S(z_J, z_{-J}) \notin (a, b) \right\}$$

Then $E(z_J)$ is two-sided monotone in $\mathbb{R}^{n-|J|}$ (Definition A.11).

PROOF. Fix z_J . Since $z_{-J} \mapsto S(z_J, z_{-J})$ is coordinatewise nondecreasing, the sets

$$D \equiv \{z_{-J} \in \mathbb{R}^{n-|J|} : S(z_J, z_{-J}) \leq a\} \quad U \equiv \{z_{-J} \in \mathbb{R}^{n-|J|} : S(z_J, z_{-J}) \geq b\}$$

are a down-set and an up-set respectively. Their union is $E(z_J)$. □

A.2.3 Gaussian AR(1): belief state is one-dimensional. In the ordered three-type setting $\mu_N < \mu_H < \mu_L$, extremely small p -values (very large $Z = \Phi^{-1}(1 - p)$) can be more indicative of a biased (exogeneity-failure) type L than of the credible causal type H . Equivalently, the singleton log-likelihood ratio $\ell(p)$ from Definition A.4 need not be monotone in Z . Thus likelihood-ratio superlevel acceptance regions can correspond to an interval in the raw index Z (“significant but not too significant”) rather than a one-sided threshold.

In the Gaussian AR(1) mean-shift model, let $M \equiv \mu_T$ denote the (static) mean parameter and write $Z_{1:n} = (Z_1, \dots, Z_n)$. Conditional on $M = \mu$, we have $Z_{1:n} \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu \mathbf{1}, \Sigma_\phi)$, where Σ_ϕ is the $n \times n$ AR(1) correlation matrix with (i, j) entry $\phi^{|i-j|}$. Therefore the likelihood of μ given $Z_{1:n} = z_{1:n}$ is of exponential-family form

$$L_n(\mu; z_{1:n}) \propto \exp\left(\mu s_n(z_{1:n}) - \frac{1}{2}\mu^2 b_n\right) \quad s_n(z_{1:n}) = \mathbf{1}^\top \Sigma_\phi^{-1} z_{1:n} \quad b_n = \mathbf{1}^\top \Sigma_\phi^{-1} \mathbf{1}$$

Hence the posterior $\mathcal{L}(M \mid Z_{1:n})$ depends on the realized singleton history only through (n, s_n) . This scalar statistic is the natural Markov state for the researcher’s POMDP in the Gaussian AR(1) example, including the three-type case $\mu_N < \mu_H < \mu_L$. Moreover, for $\phi \in [0, 1)$ the weight vector $\Sigma_\phi^{-1} \mathbf{1}$ has nonnegative entries (the row sums of the AR(1) precision matrix), so s_n is coordinatewise increasing in $z_{1:n}$.

A.2.4 Reusable stopping-time inequalities.

LEMMA A.13. Fix any acceptance policy δ and let $\sigma^*(\delta)$ be a best response with stopping time τ^* and induced report R . Then $\mathbb{E}[\tau^*] \leq 1/\gamma$ (ex ante, under the prior), hence $\tau^* < \infty$ almost surely. Moreover,

$$\mathbb{E}[\tau^* \mid T \in \mathcal{H}] \leq \frac{1}{\pi_H} \mathbb{E}[\tau^*] \leq \frac{1}{\pi_H \gamma} \quad \mathbb{E}[\tau^* \mid T \in \mathcal{T}_0] \leq \frac{1}{\pi_0} \mathbb{E}[\tau^*] \leq \frac{1}{\pi_0 \gamma}$$

PROOF. The researcher can always stop immediately and receive a payoff in $[0, 1]$, so any best response has nonnegative payoff. For any strategy, $\mathbb{E}[\delta(R)] - \gamma\mathbb{E}[\tau] \leq 1 - \gamma\mathbb{E}[\tau]$, hence $0 \leq 1 - \gamma\mathbb{E}[\tau^*]$ and $\mathbb{E}[\tau^*] \leq 1/\gamma$. Since $\mathbb{E}[\tau^*] < \infty$, necessarily $\mathbb{P}(\tau^* = \infty) = 0$. Finally,

$$\mathbb{E}[\tau^*] = \pi_H\mathbb{E}[\tau^* \mid T \in \mathcal{H}] + \pi_0\mathbb{E}[\tau^* \mid T \in \mathcal{T}_0]$$

and since both conditional expectations are nonnegative,

$$\pi_H\mathbb{E}[\tau^* \mid T \in \mathcal{H}] \leq \mathbb{E}[\tau^*] \quad \pi_0\mathbb{E}[\tau^* \mid T \in \mathcal{T}_0] \leq \mathbb{E}[\tau^*]$$

Rearranging yields the conditional-time bounds. \square

LEMMA A.14. Let $(E_n)_{n \geq 0}$ be an increasing sequence of events ($E_n \subseteq E_{n+1}$). For any stopping time τ and any deterministic n ,

$$\mathbf{1}\{E_\tau\} \leq \mathbf{1}\{E_n\} + \mathbf{1}\{\tau > n\}$$

Consequently, under any law \mathbb{P} ,

$$\mathbb{P}(E_\tau) \leq \mathbb{P}(E_n) + \mathbb{P}(\tau > n)$$

PROOF. If $\tau \leq n$, then $E_\tau \subseteq E_n$ by monotonicity; if $\tau > n$, the second indicator equals 1. \square

A.2.5 *Proofs for Section 3.* Recall the report space \mathcal{R} and the subreport order \leq from Appendix A.1.2. For $n \geq 1$, define the full report (counting measure)

$$R_n^{\text{full}}(B) \equiv \sum_{i=1}^n \mathbf{1}\{P_i \in B\}, \quad B \subseteq (0, 1) \text{ Borel}$$

and let \emptyset denote the empty report (the zero counting measure).

Because omission is unverifiable, after any realized history the researcher can discard unfavorable outcomes and submit whichever subreport maximizes acceptance probability. Given a policy $\delta : \mathcal{R} \rightarrow [0, 1]$, define the *envelope* acceptance value

$$M_n^\delta \equiv \max_{R \leq R_n^{\text{full}}} \delta(R) \quad M_0^\delta \equiv \delta(\emptyset)$$

Equivalently, $M_n^\delta = \delta^\uparrow(R_n^{\text{full}})$ for the disclosure envelope δ^\uparrow from Appendix A.1.2. Lemma A.15 formalizes that the researcher can always attain M_τ^δ at any stopping time τ , so her best-response problem reduces to an optimal stopping problem with payoff $M_\tau^\delta - \gamma\tau$.

LEMMA A.15. Fix δ and let (τ, R) be any researcher strategy. Then

$$\delta(R) \leq M_\tau^\delta \quad \text{almost surely}$$

Conversely, for every stopping time τ there exists an \mathcal{F}_τ -measurable report R^{max} such that

$$\delta(R^{\text{max}}) = M_\tau^\delta \quad \text{almost surely}$$

Consequently, the researcher's problem under δ reduces to the optimal stopping problem

$$\sup_{\tau} \mathbb{E}[M_\tau^\delta - \gamma\tau]$$

In particular, equilibrium outcomes depend on δ only through the envelope process $(M_n^\delta)_{n \geq 0}$.

PROOF. For the first claim, $\delta(R)$ is one feasible subreport acceptance value at time τ , so it cannot exceed the maximum over feasible subreports, i.e. $\delta(R) \leq M_\tau^\delta$.

For the second claim, fix n and enumerate the subsets $I \subseteq \{1, \dots, n\}$ in a deterministic order (e.g. by increasing $|I|$ and then lexicographically). Each I induces a feasible subreport $R_{n,I} \in \mathcal{R}$ defined by $R_{n,I}(B) \equiv \sum_{i \in I} \mathbf{1}\{P_i \in B\}$. Let R_n^{max} be the first subreport in this list that attains $\max_{R \leq R_n^{\text{full}}} \delta(R)$. This selection is measurable as a function of (P_1, \dots, P_n) because it is obtained by finitely many

comparisons of measurable maps. Defining $R^{\max} \equiv R_\tau^{\max}$ yields an \mathcal{F}_τ -measurable report satisfying $\delta(R^{\max}) = M_\tau^\delta$ almost surely.

The reduction to optimal stopping follows immediately: given τ , the researcher can achieve M_τ^δ by reporting R^{\max} and cannot do better by the first claim. \square

Fix δ and write $M_n \equiv M_n^\delta$. Define the value-to-go process

$$\mathcal{V}_n \equiv \operatorname{ess\,sup}_{\tau \geq n} \mathbb{E}[M_\tau - \gamma(\tau - n) \mid \mathcal{F}_n],$$

where the essential supremum is over stopping times τ with $\tau \geq n$ almost surely. Define the earliest time at which continuation has no value by

$$\tau^{\text{early}}(\delta) \equiv \inf\{n \geq 0 : \mathcal{V}_n = M_n\}.$$

PROPOSITION A.16. *Fix δ and write $M_n \equiv M_n^\delta$. Then $\tau^{\text{early}}(\delta)$ is optimal for $\sup_\tau \mathbb{E}[M_\tau - \gamma\tau]$ and is the earliest optimal stopping time among all optimizers. Moreover, every optimal stopping time τ satisfies $\mathbb{E}[\tau] \leq 1/\gamma$.*

PROOF. This is a standard Snell-envelope argument for discrete-time optimal stopping with a running cost; see, e.g., Snell [1952] or Shiryaev [1978, Ch. 2, especially §2.14]. Define $X_n := M_n - \gamma n$ and its Snell envelope

$$\mathcal{W}_n := \operatorname{ess\,sup}_{\tau \geq n} \mathbb{E}[X_\tau \mid \mathcal{F}_n].$$

Standard results imply (\mathcal{W}_n) is the smallest supermartingale dominating (X_n) , satisfies

$$\mathcal{W}_n = \max\left(X_n, \mathbb{E}[\mathcal{W}_{n+1} \mid \mathcal{F}_n]\right),$$

and that the first hitting time $\inf\{n \geq 0 : \mathcal{W}_n = X_n\}$ is optimal and earliest among all optimizers. Translating back via $\mathcal{V}_n = \mathcal{W}_n + \gamma n$ gives the claim.

For the expectation bound, note $0 \leq M_n \leq 1$. If τ is optimal then $0 \leq \mathbb{E}[M_\tau - \gamma\tau] \leq 1 - \gamma\mathbb{E}[\tau]$, hence $\mathbb{E}[\tau] \leq 1/\gamma$. \square

A.3 Robustness-check mechanism analysis

This subsection collects the mechanism-specific definitions and proofs for the robustness-check (certificate) policies studied in Section 5.

A.3.1 Robustness-check rules and separation.

Definition A.17. Fix an integer $m \geq 1$, a Borel set $B \subset (0, 1)$, and $a \in [0, 1]$. A disclosed check is significant if its p -value lies in B . Given a report R , define the number of disclosed significant results with respect to B by

$$N_B(R) \equiv \sum_{p \in R} \mathbf{1}\{p \in B\}$$

Formally, Appendix A.1.2 represents reports as counting measures r , in which case $N_B(r) = r(B)$. The robustness-check policy $\delta_{B,m,a}$ accepts if and only if the report contains at least m significant results:

$$\delta_{B,m,a}(R) \equiv a \mathbf{1}\{N_B(R) \geq m\}$$

Setting $a = 1$ recovers the main-text robustness-check rule $\delta_{B,m}$ from Definition 5.1. We retain a because it is useful when implementing a throughput target by rationing among qualifying reports.

For analysis, define the associated value function for a general reward level $a \in [0, \infty)$ by

$$V_{m,B}(a) \equiv \sup_\tau \mathbb{E}\left[a \mathbf{1}\{S_\tau(B) \geq m\} - \gamma\tau\right] \quad S_n(B) \equiv \sum_{k=1}^n \mathbf{1}\{P_k \in B\}$$

When $a \in [0, 1]$, this coincides with the researcher's best-response value under the robustness-check policy $\delta_{B,m,a}$.

Definition A.18. Fix (m, B) . Define $Q_n(m, B) \equiv \{S_n(B) \geq m\}$ and $\tau_B^{(m)} \equiv \inf\{n \geq 1 : S_n(B) \geq m\}$.

A.3.2 Two levers: standards and disclosure. Robustness checks have two core design levers: the window B (standards) and the required count m (disclosure). For a cost-share parameter $c > 0$ we set

$$m(\gamma; c) \equiv \left\lceil \frac{c}{\gamma} \right\rceil$$

We interpret c as the fraction of the $1/\gamma$ testing-capacity scale that must be converted into disclosed significant results in B before qualification. The acceptance probability a can be used to ration among qualifiers when the journal imposes a binding throughput constraint (Appendix A.3.4).

Definition A.19. Fix a cost share $c > 0$, an acceptance probability $a \in (0, 1]$, and a Borel set $B \subset (0, 1)$. Let $m(\gamma; c) \equiv \lceil c/\gamma \rceil$ as in Section A.3.2. Define $k(\gamma; a) \equiv \lceil a/\gamma \rceil$, $n(\gamma; c, a) \equiv m(\gamma; c) + k(\gamma; a)$, and $r(\gamma; c, a) \equiv m(\gamma; c)/n(\gamma; c, a)$. Define the worst-case non-high one-test significance probability

$$p_0^{\max}(B) \equiv \sup_{t \in \mathcal{T}_0} \mathbb{P}_t(P_1 \in B)$$

We say (c, a, B) satisfies the separation condition if, for all sufficiently small γ ,

$$p_0^{\max}(B) < r(\gamma; c, a) \tag{7}$$

If there exist constants $\eta_0 > 0$ and $\gamma_0 > 0$ such that $p_0^{\max}(B) \leq r(\gamma; c, a) - \eta_0$ for all $\gamma \in (0, \gamma_0]$, we say separation holds *with uniform slack*.

A.3.3 Witness windows imply separation.

LEMMA A.20. *Maintain Assumption A.2. Then $p_0^{\max}(B_0) \leq e^{-\ell_0}$. Consequently, for any acceptance probability $a \in (0, 1]$ and any cost share*

$$c > \frac{e^{-\ell_0}}{1 - e^{-\ell_0}}$$

the triple (c, a, B_0) satisfies Definition A.19 with uniform slack for all sufficiently small γ .

PROOF. Fix any non-high type $t \in \mathcal{T}_0$. Assumption A.2 gives $d\mathcal{L}_H(P_1)/d\mathcal{L}_t(P_1) \geq e^{\ell_0}$ on B_0 , $\mathcal{L}_t(P_1)$ -almost everywhere, hence

$$\mathbb{P}_H(P_1 \in B_0) \geq e^{\ell_0} \mathbb{P}_t(P_1 \in B_0)$$

Since $\mathbb{P}_H(P_1 \in B_0) \leq 1$, this implies $\mathbb{P}_t(P_1 \in B_0) \leq e^{-\ell_0}$ and therefore $p_0^{\max}(B_0) \leq e^{-\ell_0}$.

Pick $\eta_0 > 0$ such that $e^{-\ell_0} \leq c/(c+1) - 2\eta_0$. For any $a \in (0, 1]$, Definition A.19 uses $r(\gamma; c, a) = m(\gamma; c)/(m(\gamma; c) + k(\gamma; a))$ with $k(\gamma; a) = \lceil a/\gamma \rceil$. Using $m(\gamma; c) \geq c/\gamma$ and $k(\gamma; a) \leq a/\gamma + 1 \leq 1/\gamma + 1$, we have for $\gamma \in (0, 1)$

$$r(\gamma; c, a) \geq \frac{c/\gamma}{(c+1)/\gamma + 2} = \frac{c}{c+1+2\gamma}$$

Choose $\gamma_0 > 0$ such that $c/(c+1+2\gamma) \geq c/(c+1) - \eta_0$ for all $\gamma \in (0, \gamma_0]$. Then for all $\gamma \in (0, \gamma_0]$,

$$p_0^{\max}(B_0) \leq \frac{c}{c+1} - 2\eta_0 \leq r(\gamma; c, a) - \eta_0$$

which is uniform slack. □

A.3.4 Throughput implementation for robustness checks.

PROPOSITION A.21. *Maintain Assumption A.1 and fix a target throughput $\rho \in (0, 1)$ and a cost $\gamma > 0$. Fix an integer $m \geq 1$ and a Borel set $B \subset (0, 1)$. Assume there exists a (possibly mixed) stopping time τ attaining $V_{m,B}(1)$ such that $\mathbb{P}(S_\tau(B) \geq m) \geq \rho$.*

Then there exist $a^ \in [\rho, 1]$ and a (possibly mixed) best response to δ_{B,m,a^*} such that*

$$\mathbb{E}[\delta_{B,m,a^*}(R)] = \rho$$

PROOF. Fix $\rho \in (0, 1)$ and $\gamma > 0$. Maintain Assumption A.1. Fix $m \geq 1$ and Borel $B \subset (0, 1)$. For $n \geq 0$ define the count of significant results (with respect to B) in the realized history by

$$S_n^B \equiv \sum_{k=1}^n \mathbf{1}\{P_k \in B\}$$

and define the qualification indicator

$$\bar{M}_n^{m,B} \equiv \mathbf{1}\{S_n^B \geq m\} \quad (8)$$

Fix $a \in [0, 1]$ and write $\delta \equiv \delta_{B,m,a}$. We claim that the envelope acceptance value satisfies

$$M_n^\delta \equiv \max_{R \leq R_n^{\text{full}}} \delta(R) = a \bar{M}_n^{m,B} \quad (9)$$

Indeed, if $S_n^B < m$ then no feasible subreport can contain m significant results in B , so $\delta(R) = 0$ for all feasible R and $M_n^\delta = 0$. If $S_n^B \geq m$, then there exists a feasible subreport consisting of m significant results in B , for which $\delta(R) = a$, and since $\delta \leq a$ everywhere we obtain $M_n^\delta = a$. This proves (9).

In particular, $(\bar{M}_n^{m,B})$ and (M_n^δ) are adapted and take values in $[0, 1]$. Fix $a \in [0, 1]$. By Lemma A.15, the researcher's problem depends on δ only through (M_n^δ) . By (9), the stopping problem is

$$\sup_{\tau} \mathbb{E}[M_\tau^\delta - \gamma\tau] = \sup_{\tau} \mathbb{E}[a \bar{M}_\tau^{m,B} - \gamma\tau]$$

The reward process $a \bar{M}_n^{m,B} - \gamma n$ is bounded and adapted, so an optimal stopping time exists (Proposition A.16), and we allow time-0 mixing between optimal stopping times.

Define the value function $V_{m,B}$ as above:

$$V_{m,B}(a) \equiv \sup_{\tau} \mathbb{E}[a \bar{M}_\tau^{m,B} - \gamma\tau]$$

where $a \in [0, \infty)$ is a prize level and we allow time-0 randomization over stopping times.

For each (possibly mixed) stopping strategy τ , define

$$m(\tau) \equiv \mathbb{E}[\bar{M}_\tau^{m,B}] \in [0, 1] \quad c(\tau) \equiv \gamma \mathbb{E}[\tau] \in [0, \infty]$$

Then

$$V_{m,B}(a) = \sup_{\tau} (a m(\tau) - c(\tau))$$

so $V_{m,B} : [0, \infty) \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is convex as a pointwise supremum of affine functions of a (see, e.g., [Boyd and Vandenberghe, 2004, §3.2.3]). Hence for each $a > 0$ the subdifferential $\partial V_{m,B}(a)$ is a nonempty closed interval

$$\partial V_{m,B}(a) = [V'_-(a), V'_+(a)] \subseteq [0, 1]$$

We record the standard supporting-hyperplane inclusion: if τ is a -optimal then for all $a' \in [0, \infty)$,

$$V_{m,B}(a') \geq a' m(\tau) - c(\tau) = V_{m,B}(a) + m(\tau)(a' - a)$$

so $m(\tau) \in \partial V_{m,B}(a)$. Conversely, for pointwise suprema of affine functions, every $g \in \partial V_{m,B}(a)$ can be implemented by time-0 mixing between at most two a -optimal stopping times; see, e.g., [Rockafellar, 1970].

Under $\delta_{B,m,a}$ and a stopping rule τ , the induced acceptance probability equals

$$\mathbb{E}[\delta_{B,m,a}(R)] = \mathbb{E}[M_\tau^\delta] = a \cdot \mathbb{E}[\bar{M}_\tau^{m,B}] = a \cdot m(\tau)$$

In particular, under an a -optimal (possibly mixed) response, the set of achievable acceptance rates is

$$a \cdot \partial V_{m,B}(a) = \{a \cdot g : g \in \partial V_{m,B}(a)\} \quad (10)$$

Thus the throughput target $\mathbb{E}[\delta] = \rho$ is satisfiable at parameter a if and only if there exists $g \in \partial V_{m,B}(a)$ with $ag = \rho$, equivalently

$$\frac{\rho}{a} \in \partial V_{m,B}(a) \quad (11)$$

Note that any such a must satisfy $a \geq \rho$, since $\partial V_{m,B}(a) \subseteq [0, 1]$.

Define $h(a) \equiv \rho/a$ on $[\rho, 1]$. This function is continuous and strictly decreasing, with $h(\rho) = 1$ and $h(1) = \rho$. Define

$$g_+(a) \equiv \sup \partial V_{m,B}(a) = V'_+(a)$$

For convex $V_{m,B}$, the map $a \mapsto g_+(a)$ is nondecreasing, and $g_+(a) \leq 1$ for all a . By the proposition's assumption, there exists a 1-optimal rule with qualification probability at least ρ , hence $g_+(1) \geq \rho = h(1)$.

Define

$$a^\star \equiv \inf\{a \in [\rho, 1] : g_+(a) \geq h(a)\}$$

This set is nonempty because $g_+(1) \geq h(1)$, and it is bounded below by ρ . By monotonicity of g_+ and continuity of h , we have

$$\inf \partial V_{m,B}(a^\star) \leq h(a^\star) \leq \sup \partial V_{m,B}(a^\star)$$

which is exactly (11). Hence there exists $g^\star \in \partial V_{m,B}(a^\star)$ with $g^\star = h(a^\star)$.

By the subgradient implementation above, there exists an a^\star -optimal (possibly mixed) stopping rule τ^\star such that

$$m(\tau^\star) = g^\star = \frac{\rho}{a^\star}$$

Therefore the induced acceptance rate satisfies

$$\mathbb{E}[\delta_{B,m,a^\star}(R)] = a^\star m(\tau^\star) = a^\star \frac{\rho}{a^\star} = \rho$$

Define an associated best response strategy at a^\star by using τ^\star and specifying the report at τ^\star as follows. If $\bar{M}_{\tau^\star}^{m,B} = 1$, report any feasible subreport $R \leq R_{\tau^\star}^{\text{full}}$ with exactly m significant results in B (e.g. the first m such results in chronological order). If $\bar{M}_{\tau^\star}^{m,B} = 0$, report \emptyset . Either choice attains $M_{\tau^\star}^\delta$ by (9). Because the rule refers only to the finite set of indices $\{1, \dots, \tau^\star\}$ and uses chronological order, it is measurable and avoids any global ordering of reports.

This completes the proof. \square

A.3.5 Proofs for Section 5.

LEMMA A.22. Fix (m, B, a) and let $\delta = \delta_{B,m,a}$. Let $\tau_B^{(m)}$ be the qualification time from Definition A.18. For any strategy $\sigma = (\tau, S)$, define $\tilde{\tau} \equiv \min\{\tau, \tau_B^{(m)}\}$ and define \tilde{S} as follows: on $\{\tilde{\tau} = \tau\}$ set $\tilde{S} = S$, and on $\{\tilde{\tau} = \tau_B^{(m)} < \tau\}$ choose any m indices $i \leq \tau_B^{(m)}$ such that $P_i \in B$. Then

$$\mathbb{E}[\delta(\tilde{R}) - \gamma\tilde{\tau}] \geq \mathbb{E}[\delta(R) - \gamma\tau]$$

In particular, the selected best response to $\delta_{B,m,a}$ can be taken to stop upon qualification, and its stopping time has the form

$$\tau^\star = \tau_B^{(m)} \wedge \tau_{\text{quit}}$$

for some quitting time τ_{quit} . Hence for all $n \geq 1$,

$$\{\tau^\star > n\} \subseteq Q_n(m, B)^c$$

PROOF. On $\{\tau_B^{(m)} < \tau\}$, qualification holds at $\tau_B^{(m)}$ by definition, so the researcher can report a qualifying report and obtain acceptance probability a . Stopping earlier cannot reduce acceptance (the policy never exceeds a), and strictly lowers cost by $\gamma(\tau - \tau_B^{(m)}) > 0$. On $\{\tau \leq \tau_B^{(m)}\}$ nothing changes. Thus the modified strategy weakly improves payoff.

For the final claim, apply the improvement argument to the selected best response and define $\tau_{\text{quit}} \equiv \tau^\star$ on $\{\tau^\star < \tau_B^{(m)}\}$ and $\tau_{\text{quit}} \equiv \infty$ otherwise. If $\tau^\star > n$ then necessarily $\tau_B^{(m)} > n$, hence $S_n(B) < m$ and $Q_n(m, B)^c$ holds. \square

LEMMA A.23. Fix (m, B, a) with $a \in (0, 1]$ and let τ^\star be the selected best response stopping time to $\delta_{B,m,a}$. Fix any $n \geq m$ and define

$$K \equiv \left\lceil \frac{a}{\gamma} \right\rceil \quad \text{so that} \quad \gamma \cdot K \geq a$$

Then on $\{\tau^\star > n\}$,

$$\mathbb{P}(Q_{n+K}(m, B) \mid \mathcal{F}_n) \geq \frac{\gamma}{a}$$

In particular, the bound is nontrivial only when $\gamma \leq a$; if $\gamma > a$ then $\{\tau^\star > n\}$ is empty. where $\mathbb{P}(\cdot \mid \mathcal{F}_n)$ is the researcher's subjective posterior predictive probability.

PROOF. Work on the event $\{\tau^\star > n\}$, which is \mathcal{F}_n -measurable. By Lemma A.22, $Q_n(m, B)^c$ holds on $\{\tau^\star > n\}$, so stopping at n yields payoff 0.

Because τ^\star is optimal, the conditional continuation value at time n cannot be negative on $\{\tau^\star > n\}$: otherwise stopping at n on a subset where it is negative would strictly improve payoff. Thus on $\{\tau^\star > n\}$,

$$0 \leq \mathbb{E}[a \mathbf{1}\{Q_{\tau^\star}(m, B)\} - \gamma(\tau^\star - n) \mid \mathcal{F}_n]$$

Since $Q_k(m, B)$ is increasing in k , Lemma A.14 gives

$$\mathbf{1}\{Q_{\tau^\star}(m, B)\} \leq \mathbf{1}\{Q_{n+K}(m, B)\} + \mathbf{1}\{\tau^\star > n + K\}$$

Also $\tau^\star - n \geq 1 + K \mathbf{1}\{\tau^\star > n + K\}$ pointwise on $\{\tau^\star > n\}$. Taking conditional expectations and combining yields

$$0 \leq a \mathbb{P}(Q_{n+K}(m, B) \mid \mathcal{F}_n) - \gamma + (a - \gamma K) \mathbb{P}(\tau^\star > n + K \mid \mathcal{F}_n)$$

Since $a - \gamma K \leq 0$, we obtain

$$0 \leq a \mathbb{P}(Q_{n+K}(m, B) \mid \mathcal{F}_n) - \gamma$$

which is the claimed inequality. \square

LEMMA A.24. Fix (m, B, a) with $a \in (0, 1]$ and let τ^\star be the selected best response stopping time to $\delta_{B,m,a}$. Let

$$\pi_n(H) \equiv \mathbb{P}(T \in \mathcal{H} \mid \mathcal{F}_n)$$

denote the posterior probability that the submission is high-impact at time n . Fix any $n \geq m$ and define $K = \lceil a/\gamma \rceil$ as in Lemma A.23. Define the “ K -step non-high opportunity” event and its non-high conditional probability by

$$\Delta_{n,K} \equiv Q_{n+K}(m, B) \setminus Q_n(m, B) \quad q_{n,K}^0 \equiv \mathbb{P}_0(\Delta_{n,K} \mid \mathcal{F}_n)$$

Then on $\{\tau^\star > n\}$,

$$\pi_n(H) + q_{n,K}^0 \geq \frac{\gamma}{a}$$

Consequently,

$$\{\tau^\star > n\} \subseteq \left\{ \pi_n(H) \geq \frac{\gamma}{2a} \right\} \cup \left\{ q_{n,K}^0 \geq \frac{\gamma}{2a} \right\}$$

PROOF. On the event $\{\tau^\star > n\}$ we have $Q_n(m, B)^c$ by Lemma A.22. Lemma A.23 gives

$$\mathbb{P}(Q_{n+K}(m, B) \mid \mathcal{F}_n) \geq \frac{\gamma}{a} \quad \text{on } \{\tau^\star > n\}$$

On $Q_n(m, B)^c$, the event $Q_{n+K}(m, B)$ is equivalent to $\Delta_{n,K}$, so it suffices to bound $\mathbb{P}(\Delta_{n,K} \mid \mathcal{F}_n)$.

Decompose the posterior predictive probability by the coarse type class:

$$\mathbb{P}(\Delta_{n,K} \mid \mathcal{F}_n) = \pi_n(H)\mathbb{P}(\Delta_{n,K} \mid \mathcal{F}_n, T \in \mathcal{H}) + (1 - \pi_n(H))\mathbb{P}(\Delta_{n,K} \mid \mathcal{F}_n, T \in \mathcal{T}_0)$$

The first conditional probability is at most 1. For the second, by definition of $\mathbb{P}_0(\cdot) = \mathbb{P}(\cdot \mid T \in \mathcal{T}_0)$ we have $\mathbb{P}(\Delta_{n,K} \mid \mathcal{F}_n, T \in \mathcal{T}_0) = \mathbb{P}_0(\Delta_{n,K} \mid \mathcal{F}_n) = q_{n,K}^0$. Therefore,

$$\mathbb{P}(\Delta_{n,K} \mid \mathcal{F}_n) \leq \pi_n(H) + q_{n,K}^0$$

Combining yields $\pi_n(H) + q_{n,K}^0 \geq \gamma/a$ on $\{\tau^\star > n\}$, and the union bound is immediate. \square

LEMMA A.25. Let (X_n) be a stationary reversible Markov chain with L^2 spectral gap $\text{gap} \in (0, 1]$. Let $f : X \rightarrow [0, 1]$ be measurable and define

$$S_n \equiv \sum_{k=1}^n (f(X_k) - \mathbb{E}[f(X_1)])$$

Then there exists a universal constant $C_H < \infty$ such that for all $n \geq 1$ and all $\varepsilon > 0$,

$$\mathbb{P}\left(\frac{1}{n}S_n \geq \varepsilon\right) \leq \exp(-C_H \text{gap } n \varepsilon^2) \quad \mathbb{P}\left(\frac{1}{n}S_n \leq -\varepsilon\right) \leq \exp(-C_H \text{gap } n \varepsilon^2)$$

PROOF. See Lézaud [1998] or Paulin [2015]. We use only the existence of a universal constant C_H and the dependence of the exponent on the spectral gap. \square

PROPOSITION A.26. Maintain Assumption A.1 and Definition A.5. Fix a type $t \in \mathcal{T}$ and a Borel evidence window $B \subset (0, 1)$. Define the one-test significance probability

$$p_t(B) \equiv \mathbb{P}_t(P_1 \in B) \in [0, 1]$$

Let $Y_n \equiv \mathbf{1}\{P_n \in B\}$ and $S_n(B) \equiv \sum_{k=1}^n Y_k$. Then there exists a universal constant $C < \infty$ such that for all $n \geq 1$ and all $\varepsilon \in (0, 1)$,

$$\mathbb{P}_t\left(\frac{1}{n}S_n(B) \geq p_t(B) + \varepsilon\right) \leq \exp(-C n_{\text{eff}}(\theta) n \varepsilon^2)$$

$$\mathbb{P}_t\left(\frac{1}{n}S_n(B) \leq p_t(B) - \varepsilon\right) \leq \exp(-C n_{\text{eff}}(\theta) n \varepsilon^2)$$

PROOF. This is immediate from Assumption A.1(iii) with $C = C_H$. \square

LEMMA A.27. *Maintain Assumption A.1 and Definition A.18. Fix a type $t \in \mathcal{T}$ and a Borel evidence window $B \subset (0, 1)$ with $p_t(B) > 0$. Fix any $\delta \in (0, 1)$ and define*

$$n_m \equiv \left\lceil \frac{1 + \delta}{p_t(B)} m \right\rceil$$

Then there exists a constant $C_{\delta,t,B} < \infty$ such that for all integers $m \geq 1$,

$$\mathbb{E}_t[\tau_B^{(m)}] \leq n_m + C_{\delta,t,B}$$

In particular, for each fixed $\delta \in (0, 1)$,

$$\mathbb{E}_t[\tau_B^{(m)}] \leq \frac{1 + \delta}{p_t(B)} m + O_{\delta,t,B}(1)$$

so the expected qualification time grows at most linearly in m with slope arbitrarily close to $1/p_t(B)$. Moreover, if $\inf_{t \in \mathcal{H}} p_t(B) > 0$, then for every $\delta \in (0, 1)$ there exists $C_{\delta,B} < \infty$ such that

$$\sup_{t \in \mathcal{H}} \mathbb{E}_t[\tau_B^{(m)}] \leq \left\lceil \frac{1 + \delta}{\inf_{t \in \mathcal{H}} p_t(B)} m \right\rceil + C_{\delta,B} \quad \text{for all } m \geq 1$$

PROOF. Fix t, B , and $\delta \in (0, 1)$ and write $p \equiv p_t(B) > 0$. Recall that $\{\tau_B^{(m)} > n\} = \{S_n(B) < m\}$. By the tail-sum formula,

$$\mathbb{E}_t[\tau_B^{(m)}] = \sum_{n \geq 0} \mathbb{P}_t(\tau_B^{(m)} > n) = \sum_{n \geq 0} \mathbb{P}_t(S_n(B) < m)$$

Split the sum at n_m :

$$\mathbb{E}_t[\tau_B^{(m)}] \leq n_m + \sum_{n \geq n_m} \mathbb{P}_t(S_n(B) < m)$$

For $n \geq n_m$, we have $m/n \leq p/(1 + \delta)$, so

$$p - \frac{m}{n} \geq p - \frac{p}{1 + \delta} = \frac{\delta}{1 + \delta} p$$

Therefore,

$$\{S_n(B) < m\} \subseteq \left\{ \frac{1}{n} S_n(B) \leq p - \frac{\delta}{1 + \delta} p \right\}$$

Apply Proposition A.26 with $\varepsilon \equiv \frac{\delta}{1 + \delta} p$ to obtain

$$\mathbb{P}_t(S_n(B) < m) \leq \exp(-C n_{\text{eff}}(\theta) n \varepsilon^2) \quad \text{for all } n \geq n_m$$

for the universal constant C from Proposition A.26. The tail sum is therefore bounded by a finite geometric series:

$$\sum_{n \geq n_m} \mathbb{P}_t(S_n(B) < m) \leq \sum_{n \geq n_m} \exp(-c_{\delta,t,B} n) \leq \frac{\exp(-c_{\delta,t,B} n_m)}{1 - \exp(-c_{\delta,t,B})} \leq C_{\delta,t,B} \equiv \frac{1}{1 - \exp(-c_{\delta,t,B})}$$

where $c_{\delta,t,B} \equiv C n_{\text{eff}}(\theta) (\frac{\delta}{1 + \delta} p)^2 > 0$ and $C_{\delta,t,B} < \infty$ depends only on (δ, t, B) and the standing primitives. This proves the first claim. The uniform bound over $t \in \mathcal{H}$ follows by replacing $p_t(B)$ with $\inf_{t \in \mathcal{H}} p_t(B)$. \square

THEOREM A.28. Fix $c > 0$, $a \in (0, 1]$, and a Borel evidence window $B \subset (0, 1)$. Let $m = m(\gamma; c)$ as in Section A.3.2 and consider the robustness-check rule $\delta_{B,m,a}$. Define

$$K \equiv \left\lceil \frac{a}{\gamma} \right\rceil \quad n \equiv m + K \quad r(\gamma; c, a) \equiv \frac{m}{n}$$

Let τ^* be the selected best response stopping time. Define the worst-case non-high one-test significance probability

$$p_0^{\max}(B) \equiv \sup_{t \in \overline{\mathcal{T}}_0} \mathbb{P}_t(P_1 \in B) \in [0, 1]$$

Assume the separation condition $p_0^{\max}(B) < r(\gamma; c, a)$ (Definition A.19). Then there exist constants $C_1, c_2 > 0$ depending only on primitives and (c, a, B) such that:

(i) The non-high qualification probability satisfies

$$\mathbb{P}_0(Q_{\tau^*}(m, B)) \leq \mathbb{P}_0\left(\pi_m(H) > \frac{\gamma}{2a}\right) + C_1 \left(1 + \frac{a}{\gamma}\right) \exp\left(-c_2 n_{\text{eff}}(\theta) n (r(\gamma; c, a) - p_0^{\max}(B))^2\right)$$

(ii) The induced non-high acceptance probability satisfies

$$q_0(\delta_{B,m,a}) = a \mathbb{P}_0(Q_{\tau^*}(m, B))$$

and hence $q_0(\delta_{B,m,a})$ is bounded by a times the right-hand side in part (i).

PROOF. We bound the non-high qualification probability in three steps. First, we reduce the random horizon to a deterministic one. Since $Q_k(m, B)$ is increasing in k , Lemma A.14 gives

$$\mathbb{P}_0(Q_{\tau^*}(m, B)) \leq \mathbb{P}_0(Q_m(m, B)) + \mathbb{P}_0(\tau^* > m)$$

Next, we bound $\mathbb{P}_0(\tau^* > m)$ using the K -step lemma. Set $n = m + K$. Lemma A.24 (with $n = m$) implies

$$\mathbb{P}_0(\tau^* > m) \leq \mathbb{P}_0\left(\pi_m(H) > \frac{\gamma}{2a}\right) + \mathbb{P}_0\left(q_{m,K}^0 > \frac{\gamma}{2a}\right)$$

For the opportunity term, $q_{m,K}^0 = \mathbb{P}_0(\Delta_{m,K} | \mathcal{F}_m)$, so $\mathbb{E}_0[q_{m,K}^0] = \mathbb{P}_0(\Delta_{m,K})$, and Markov's inequality gives

$$\mathbb{P}_0\left(q_{m,K}^0 > \frac{\gamma}{2a}\right) \leq \frac{2a}{\gamma} \mathbb{P}_0(\Delta_{m,K}) \leq \frac{2a}{\gamma} \mathbb{P}_0(Q_{m+K}(m, B)),$$

where the final inequality uses $\Delta_{m,K} \subseteq Q_{m+K}(m, B)$. Since $Q_m(m, B) \subseteq Q_{m+K}(m, B)$, combining yields

$$\mathbb{P}_0(Q_{\tau^*}(m, B)) \leq \mathbb{P}_0\left(\pi_m(H) > \frac{\gamma}{2a}\right) + \left(1 + \frac{2a}{\gamma}\right) \mathbb{P}_0(Q_{m+K}(m, B)).$$

Finally, we apply concentration at the deterministic horizon $n = m + K$. Set

$$\varepsilon \equiv \frac{m}{m+K} - p_0^{\max}(B) = r(\gamma; c, a) - p_0^{\max}(B) > 0,$$

where positivity is the separation condition. Fix any non-high type $t \in \overline{\mathcal{T}}_0$ and write $p_t(B) \equiv \mathbb{P}_t(P_1 \in B) \leq p_0^{\max}(B)$. Since $Q_n(m, B) = \{S_n(B) \geq m\}$, we have

$$\mathbb{P}_t(Q_n(m, B)) = \mathbb{P}_t\left(\frac{1}{n}S_n(B) \geq \frac{m}{n}\right) \leq \mathbb{P}_t\left(\frac{1}{n}S_n(B) \geq p_t(B) + \varepsilon\right).$$

Applying Proposition A.26 yields

$$\mathbb{P}_t(Q_n(m, B)) \leq \exp(-C n_{\text{eff}}(\theta) n \varepsilon^2)$$

for a universal constant $C > 0$. Since \mathbb{P}_0 is a mixture over non-high types, the same bound holds for $\mathbb{P}_0(Q_n(m, B))$. Absorb constants into C_1, c_2 to obtain (i).

Part (ii) is immediate from Definition A.17. \square

Theorem 5.2 (restated). Maintain the standing assumptions (Appendix A.1.1), Assumption A.8, and suppose $n_{\text{eff}}(\theta) > 0$. Let B_0 be the witness window from Assumption A.2. Fix c satisfying $e^{-\ell_0}/(1-e^{-\ell_0}) < c < p_H(B_0)$ and set $m(\gamma) = \lceil c/\gamma \rceil$. Then there exist constants $c_0 > 0$ and $c_H \in (0, 1]$ such that for all sufficiently small γ ,

$$q_0(\delta_{B_0, m(\gamma)}) \leq \exp(-c_0 \kappa_{\text{eff}}) \quad q_H(\delta_{B_0, m(\gamma)}) \geq c_H$$

so $\text{FDR}(\delta_{B_0, m(\gamma)}) = \exp(-\Omega(\kappa_{\text{eff}}))$ and throughput is nonvanishing.

PROOF. We prove the bound for the more general rationed rule $\delta_{B, m, a}$ from Definition A.17; the main-text policy is the special case $a = 1$.

Fix $a \in (0, 1]$ and a constant c such that separation holds with uniform slack and the design is feasible under high types:

$$c > \frac{e^{-\ell_0}}{1 - e^{-\ell_0}} \quad \text{and} \quad c < a p_H(B_0)$$

where $(\ell_0, p_H(B_0))$ are from Assumption A.2. Write $m = m(\gamma) = \lceil c/\gamma \rceil$ and $B = B_0$. Let $\delta = \delta_{B, m, a}$ and let τ^* be the selected best-response stopping time.

Theorem A.28(i) yields

$$\mathbb{P}_0(Q_{\tau^*}(m, B)) \leq \mathbb{P}_0\left(\pi_m(H) > \frac{\gamma}{2a}\right) + C_1 \left(1 + \frac{a}{\gamma}\right) \exp\left(-c_2 n_{\text{eff}}(\theta) n (r(\gamma; c, a) - p_0^{\max}(B))^2\right) \quad (12)$$

where $n = m + \lceil a/\gamma \rceil$ and $r(\gamma; c, a) = m/n$.

Suppose separation holds with uniform slack (Definition A.19). For the witness window B_0 , Lemma A.20 implies this whenever $c > e^{-\ell_0}/(1 - e^{-\ell_0})$ (and any $a \in (0, 1]$). Under this slack, $r(\gamma; c, a) - p_0^{\max}(B) \geq \eta_0 > 0$ for all sufficiently small γ , so the exponential term in (12) is $\exp(-\Omega(n_{\text{eff}}(\theta) n)) = \exp(-\Omega(\kappa_{\text{eff}}))$. Moreover, $\log(1 + a/\gamma) = O(\log(1/\gamma)) = o(\kappa_{\text{eff}})$, so the prefactor $(1 + a/\gamma)$ can be absorbed into the exponent. Thus (12) gives

$$\mathbb{P}_0(Q_{\tau^*}(m, B)) \leq \mathbb{P}_0\left(\pi_m(H) > \frac{\gamma}{2a}\right) + \exp(-\Omega(\kappa_{\text{eff}}))$$

Since $q_0(\delta) = a \mathbb{P}_0(Q_{\tau^*}(m, B))$, we obtain

$$q_0(\delta) \leq a \mathbb{P}_0\left(\pi_m(H) > \frac{\gamma}{2a}\right) + \exp(-\Omega(\kappa_{\text{eff}}))$$

Assumption A.8 bounds the posterior tail term with $n = m$ and $\varepsilon = \gamma/(2a)$:

$$\mathbb{P}_0\left(\pi_m(H) > \frac{\gamma}{2a}\right) \leq C_{\pi, \alpha} \left(\frac{2a}{\gamma}\right)^{(\alpha-1)/\alpha} \exp\left(-\frac{\alpha-1}{\alpha} C_\alpha(\theta) n_{\text{eff}}(\theta) (m-1)\right)$$

Since $m = \lceil c/\gamma \rceil$ we have $n_{\text{eff}}(\theta) (m-1) = \Theta(\kappa_{\text{eff}})$, while $\log(2a/\gamma) = O(\log(1/\gamma)) = o(\kappa_{\text{eff}})$, so the right-hand side is $\exp(-\Omega(\kappa_{\text{eff}}))$. Therefore $q_0(\delta) \leq a \exp(-c_0 \kappa_{\text{eff}})$ for some $c_0 > 0$ and all sufficiently small γ . Appendix A.6 shows that in the ordered Gaussian AR(1) example the posterior tail term is itself $\exp(-\Omega(\kappa_{\text{eff}}))$ (Lemma A.49), which is sufficient for the robustness-check bound.

By Definition A.17, the best-response value satisfies

$$V_{m, B}(a) = \mathbb{E}[\delta(R) - \gamma \tau^*] \leq \mathbb{E}[\delta(R)] = \rho(\delta) = \pi_H q_H(\delta) + \pi_0 q_0(\delta)$$

so $\pi_H q_H(\delta) \geq V_{m, B}(a) - \pi_0 q_0(\delta)$.

To lower bound $V_{m, B}(a)$, fix $\eta \in (0, 1)$ such that $c < (1 - \eta)a p_H(B_0)$. Let $p_0^{\max} \equiv p_0^{\max}(B_0)$ and set $r_1 \equiv (p_H(B_0) + p_0^{\max})/2 \in (0, 1)$. Choose $n_1 = n_1(\gamma) \equiv \lceil L \log(1/\gamma) \rceil$ for a large constant $L > 0$, and define the stage-1 event

$$E_1 \equiv \left\{ \frac{1}{n_1} S_{n_1}(B_0) \geq r_1 \right\}$$

By Proposition A.26, $\mathbb{P}(E_1 | T \in \mathcal{H}) \rightarrow 1$ and $\mathbb{P}(E_1 | T \in \mathcal{T}_0) \rightarrow 0$, and moreover $\gamma n_1 = o(1)$.

Next define a stage-2 horizon

$$n_2 = n_2(\gamma) \equiv \left\lceil \frac{1 + \eta}{p_H(B_0)} m(\gamma) \right\rceil$$

so $\gamma n_2 \leq (1 + \eta)c/p_H(B_0) + o(1) < (1 - \eta^2)a$ for all sufficiently small γ . Consider the feasible strategy that stops at time n_1 if E_1 fails, and otherwise continues to time n_2 and then stops, disclosing all significant results in B_0 . Under $T \in \mathcal{H}$, Proposition A.26 also gives $\mathbb{P}(S_{n_2}(B_0) \geq m | T \in \mathcal{H}) \rightarrow 1$ because $m/n_2 \leq p_H(B_0)/(1 + \eta) < p_H(B_0)$. Therefore this strategy yields (for all sufficiently small γ)

$$V_{m,B}(a) \geq a \mathbb{P}(E_1 \cap \{S_{n_2}(B_0) \geq m\}) - \gamma n_1 - \gamma(n_2 - n_1) \mathbb{P}(E_1) \geq \pi_H \cdot \frac{\eta^2 a}{2}$$

after using $\mathbb{P}(E_1 \cap \{S_{n_2}(B_0) \geq m\}) \geq \pi_H(1 - o(1))$, $\mathbb{P}(E_1) = \pi_H + o(1)$, $\gamma n_1 = o(1)$, and $\gamma n_2 \leq (1 - \eta^2)a$ for all sufficiently small γ .

Combining with $q_0(\delta) = \exp(-\Omega(\kappa_{\text{eff}}))$ gives, for all sufficiently small γ ,

$$q_H(\delta) \geq \frac{\eta^2 a}{4}$$

Finally, for the false discovery rate, since $\rho(\delta) \geq \pi_H q_H(\delta) \geq \pi_H \eta^2 a/4$, we have

$$\text{FDR}(\delta) = \frac{\pi_0 q_0(\delta)}{\rho(\delta)} \leq \frac{4\pi_0}{\pi_H \eta^2 a} \exp(-c_0 \kappa_{\text{eff}}) = \exp(-\Omega(\kappa_{\text{eff}}))$$

□

A.4 Information-theoretic lower bound

This appendix collects auxiliary inequalities and proofs for the mechanism-independent frontier bounds in Section 4, including Theorems 4.3 and 4.4. We first record auxiliary inequalities, then establish a stopped-process KL budget under Assumption A.1, and finally assemble the main lower bound and its slice corollaries. The KL budget appeals to the standing assumptions in Appendix A.1.1 and the universal effort bound in Lemma A.13 (Appendix A.2).

For a policy δ , let $q_H(\delta) \equiv \mathbb{P}(A = 1 | T \in \mathcal{H})$ and $q_0(\delta) \equiv \mathbb{P}(A = 1 | T \in \mathcal{T}_0)$ denote the induced acceptance probabilities under high and non-high types. Write $\rho(\delta) = \pi_H q_H(\delta) + \pi_0 q_0(\delta)$ and $\text{FDR}(\delta) = \pi_0 q_0(\delta)/\rho(\delta)$, and let

$$K(\delta) \equiv \text{KL}(\text{Bern}(q_H(\delta)) \parallel \text{Bern}(q_0(\delta)))$$

A.4.1 Auxiliary inequalities. Fix $\alpha > 1$. For probability measures $P \ll Q$ on a measurable space, we use the order- α Rényi divergence

$$D_\alpha(P \parallel Q) \equiv \frac{1}{\alpha - 1} \log \mathbb{E}_Q \left[\left(\frac{dP}{dQ} \right)^\alpha \right].$$

LEMMA A.29. *Let $P \ll Q$ be probability measures on a measurable space and fix $\alpha > 1$. Write $L \equiv dP/dQ$. Then for every $x > 0$,*

$$Q(L \geq x) \leq x^{-\alpha} \exp((\alpha - 1)D_\alpha(P \parallel Q))$$

PROOF. By Markov's inequality,

$$Q(L \geq x) = Q(L^\alpha \geq x^\alpha) \leq \mathbb{E}_Q[L^\alpha] x^{-\alpha}$$

By definition of Rényi divergence, $\mathbb{E}_Q[L^\alpha] = \exp((\alpha - 1)D_\alpha(P \parallel Q))$. □

LEMMA A.30. Let $P \ll Q$ be probability measures on a measurable space and fix $\alpha > 1$. Assume $D_\alpha(P\|Q) < \infty$. Then for every measurable function f with values in $[0, 1]$,

$$\mathbb{E}_Q[f] \geq \mathbb{E}_P[f]^{\alpha/(\alpha-1)} \exp(-D_\alpha(P\|Q))$$

PROOF. Let $L \equiv dP/dQ$. Then $\mathbb{E}_P[f] = \mathbb{E}_Q[Lf]$. Hölder's inequality with conjugate exponents α and $\alpha/(\alpha-1)$ gives

$$\mathbb{E}_Q[Lf] \leq \mathbb{E}_Q[L^\alpha]^{1/\alpha} \mathbb{E}_Q\left[f^{\alpha/(\alpha-1)}\right]^{(\alpha-1)/\alpha}$$

Since $f \in [0, 1]$, we have $f^{\alpha/(\alpha-1)} \leq f$, so

$$\mathbb{E}_P[f] \leq \mathbb{E}_Q[L^\alpha]^{1/\alpha} \mathbb{E}_Q[f]^{(\alpha-1)/\alpha}$$

Rearranging yields

$$\mathbb{E}_Q[f] \geq \mathbb{E}_P[f]^{\alpha/(\alpha-1)} \mathbb{E}_Q[L^\alpha]^{-1/(\alpha-1)}$$

By definition of Rényi divergence, $\mathbb{E}_Q[L^\alpha] = \exp((\alpha-1)D_\alpha(P\|Q))$. Substituting proves the claim. \square

LEMMA A.31. For $p \in (0, 1]$, define $C(p) \equiv -(1-p)\log(1-p)$. Then for all $p \in (0, 1]$ and all $q \in (0, 1)$,

$$\text{KL}(p\|q) \geq p \log \frac{p}{q} - C(p)$$

Consequently, if $\text{KL}(p\|q) \leq K$ then

$$q \geq p \exp\left(-\frac{K + C(p)}{p}\right)$$

PROOF. For $p \in (0, 1]$ and $q \in (0, 1)$,

$$\text{KL}(p\|q) = p \log \frac{p}{q} + (1-p) \log \frac{1-p}{1-q}$$

Since $1-q \leq 1$

$$\log \frac{1-p}{1-q} \geq \log(1-p)$$

Thus

$$\text{KL}(p\|q) \geq p \log \frac{p}{q} + (1-p) \log(1-p)$$

Rearranging gives $\text{KL}(p\|q) \geq p \log(p/q) - C(p)$.

For the inversion, if $\text{KL}(p\|q) \leq K$ then

$$p \log \frac{p}{q} \leq K + C(p)$$

Hence

$$\log \frac{p}{q} \leq \frac{K + C(p)}{p}$$

Exponentiating yields $q \geq p \exp(-(K + C(p))/p)$. \square

COROLLARY A.32. Fix (γ, θ) and any policy δ and write $q_H \equiv q_H(\delta)$ and $q_0 \equiv q_0(\delta)$. For $q_H \in (0, 1]$, define $C(q_H) \equiv -(1-q_H)\log(1-q_H)$. Then

$$q_0 \geq q_H \exp\left(-\frac{C_\nu + D_{\text{mix}}(\theta)\mathbb{E}_H[\tau^*(\delta)] + C(q_H)}{q_H}\right)$$

PROOF. Combine Theorem 4.3 with Lemma A.31. \square

A.4.2 *Fixed-throughput and fixed-FDR slices.* Define the false discovery rate

$$\text{FDR}(\delta) \equiv \mathbb{P}(T \in \mathcal{T}_0 \mid A = 1) = \frac{\pi_0 q_0(\delta)}{\rho(\delta)}$$

with the convention that $\text{FDR}(\delta) = 0$ when $\rho(\delta) = 0$. For $\varepsilon \in (0, 1)$ define the slope

$$\eta(\varepsilon) \equiv \frac{\pi_H}{\pi_0} \cdot \frac{\varepsilon}{1 - \varepsilon}$$

and the associated log-stringency scalar

$$L(\varepsilon) \equiv \log \frac{1}{\eta(\varepsilon)} = \log \left(\frac{\pi_0(1 - \varepsilon)}{\pi_H \varepsilon} \right)$$

For the dual fixed-FDR view, define the maximal recall on an FDR slice:

$$G_{\gamma, \theta}(\varepsilon) \equiv \sup \{q_H(\delta) : \delta \text{ measurable and } \text{FDR}(\delta) \leq \varepsilon\}$$

LEMMA A.33. *Fix $\varepsilon \in (0, 1)$. For any policy δ ,*

$$\text{FDR}(\delta) \leq \varepsilon \quad \iff \quad q_0(\delta) \leq \eta(\varepsilon) q_H(\delta)$$

PROOF. If $\rho(\delta) = 0$ then $q_H(\delta) = q_0(\delta) = 0$, so both sides hold. Otherwise the equivalence is immediate from $\text{FDR} = \pi_0 q_0 / (\pi_H q_H + \pi_0 q_0)$ by rearranging. \square

COROLLARY A.34. *Fix a target throughput $\bar{\rho} \in (0, \pi_H]$. There exist constants $c, C > 0$ depending only on $(\bar{\rho}, \pi_H, \pi_0)$ and standing constants such that for every policy δ with $\rho(\delta) = \bar{\rho}$,*

$$\text{FDR}(\delta) \geq c \exp(-C \cdot \kappa_{\text{KL}}) \quad \text{equivalently} \quad q_0(\delta) \geq \frac{\bar{\rho}}{\pi_0} c \exp(-C \cdot \kappa_{\text{KL}})$$

PROOF. Write $q_H \equiv q_H(\delta)$ and $q_0 \equiv q_0(\delta)$. Under $\rho(\delta) = \bar{\rho}$ we have $\bar{\rho} = \pi_H q_H + \pi_0 q_0$ and $\text{FDR}(\delta) = \pi_0 q_0 / \bar{\rho}$.

If $q_H < \bar{\rho} / (2\pi_H)$ then $\pi_0 q_0 > \bar{\rho} / 2$ and $\text{FDR}(\delta) > 1/2$, so the claim holds after adjusting constants. Otherwise $q_H \geq \bar{\rho} / (2\pi_H)$.

By Lemma A.31 and $C(q_H) \leq 1/e$,

$$\text{KL}(\text{Bern}(q_H) \parallel \text{Bern}(q_0)) \geq q_H \log \frac{q_H}{q_0} - \frac{1}{e}$$

Combine with Theorem 4.3 to obtain

$$q_H \log \frac{q_H}{q_0} \leq C_v + \frac{\kappa_{\text{KL}}}{\pi_H} + \frac{1}{e}$$

Since $q_H \geq \bar{\rho} / (2\pi_H)$, this implies $\log(q_H/q_0) \leq C_0 + C_1 \kappa_{\text{KL}}$ for constants $C_0, C_1 > 0$ depending only on $(\bar{\rho}, \pi_H)$ and standing constants. Therefore

$$q_0 \geq q_H \exp(-C_0 - C_1 \kappa_{\text{KL}}) \geq \frac{\bar{\rho}}{2\pi_H} \exp(-C_0 - C_1 \kappa_{\text{KL}})$$

and hence

$$\text{FDR}(\delta) = \frac{\pi_0 q_0}{\bar{\rho}} \geq \frac{\pi_0}{2\pi_H} \exp(-C_0 - C_1 \kappa_{\text{KL}})$$

which is the desired $\exp(-\Theta(\kappa_{\text{KL}}))$ lower bound after relabeling constants. \square

COROLLARY A.35. *Fix $\varepsilon \in (0, 1)$ with $L(\varepsilon) > 0$. For every policy δ with $\text{FDR}(\delta) \leq \varepsilon$,*

$$q_H(\delta) L(\varepsilon) \leq C_v + \frac{\kappa_{\text{KL}}}{\pi_H} + \frac{1}{e} \quad \rho(\delta) \leq \frac{\pi_H}{1 - \varepsilon} \cdot \frac{C_v + \kappa_{\text{KL}} / \pi_H + 1/e}{L(\varepsilon)}$$

Consequently,

$$G_{\gamma, \theta}(\varepsilon) \leq 1 \wedge \frac{C_v + \kappa_{\text{KL}}/\pi_H + 1/e}{L(\varepsilon)}$$

PROOF. Fix any policy δ with $\text{FDR}(\delta) \leq \varepsilon$. By Lemma A.33, $q_0 \leq \eta(\varepsilon)q_H$. If $q_H = 0$ then $\rho(\delta) = 0$ and the claim is trivial, so assume $q_H \in (0, 1]$. Then $\log(q_H/q_0) \geq \log(1/\eta(\varepsilon)) = L(\varepsilon)$.

By Lemma A.31 and $C(q_H) \leq 1/e$,

$$\text{KL}(\text{Bern}(q_H) \parallel \text{Bern}(q_0)) \geq q_H \log \frac{q_H}{q_0} - \frac{1}{e} \geq q_H L(\varepsilon) - \frac{1}{e}$$

Combine with Theorem 4.3 to obtain

$$q_H(\delta) \cdot L(\varepsilon) \leq C_v + \frac{\kappa_{\text{KL}}}{\pi_H} + \frac{1}{e}$$

Taking the supremum over policies yields the bound on $G_{\gamma, \theta}(\varepsilon)$. Finally, $\text{FDR}(\delta) \leq \varepsilon$ implies $\pi_0 q_0 \leq \varepsilon \rho$, hence $\pi_H q_H = \rho - \pi_0 q_0 \geq (1 - \varepsilon)\rho$ and $\rho \leq \pi_H q_H / (1 - \varepsilon)$. \square

A.4.3 Proof of Theorem 4.4. Theorem 4.4 (restated). Fix θ and consider $\gamma \downarrow 0$. Let δ^γ be any sequence of policies with selected best-response stopping times τ^γ and induced operating points (q_H^γ, q_0^γ) . Assume $\liminf_{\gamma \downarrow 0} q_H^\gamma \geq c_H > 0$. If $\mathbb{E}_H[\tau^\gamma] = o(1/\gamma)$ then $K(\delta^\gamma) = o(\kappa_{\text{KL}})$ and hence $-\log q_0^\gamma = o(\kappa_{\text{KL}})$ (equivalently $q_0^\gamma = \exp(-o(\kappa_{\text{KL}}))$), implying $\text{FDR}(\delta^\gamma) \geq \exp(-o(\kappa_{\text{KL}}))$ on any throughput floor $\rho(\delta^\gamma) \geq \bar{\rho} > 0$. If instead $\mathbb{E}_H[\tau^\gamma] = O(1)$ then q_0^γ is bounded away from 0 for all sufficiently small γ (and hence $\text{FDR}(\delta^\gamma)$ is bounded away from 0 as well).

PROOF. Fix θ and a sequence $\gamma \downarrow 0$. Let δ^γ be any sequence of policies with induced operating points (q_H^γ, q_0^γ) under the selected best response τ^γ . Assume $\liminf_{\gamma \downarrow 0} q_H^\gamma \geq c_H > 0$.

By the universal KL budget (Theorem 4.3),

$$K(\delta^\gamma) = \text{KL}(\text{Bern}(q_H^\gamma) \parallel \text{Bern}(q_0^\gamma)) \leq C_v + D_{\text{mix}}(\theta) \mathbb{E}_H[\tau^\gamma]$$

By Lemma A.31 and $C(q_H^\gamma) \leq 1/e$,

$$K(\delta^\gamma) \geq q_H^\gamma \log \frac{q_H^\gamma}{q_0^\gamma} - \frac{1}{e}$$

Therefore,

$$\log \frac{q_H^\gamma}{q_0^\gamma} \leq \frac{K(\delta^\gamma) + 1/e}{q_H^\gamma}$$

By the recall assumption, for all sufficiently small γ we have $q_H^\gamma \geq c_H/2$, so

$$-\log q_0^\gamma \leq \log \frac{1}{q_H^\gamma} + \frac{K(\delta^\gamma) + 1/e}{q_H^\gamma} \leq O(1) + O(K(\delta^\gamma))$$

If $\mathbb{E}_H[\tau^\gamma] = o(1/\gamma)$, then $D_{\text{mix}}(\theta) \mathbb{E}_H[\tau^\gamma] = o(D_{\text{mix}}(\theta)/\gamma) = o(\kappa_{\text{KL}})$ and hence $K(\delta^\gamma) = C_v + o(\kappa_{\text{KL}}) = o(\kappa_{\text{KL}})$. Substituting into the bound above yields $-\log q_0^\gamma = o(\kappa_{\text{KL}})$. On any throughput floor $\rho(\delta^\gamma) \geq \bar{\rho} > 0$ we therefore have

$$\text{FDR}(\delta^\gamma) = \frac{\pi_0 q_0^\gamma}{\rho(\delta^\gamma)} \geq \frac{\pi_0}{\bar{\rho}} q_0^\gamma = \exp(-o(\kappa_{\text{KL}}))$$

If instead $\mathbb{E}_H[\tau^\gamma] = O(1)$, then $K(\delta^\gamma) = O(1)$ and the same bound implies q_0^γ is bounded away from 0 for all sufficiently small γ (and hence $\text{FDR}(\delta^\gamma)$ is bounded away from 0 as well). \square

A.4.4 *Proof of Corollary 5.3.* Corollary 5.3 (restated). Assume $D_{\text{mix}}(\theta) \asymp n_{\text{eff}}(\theta)$ so $\kappa_{\text{KL}} = \Theta(\kappa_{\text{eff}})$. Then robustness-check policies with $m(\gamma) = \Theta(1/\gamma)$ attain the optimal purification scale on both slices:

- (1) on any nonvanishing-throughput slice, $\text{FDR} = \exp(-\Theta(\kappa_{\text{KL}}))$ is achievable and unimprovable up to constants in the exponent;
- (2) on the fixed-FDR slice, sustaining nonvanishing throughput requires $\log(1/\varepsilon) = O(\kappa_{\text{KL}})$; conversely, there exists $c_\star > 0$ such that any target sequence satisfying $\log(1/\varepsilon) \leq c_\star \kappa_{\text{KL}}$ is attainable by an appropriate choice of $m(\gamma) = \Theta(1/\gamma)$ without collapsing throughput.

PROOF. Assume comparability $D_{\text{mix}}(\theta) \asymp n_{\text{eff}}(\theta)$ so $\kappa_{\text{KL}} = \Theta(\kappa_{\text{eff}})$.

On any fixed-throughput slice $\rho(\delta) = \bar{\rho} > 0$, Corollary A.34 implies

$$\text{FDR}(\delta) \geq \exp(-O(\kappa_{\text{KL}}))$$

so no policy can purify faster than $\exp(-O(\kappa_{\text{KL}}))$ at nonvanishing throughput. On the other hand, Theorem 5.2 gives a robustness-check design with nonvanishing recall and

$$\text{FDR} = \exp(-\Omega(\kappa_{\text{eff}})) = \exp(-\Omega(\kappa_{\text{KL}}))$$

so under comparability robustness checks attain $\exp(-\Theta(\kappa_{\text{KL}}))$ purification up to constants in the exponent.

If a policy satisfies $\text{FDR}(\delta) \leq \varepsilon$, Corollary A.35 implies

$$\rho(\delta) \leq \frac{\pi_H}{1-\varepsilon} \cdot \frac{C_v + \kappa_{\text{KL}}/\pi_H + 1/e}{L(\varepsilon)} \quad \text{where } L(\varepsilon) = \log\left(\frac{\pi_0(1-\varepsilon)}{\pi_H\varepsilon}\right) \asymp \log\frac{1}{\varepsilon}$$

Thus sustaining nonvanishing throughput while $\varepsilon \downarrow 0$ requires $\log(1/\varepsilon) = O(\kappa_{\text{KL}})$, and no policy can substantially improve the exponent beyond the κ_{KL} -scale without collapsing throughput. Conversely, under comparability Theorem 5.2 gives a robustness-check design with nonvanishing throughput and

$$\text{FDR} \leq \exp(-c_\star \kappa_{\text{KL}})$$

for some constant $c_\star > 0$. Therefore any target sequence satisfying $\log(1/\varepsilon) \leq c_\star \kappa_{\text{KL}}$ is attained by such a $m(\gamma) = \Theta(1/\gamma)$ design. \square

A.4.5 A stopped-process KL budget.

LEMMA A.36. Let P and Q be Markov laws for a latent process $(X_n)_{n \geq 1}$ with initial distributions ν_P, ν_Q and transition kernels K_P, K_Q . Let τ be a stopping time for the natural filtration $\mathcal{G}_n \equiv \sigma(X_1, \dots, X_n)$. Assume $\nu_P \ll \nu_Q$ and $K_P(x, \cdot) \ll K_Q(x, \cdot)$ for all x . Then

$$\text{KL}(\mathcal{L}_P(X_{1:\tau}) \parallel \mathcal{L}_Q(X_{1:\tau})) \leq \text{KL}(\nu_P \parallel \nu_Q) + \mathbb{E}_P \left[\sum_{n=1}^{\tau-1} \text{KL}(K_P(X_n, \cdot) \parallel K_Q(X_n, \cdot)) \right]$$

PROOF. Let Δ be a cemetery symbol and define the stopped process $Y_n \equiv X_n$ on $\{n \leq \tau\}$ and $Y_n \equiv \Delta$ on $\{n > \tau\}$. For $N \geq 1$, define the truncated stopping time $\tau_N \equiv \tau \wedge N$. Then $X_{1:\tau_N}$ is a measurable function of $Y_{1:N}$ (erase trailing Δ 's), hence by data processing,

$$\text{KL}(\mathcal{L}_P(X_{1:\tau_N}) \parallel \mathcal{L}_Q(X_{1:\tau_N})) \leq \text{KL}(\mathcal{L}_P(Y_{1:N}) \parallel \mathcal{L}_Q(Y_{1:N})) \quad \text{for every } N \geq 1$$

By the chain rule for relative entropy (e.g. Gray [1990, Eq. (2.24)]),

$$\text{KL}(\mathcal{L}_P(Y_{1:N}) \parallel \mathcal{L}_Q(Y_{1:N})) = \text{KL}(\nu_P \parallel \nu_Q) + \sum_{n=1}^{N-1} \mathbb{E}_P \left[\text{KL}(\mathcal{L}_P(Y_{n+1} \mid Y_{1:n}) \parallel \mathcal{L}_Q(Y_{n+1} \mid Y_{1:n})) \right]$$

On the event $\{\tau \leq n\}$ we have $Y_{n+1} \equiv \Delta$ under both P and Q , so the conditional KL is 0. On $\{\tau > n\}$, we have $Y_{1:n} = X_{1:n}$ and $\{\tau > n\} \in \mathcal{G}_n$, so by the Markov property,

$$\mathcal{L}_P(Y_{n+1} | Y_{1:n}) = \mathcal{L}_P(X_{n+1} | X_n) = K_P(X_n, \cdot) \quad \mathcal{L}_Q(Y_{n+1} | Y_{1:n}) = K_Q(X_n, \cdot)$$

Therefore,

$$\text{KL}(\mathcal{L}_P(Y_{1:N}) \parallel \mathcal{L}_Q(Y_{1:N})) \leq \text{KL}(v_P \parallel v_Q) + \mathbb{E}_P \left[\sum_{n=1}^{N-1} \mathbf{1}\{\tau > n\} \text{KL}(K_P(X_n, \cdot) \parallel K_Q(X_n, \cdot)) \right]$$

Combining with the data-processing inequality above yields, for every N ,

$$\text{KL}(\mathcal{L}_P(X_{1:\tau_N}) \parallel \mathcal{L}_Q(X_{1:\tau_N})) \leq \text{KL}(v_P \parallel v_Q) + \mathbb{E}_P \left[\sum_{n=1}^{\tau_N-1} \text{KL}(K_P(X_n, \cdot) \parallel K_Q(X_n, \cdot)) \right]$$

Finally, as $N \rightarrow \infty$ we have $\tau_N \uparrow \tau$ and the stopped history $X_{1:\tau}$ is generated by the increasing truncations $(X_{1:\tau_N})_{N \geq 1}$. Therefore $\text{KL}(\mathcal{L}_P(X_{1:\tau_N}) \parallel \mathcal{L}_Q(X_{1:\tau_N})) \uparrow \text{KL}(\mathcal{L}_P(X_{1:\tau}) \parallel \mathcal{L}_Q(X_{1:\tau}))$, and monotone convergence yields the claim. \square

LEMMA A.37. *Maintain Assumption A.1. Fix any policy δ and let $\tau^*(\delta)$ be the selected optimal stopping time. Let R be the induced report and let \mathcal{L}_H and \mathcal{L}_0 denote the induced laws under $T \in \mathcal{H}$ and $T \in \mathcal{T}_0$. Then*

$$\text{KL}(\mathcal{L}_H(R) \parallel \mathcal{L}_0(R)) \leq C_v + D_{\text{mix}}(\theta) \mathbb{E}_H[\tau^*(\delta)]$$

PROOF. By data processing, the report is a measurable function of the latent stopped history

$$(X_1, \dots, X_{\tau^*(\delta)})$$

Hence

$$\text{KL}(\mathcal{L}_H(R) \parallel \mathcal{L}_0(R)) \leq \text{KL}(\mathcal{L}_H(X_{1:\tau^*}) \parallel \mathcal{L}_0(X_{1:\tau^*}))$$

We bound the right-hand side by handling the non-high mixture at the path level. Let μ_H denote the conditional law of T given $T \in \mathcal{H}$ and let μ_0 denote the conditional law given $T \in \mathcal{T}_0$. For each high type $t_H \in \mathcal{H}$ and non-high type $t_0 \in \mathcal{T}_0$, write

$$P_{t_H} \equiv \mathcal{L}(X_{1:\tau^*} | T = t_H) \quad Q_{t_0} \equiv \mathcal{L}(X_{1:\tau^*} | T = t_0)$$

Then

$$\mathcal{L}_H(X_{1:\tau^*}) = \int P_{t_H} \mu_H(dt_H) \quad \mathcal{L}_0(X_{1:\tau^*}) = \int Q_{t_0} \mu_0(dt_0)$$

For fixed t_H , by convexity of KL in its second argument,

$$\text{KL}(P_{t_H} \parallel \mathcal{L}_0(X_{1:\tau^*})) \leq \int \text{KL}(P_{t_H} \parallel Q_{t_0}) \mu_0(dt_0)$$

By convexity of KL in its first argument,

$$\text{KL}(\mathcal{L}_H(X_{1:\tau^*}) \parallel \mathcal{L}_0(X_{1:\tau^*})) \leq \int \text{KL}(P_{t_H} \parallel \mathcal{L}_0(X_{1:\tau^*})) \mu_H(dt_H)$$

Combining,

$$\text{KL}(\mathcal{L}_H(X_{1:\tau^*}) \parallel \mathcal{L}_0(X_{1:\tau^*})) \leq \int \int \text{KL}(P_{t_H} \parallel Q_{t_0}) \mu_0(dt_0) \mu_H(dt_H)$$

Fix (t_H, t_0) . Since $P_n = p(X_n)$, the observation filtration satisfies $\sigma(P_1, \dots, P_n) \subseteq \sigma(X_1, \dots, X_n)$, so τ^\star is also a stopping time for the latent chain filtration. Under Assumption A.1, both type-conditional laws are Markov with stationary distributions ν_{t_H}, ν_{t_0} and transition kernels $K_{t_H}^\theta, K_{t_0}^\theta$. By Lemma A.36,

$$\text{KL}(P_{t_H} \| Q_{t_0}) \leq \text{KL}(\nu_{t_H} \| \nu_{t_0}) + \mathbb{E}_{t_H} \left[\sum_{n=1}^{\tau^\star-1} \text{KL} \left(K_{t_H}^\theta(X_n, \cdot) \parallel K_{t_0}^\theta(X_n, \cdot) \right) \right]$$

By (6), $\text{KL}(\nu_{t_H} \| \nu_{t_0}) \leq C_v$. Moreover, by definition of $D(t_H \rightarrow t_0; \theta)$ and since $\sum_{n=1}^{\tau^\star-1} 1 \leq \tau^\star$,

$$\mathbb{E}_{t_H} \left[\sum_{n=1}^{\tau^\star-1} \text{KL} \left(K_{t_H}^\theta(X_n, \cdot) \parallel K_{t_0}^\theta(X_n, \cdot) \right) \right] \leq D(t_H \rightarrow t_0; \theta) \mathbb{E}_{t_H} [\tau^\star]$$

Therefore,

$$\text{KL}(P_{t_H} \| Q_{t_0}) \leq C_v + D(t_H \rightarrow t_0; \theta) \mathbb{E}_{t_H} [\tau^\star]$$

Integrating over μ_0 and using (5) gives, for μ_H -a.e. t_H ,

$$\int \text{KL}(P_{t_H} \| Q_{t_0}) \mu_0(dt_0) \leq C_v + D_{\text{mix}}(\theta) \mathbb{E}_{t_H} [\tau^\star]$$

Integrating over μ_H and using $\mathbb{E}_H[\tau^\star] = \int \mathbb{E}_{t_H}[\tau^\star] \mu_H(dt_H)$ yields

$$\text{KL}(\mathcal{L}_H(X_{1:\tau^\star}) \parallel \mathcal{L}_0(X_{1:\tau^\star})) \leq C_v + D_{\text{mix}}(\theta) \mathbb{E}_H[\tau^\star]$$

Combining with the initial data-processing step proves the claim. \square

A.4.6 Proof of Theorem 4.3. Theorem 4.3 (restated). There exists a constant $C_v < \infty$ from Assumption A.1 such that for every policy δ with selected best-response stopping time $\tau^\star(\delta)$,

$$K(\delta) \leq C_v + D_{\text{mix}}(\theta) \mathbb{E}_H[\tau^\star(\delta)] \leq C_v + \frac{\kappa_{\text{KL}}}{\pi_H}$$

PROOF. Fix an environment (y, θ) and an acceptance policy δ with selected best response $\sigma^\star(\delta)$. Let R denote the induced report and let $A \in \{0, 1\}$ denote the induced acceptance decision. By construction, conditional on R the journal draws $U \sim \text{Unif}[0, 1]$ independently and sets $A = 1\{U \leq \delta(R)\}$, so A is generated from R by a Markov kernel. Therefore, data processing yields

$$\text{KL}(\mathcal{L}_H(A) \parallel \mathcal{L}_0(A)) \leq \text{KL}(\mathcal{L}_H(R) \parallel \mathcal{L}_0(R))$$

Since $\mathcal{L}_H(A) = \text{Bern}(q_H(\delta))$ and $\mathcal{L}_0(A) = \text{Bern}(q_0(\delta))$, the left-hand side equals

$$\text{KL}(\text{Bern}(q_H(\delta)) \parallel \text{Bern}(q_0(\delta)))$$

By Lemma A.37,

$$\text{KL}(\mathcal{L}_H(R) \parallel \mathcal{L}_0(R)) \leq C_v + D_{\text{mix}}(\theta) \mathbb{E}_H[\tau^\star(\delta)]$$

Combining the displays gives the first inequality in Theorem 4.3. Finally, Lemma A.13 implies $\mathbb{E}_H[\tau^\star(\delta)] \leq 1/(\pi_H \gamma)$, which yields the second display. \square

A.5 Short reports and extra information from selection

This appendix provides the technical change-of-measure machinery behind Theorem 4.5. We formalize a truncated-report divergence bound and an extra-information-from-selection term Λ_{sel} , and then use them to prove the theorem and its disclosure-scaling implication. The argument relies on the report-space formalization in Appendix A.1.2 and uses the monotonicity tools in Appendix A.2 to obtain verifiable selection-control conditions (verified in Appendix A.6.5).

A.5.1 *A short-report (truncated-report) Rényi budget.* Fix an integer horizon $n \geq 1$. Let τ be the (selected) stopping time and let $R \in \mathcal{R}$ be the reported counting measure on $(0, 1)$ (equivalently, the reported multiset of p -values; see Section A.2.1). Define the truncated report

$$\tilde{R}^{(n)} \equiv \begin{cases} R & \tau \leq n \\ \perp & \tau > n \end{cases}$$

where \perp is a cemetery symbol.

The proof of Theorem 4.5 proceeds by applying a Rényi change-of-measure bound to the acceptance event truncated at a large horizon n_γ . The key input is that, under short disclosure and negligible extra information from selection, the truncated report $\tilde{R}^{(n_\gamma)}$ cannot carry κ_{eff} -scale separation between H and 0 . Accordingly we work with an explicit *truncated-report* Rényi divergence bound for $\tilde{R}^{(n)}$. This is the natural object because the journal observes only the disclosed report; bounding the divergence of an augmented output that reveals unobserved selection objects (such as (τ, I)) can be overly conservative in multi-type window environments.

We obtain a sufficient condition for the truncated-report budget by upper bounding the divergence of $\tilde{R}^{(n)}$ by that of an augmented transcript that includes the stopping time and disclosed indices. The only place where this augmentation can be conservative is in comparing the induced selection weights under H versus 0 ; we isolate this as a belief-state extra-information-from-selection term $\Lambda_{\text{sel}}(n, k)$.

The bound is written in terms of a marginal Rényi rate $d_\alpha(\theta)$. We maintain the subset Rényi growth condition in Assumption A.6.

Fix a horizon n and a report cap m (so $|R| \leq m$ almost surely). On $\{\tau \leq n\}$ let $I \subseteq \{1, \dots, \tau\}$ be the (random) set of disclosed indices, so $|I| \leq m$. Define $J \equiv I \cup \{\tau\}$, so $|J| \leq m + 1$. Define the augmented truncated transcript

$$\widehat{R}^{(n)} \equiv \begin{cases} (\tau, I, Z_J) & \tau \leq n \\ \perp & \tau > n \end{cases}$$

where Z_J is listed in increasing index order and \perp is a cemetery symbol. Then $\tilde{R}^{(n)}$ is a measurable function of $\widehat{R}^{(n)}$, hence by data processing,

$$D_\alpha(\mathcal{L}_H(\tilde{R}^{(n)}) \parallel \mathcal{L}_0(\tilde{R}^{(n)})) \leq D_\alpha(\mathcal{L}_H(\widehat{R}^{(n)}) \parallel \mathcal{L}_0(\widehat{R}^{(n)}))$$

For each component $c \equiv (t, I)$ of $\widehat{R}^{(n)}$ with $t \leq n$, write $J(c) \equiv I \cup \{t\}$ and let $w_u^{(c)}(z_{J(c)})$ denote the conditional probability under $u \in \{H, 0\}$ that the transcript equals (t, I) given $Z_{J(c)} = z_{J(c)}$. For the cemetery component, set $J(\perp) \equiv \emptyset$ and write $w_u^{(\perp)} \equiv \mathbb{P}_u(\tau > n)$. We define the order-0 (log-LR) extra-information-from-selection term as

$$\Lambda_{\text{sel}}(n, k) \equiv \sup_{\substack{c \in \{\perp\} \cup \{(t, I): t \leq n\} \\ |J(c)| \leq k}} \text{ess sup}_{z_{J(c)}} \log \frac{w_H^{(c)}(z_{J(c)})}{w_0^{(c)}(z_{J(c)})} \in [0, \infty] \quad (13)$$

$\mathbb{P}_0(\widehat{R}^{(n)} \text{ is in component } c) > 0$

where the essential supremum is taken with respect to the conditional law

$$\mathcal{L}_0(Z_{J(c)} \mid \widehat{R}^{(n)} \text{ is in component } c)$$

Equivalently, it is taken with respect to the unnormalized measure $w_0^{(c)}(z_{J(c)}) \mathcal{L}_0(Z_{J(c)})(dz_{J(c)})$, so $\Lambda_{\text{sel}}(n, k)$ ignores zero-probability transcript components under \mathcal{L}_0 . Intuitively, $\Lambda_{\text{sel}}(n, k)$ quantifies how much additional H -vs- 0 likelihood ratio can be created by endogenous stopping and selective disclosure beyond what is already carried by the disclosed coordinates.

The definition (13) is endogenous: it depends on the equilibrium stopping and reporting rule induced by the journal's policy. Theorem 4.5 therefore treats Λ_{sel} as a primitive "extra information from selection" object and assumes only that it is negligible on the κ_{eff} scale along the relevant equilibrium sequence.

Assumption A.38. Along the equilibrium sequence considered in Theorem 4.5, with truncation horizon

$$n_\gamma \equiv \left\lceil \frac{8}{\gamma} \log \frac{1}{\gamma} \right\rceil$$

we have

$$\Lambda_{\text{sel}}(n_\gamma, m(\gamma) + 1) = o(\kappa_{\text{eff}}) \quad \text{as } \gamma \downarrow 0$$

Since $n \mapsto \Lambda_{\text{sel}}(n, k)$ is nondecreasing, Assumption A.38 also implies $\Lambda_{\text{sel}}(n, m(\gamma) + 1) = o(\kappa_{\text{eff}})$ for every $n = O(1/\gamma)$. Appendix A.6.5 verifies Assumption A.38 in the ordered three-type Gaussian AR(1) example by checking the ordered-sandwiching sufficient condition in Proposition A.41; in particular, selection contributes only an $O(1)$ additive term (hence is negligible on the κ_{eff} scale).

PROPOSITION A.39. Fix $\alpha > 1$ and integers $n \geq 1$ and $m \geq 0$. Maintain Assumption A.6. Then for every equilibrium in which $|R| \leq m$ almost surely,

$$D_\alpha(\mathcal{L}_H(\tilde{R}^{(n)}) \parallel \mathcal{L}_0(\tilde{R}^{(n)})) \leq (m+1)d_\alpha(\theta) + \frac{1}{\alpha-1} \log \left(\sum_{k=0}^{m+1} \binom{n+1}{k} \right) + \Lambda_{\text{sel}}(n, m+1).$$

PROOF. We upper bound the Rényi divergence of the truncated report by that of the augmented transcript $\widehat{R}^{(n)}$. For $\widehat{R}^{(n)}$, we expand the α -moment of the likelihood ratio over its disjoint components c . On each component c , the likelihood ratio factors into (i) the marginal likelihood ratio of the disclosed coordinates Z_J and (ii) a ratio of conditional selection weights $w_H^{(c)}/w_0^{(c)}$ capturing the extra information carried by stopping and disclosure. The marginal term is controlled by Assumption A.6, while the selection term is controlled by $\Lambda_{\text{sel}}(n, m+1)$. Counting the number of possible components yields the combinatorial term.

By data processing,

$$D_\alpha(\mathcal{L}_H(\tilde{R}^{(n)}) \parallel \mathcal{L}_0(\tilde{R}^{(n)})) \leq D_\alpha(\mathcal{L}_H(\widehat{R}^{(n)}) \parallel \mathcal{L}_0(\widehat{R}^{(n)}))$$

Let $P \equiv \mathcal{L}_H(\widehat{R}^{(n)})$ and $Q \equiv \mathcal{L}_0(\widehat{R}^{(n)})$, and let $L \equiv dP/dQ$. Then

$$\exp\left((\alpha-1)D_\alpha(\mathcal{L}_H(\widehat{R}^{(n)}) \parallel \mathcal{L}_0(\widehat{R}^{(n)}))\right) = \mathbb{E}_Q[L^\alpha]$$

Since the components of $\widehat{R}^{(n)}$ are disjoint (including the cemetery component \perp),

$$\mathbb{E}_Q[L^\alpha] = \sum_c \mathbb{E}_Q\left[L^\alpha \mathbf{1}\{\widehat{R}^{(n)} \text{ is in component } c\}\right]$$

Fix a component c . If $c = \perp$, set $J \equiv \emptyset$ and recall $w_u^{(\perp)} = \mathbb{P}_u(\tau > n)$. If $c \equiv (t, I)$ with $t \leq n$, set $J \equiv J(c) = I \cup \{t\}$ and recall $w_u^{(c)}(z_J) = \mathbb{P}_u((\tau, I) = c \mid Z_J = z_J)$.

Write $\ell_J(z_J) \equiv d\mathcal{L}_H(Z_J)/d\mathcal{L}_0(Z_J)(z_J)$ for the marginal likelihood ratio on the disclosed coordinates (with the convention $\ell_\emptyset \equiv 1$). On component c , the likelihood ratio factors as

$$L = \ell_J(Z_J) \cdot \frac{w_H^{(c)}(Z_J)}{w_0^{(c)}(Z_J)} \quad Q\text{-almost surely}$$

Therefore,

$$\mathbb{E}_Q \left[L^\alpha \mathbf{1}\{\widehat{R}^{(n)} \text{ is in component } c\} \right] = \int \ell_J(z_J)^\alpha \left(\frac{w_H^{(c)}(z_J)}{w_0^{(c)}(z_J)} \right)^\alpha w_0^{(c)}(z_J) \mathcal{L}_0(Z_J)(dz_J)$$

where we interpret the integrand as zero on $\{w_0^{(c)}(z_J) = 0\}$.

Since $w_H^{(c)} \in [0, 1]$ and $\alpha > 1$, on $\{w_0^{(c)}(z_J) > 0\}$ we have

$$\left(\frac{w_H^{(c)}}{w_0^{(c)}} \right)^\alpha w_0^{(c)} = \left(\frac{w_H^{(c)}}{w_0^{(c)}} \right)^{\alpha-1} w_0^{(c)} \leq \left(\frac{w_H^{(c)}}{w_0^{(c)}} \right)^{\alpha-1}$$

By definition of $\Lambda_{\text{sel}}(n, m+1)$ and since $|J| \leq m+1$ on every component,

$$\left(\frac{w_H^{(c)}(z_J)}{w_0^{(c)}(z_J)} \right)^{\alpha-1} \leq e^{(\alpha-1)\Lambda_{\text{sel}}(n, m+1)}$$

for $(w_0^{(c)}(z_J) \mathcal{L}_0(Z_J)(dz_J))$ -a.e. z_J . Thus each component satisfies

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}_Q \left[L^\alpha \mathbf{1}\{\widehat{R}^{(n)} \text{ is in component } c\} \right] &\leq e^{(\alpha-1)\Lambda_{\text{sel}}(n, m+1)} \int \ell_J(z_J)^\alpha \mathcal{L}_0(Z_J)(dz_J) \\ &= \exp\left((\alpha-1)\{\Lambda_{\text{sel}}(n, m+1) + D_\alpha(\mathcal{L}_H(Z_J) \parallel \mathcal{L}_0(Z_J))\}\right) \end{aligned}$$

By Assumption A.6 and $|J| \leq m+1$,

$$D_\alpha(\mathcal{L}_H(Z_J) \parallel \mathcal{L}_0(Z_J)) \leq (m+1)d_\alpha(\theta)$$

For each $t \leq n$ and each $k \leq \min\{m, t\}$ there are $\binom{t}{k}$ index sets $I \subseteq \{1, \dots, t\}$ of size k . Thus the number of non-cemetery components of the form (t, I) is at most

$$\sum_{t=0}^n \sum_{k=0}^{\min\{m, t\}} \binom{t}{k}$$

and including the cemetery component gives at most

$$1 + \sum_{t=0}^n \sum_{k=0}^{\min\{m, t\}} \binom{t}{k} = \sum_{k=0}^{m+1} \binom{n+1}{k}$$

using $\sum_{t=k}^n \binom{t}{k} = \binom{n+1}{k+1}$. Summing the component bounds therefore yields

$$\exp\left((\alpha-1)D_\alpha(\mathcal{L}_H(\widehat{R}^{(n)}) \parallel \mathcal{L}_0(\widehat{R}^{(n)}))\right) \leq \left(\sum_{k=0}^{m+1} \binom{n+1}{k} \right) e^{(\alpha-1)\{(m+1)d_\alpha(\theta) + \Lambda_{\text{sel}}(n, m+1)\}}$$

Taking logs and dividing by $\alpha-1$ gives the stated bound. \square

A.5.2 A sufficient condition for Assumption A.38. Assumption A.38 is the most opaque primitive in the short-report analysis because it is endogenous: it depends on the equilibrium stopping and disclosure rule induced by the journal's policy. The sufficient condition below is stated for a generic finite environment (it does not assume an AR(1) structure); Appendix A.6.5 verifies it in the Gaussian AR(1) running example. In many ordered environments, however, selection can create at most a constant amount of additional H -vs-0 likelihood ratio beyond what is already carried by the disclosed coordinates. The next proposition records one sufficient condition.

Assumption A.40. Fix $n \geq 1$ and consider an equilibrium with $|R| \leq m$ almost surely for some $m \geq 0$. Let $\widehat{R}^{(n)}$ be the augmented truncated transcript from Appendix A.5.1 with components $c \equiv (t, I)$ and $J(c) = I \cup \{t\}$. We assume that for every component c with $\mathbb{P}_0(\widehat{R}^{(n)} \text{ is in component } c) > 0$ and $\mathcal{L}_0(Z_{J(c)} \mid \widehat{R}^{(n)} \text{ is in component } c)$ -a.e. $z_{J(c)}$, the conditional selection event $\{(\tau, I) = c\}$ viewed as a subset of the omitted coordinates $Z_{-J(c)}$ given $Z_{J(c)} = z_{J(c)}$ is two-sided monotone (Definition A.11) in the coordinatewise order.

Assumption A.40 holds, for example, if conditional on disclosed coordinates the transcript component is determined by whether a scalar belief statistic of the omitted coordinates (e.g. posterior odds or a likelihood-ratio statistic) lies outside an interval, and that statistic is coordinatewise increasing; Lemma A.12 records this scalar sufficient condition.

The key structural requirement is a conditional stochastic ordering: given any disclosed subvector $Z_J = z_J$, the conditional law of the omitted coordinates under H is sandwiched between the laws under two non-high types in the down-set order. Intuitively, this is a conditional form of “ H lies between two extremes” on the evidence scale. It holds in many ordered multi-type settings; Appendix A.6.5 verifies it explicitly in the ordered three-type Gaussian AR(1) example via an exact monotone-shift property.

In the i.i.d. benchmark, ordered sandwiching reduces to a transparent parameter ordering in many one-dimensional exponential-family models with the monotone likelihood ratio property: (14) holds whenever the high type is bracketed by two non-high extremes (e.g. $\mu_N < \mu_H < \mu_L$ in the Gaussian location model). The polar case where all high types lie on one side of all non-high types corresponds to one-sided (threshold) screening, and can be treated by a one-sided variant under one-sided transcript events; Corollary A.42 records such a bound.

A common route to ordered sandwiching is a conditional mean-shift property: if, given $Z_J = z_J$, the conditional law of Z_{-J} has a type-independent covariance and its conditional mean shifts coordinatewise with the type parameter, then down-set probabilities are ordered by translation.

PROPOSITION A.41. Fix $\alpha > 1$ and integers $n \geq 1$ and $m \geq 0$. Consider any finite environment with \mathcal{H} possibly multi-valued and non-high set \mathcal{T}_0 . Assume there exist two non-high types $t^-, t^+ \in \mathcal{T}_0$ with prior weights

$$\pi_{t^-}^0 \equiv \mathbb{P}(T = t^- \mid T \in \mathcal{T}_0) > 0 \quad \pi_{t^+}^0 \equiv \mathbb{P}(T = t^+ \mid T \in \mathcal{T}_0) > 0 \quad \pi_{\min}^{0,\pm} \equiv \min\{\pi_{t^-}^0, \pi_{t^+}^0\}$$

such that for every index set $J \subseteq \{1, \dots, n\}$, every z_J , and every down-set $D \subseteq \mathbb{R}^{|-J|}$,

$$\mathbb{P}_{t^+}(Z_{-J} \in D \mid Z_J = z_J) \leq \mathbb{P}_H(Z_{-J} \in D \mid Z_J = z_J) \leq \mathbb{P}_{t^-}(Z_{-J} \in D \mid Z_J = z_J) \quad (14)$$

where $\mathbb{P}_H(\cdot \mid Z_J = z_J)$ denotes the conditional law under $T \in \mathcal{H}$.

Assume an equilibrium in which $|R| \leq m$ almost surely, and consider the augmented truncated transcript $\widehat{R}^{(n)}$ with components $c \equiv (t, I)$ and $J(c) = I \cup \{t\}$ from Appendix A.5.1. Assume Assumption A.40. Finally, assume there exists $d_\alpha(\theta) < \infty$ such that for every $J \subseteq \{1, \dots, n\}$ and each $u \in \{t^-, t^+\}$,

$$D_\alpha(\mathcal{L}_H(Z_J) \parallel \mathcal{L}_u(Z_J)) \leq |J| d_\alpha(\theta)$$

Then the truncated-report Rényi divergence satisfies

$$D_\alpha(\mathcal{L}_H(\tilde{R}^{(n)}) \parallel \mathcal{L}_0(\tilde{R}^{(n)})) \leq (m+1)d_\alpha(\theta) + \frac{1}{\alpha-1} \log \left(\sum_{k=0}^{m+1} \binom{n+1}{k} \right) + \log \frac{1}{\pi_{\min}^{0,\pm}} + C_\alpha$$

where $C_\alpha < \infty$ depends only on α . In particular, ordered sandwiching and two-sided transcript events contribute only an $O_\alpha(1) + \log(1/\pi_{\min}^{0,\pm})$ additive term, uniformly in the truncation horizon n .

PROOF. The proof follows the disjoint-component expansion in Proposition A.39, but bounds the selection factor directly using the sandwiching condition (14) and Assumption A.40.

The component expansion expresses $\mathbb{E}_0[(d\mathcal{L}_H/d\mathcal{L}_0)^\alpha]$ as a sum over transcript components. For each component, Assumption A.40 and (14) compare the component's selection probability under H to its probabilities under the two bracketing non-high types t^- and t^+ . This yields a bound on $(w_H^{(c)})^\alpha (w_0^{(c)})^{1-\alpha}$ in terms of posterior non-high mixture weights, and hence in terms of $\pi_{\min}^{0,\pm}$. The result is a constant extra-information-from-selection term $\log(1/\pi_{\min}^{0,\pm})$, independent of the horizon.

By data processing,

$$D_\alpha(\mathcal{L}_H(\tilde{R}^{(n)})\|\mathcal{L}_0(\tilde{R}^{(n)})) \leq D_\alpha(\mathcal{L}_H(\widehat{R}^{(n)})\|\mathcal{L}_0(\widehat{R}^{(n)}))$$

Let $P \equiv \mathcal{L}_H(\widehat{R}^{(n)})$ and $Q \equiv \mathcal{L}_0(\widehat{R}^{(n)})$ and write $L \equiv dP/dQ$. Then

$$\exp\left((\alpha - 1)D_\alpha(\mathcal{L}_H(\widehat{R}^{(n)})\|\mathcal{L}_0(\widehat{R}^{(n)}))\right) = \mathbb{E}_Q[L^\alpha]$$

Since components are disjoint,

$$\mathbb{E}_Q[L^\alpha] = \sum_c \mathbb{E}_Q\left[L^\alpha \mathbf{1}\{\widehat{R}^{(n)} \text{ is in component } c\}\right]$$

Fix a component $c \equiv (t, I)$ with $t \leq n$ and write $J \equiv J(c)$. Write $w_H^{(c)}(z_J) \equiv \mathbb{P}_H((\tau, I) = c \mid Z_J = z_J)$, and for each non-high type $u \in \mathcal{T}_0$ write $w_u^{(c)}(z_J) \equiv \mathbb{P}_u((\tau, I) = c \mid Z_J = z_J)$.

By Assumption A.40, for $(w_0^{(c)}(z_J) \mathcal{L}_0(Z_J)(dz_J))$ -a.e. z_J there exist a down-set $D \subseteq \mathbb{R}^{|-J|}$ and an up-set $U \subseteq \mathbb{R}^{|-J|}$ such that

$$\{(\tau, I) = c\} \equiv \{Z_{-J} \in D \cup U\} \quad \text{conditional on } Z_J = z_J$$

Since U^c is a down-set, (14) implies the corresponding up-set ordering. Hence

$$\begin{aligned} w_H^{(c)}(z_J) &= \mathbb{P}_H(Z_{-J} \in D \cup U \mid Z_J = z_J) \\ &\leq \mathbb{P}_{t^-}(Z_{-J} \in D \mid Z_J = z_J) + \mathbb{P}_{t^+}(Z_{-J} \in U \mid Z_J = z_J) \\ &\leq w_{t^-}^{(c)}(z_J) + w_{t^+}^{(c)}(z_J) \end{aligned}$$

Write $\pi_u(z_J) \equiv \mathbb{P}(T = u \mid T \in \mathcal{T}_0, Z_J = z_J)$ for posterior non-high mixture weights, so $w_0^{(c)}(z_J) = \sum_{u \in \mathcal{T}_0} \pi_u(z_J) w_u^{(c)}(z_J)$. Therefore,

$$w_0^{(c)}(z_J) \geq \min\{\pi_{t^-}(z_J), \pi_{t^+}(z_J)\} (w_{t^-}^{(c)}(z_J) + w_{t^+}^{(c)}(z_J)) \geq \min\{\pi_{t^-}(z_J), \pi_{t^+}(z_J)\} w_H^{(c)}(z_J)$$

Thus

$$\left(\frac{w_H^{(c)}(z_J)}{w_0^{(c)}(z_J)}\right)^\alpha w_0^{(c)}(z_J) = \left(\frac{w_H^{(c)}(z_J)}{w_0^{(c)}(z_J)}\right)^{\alpha-1} w_H^{(c)}(z_J) \leq \min\{\pi_{t^-}(z_J), \pi_{t^+}(z_J)\}^{1-\alpha}$$

Let $\ell_{u,J}(z_J) \equiv d\mathcal{L}_u(Z_J)/d\mathcal{L}_0(Z_J)(z_J)$ denote type- u likelihood ratios against the non-high mixture. Since $\mathcal{L}_0(Z_J) = \sum_{u \in \mathcal{T}_0} \pi_u^0 \mathcal{L}_u(Z_J)$, Bayes' rule gives

$$\pi_u(z_J) = \pi_u^0 \ell_{u,J}(z_J) \quad \text{for } \mathcal{L}_0(Z_J)\text{-a.e. } z_J$$

Hence

$$\min\{\pi_{t^-}(z_J), \pi_{t^+}(z_J)\}^{1-\alpha} \leq (\pi_{\min}^{0,\pm})^{1-\alpha} \sum_{u \in \{t^-, t^+\}} \ell_{u,J}(z_J)^{1-\alpha}$$

Write $\ell_{H,J}(z_J) \equiv d\mathcal{L}_H(Z_J)/d\mathcal{L}_0(Z_J)(z_J)$. On component c the likelihood ratio factors as $L = \ell_{H,J}(Z_J) \cdot (w_H^{(c)}(Z_J)/w_0^{(c)}(Z_J))$. Therefore,

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}_Q \left[L^\alpha \mathbf{1}\{\widehat{R}^{(n)} \text{ is in component } c\} \right] &= \int \ell_{H,J}(z_J)^\alpha \left(\frac{w_H^{(c)}(z_J)}{w_0^{(c)}(z_J)} \right)^\alpha w_0^{(c)}(z_J) \mathcal{L}_0(Z_J)(dz_J) \\ &\leq (\pi_{\min}^{0,\pm})^{1-\alpha} \sum_{u \in \{t^-, t^+\}} \int \ell_{H,J}(z_J)^\alpha \ell_{u,J}(z_J)^{1-\alpha} \mathcal{L}_0(Z_J)(dz_J) \end{aligned}$$

Since $d\mathcal{L}_H(Z_J)/d\mathcal{L}_u(Z_J) = \ell_{H,J}/\ell_{u,J}$, each term equals

$$\int \ell_{H,J}^\alpha \ell_{u,J}^{1-\alpha} d\mathcal{L}_0 = \int \left(\frac{d\mathcal{L}_H(Z_J)}{d\mathcal{L}_u(Z_J)} \right)^\alpha d\mathcal{L}_u(Z_J) = \exp\left((\alpha-1)D_\alpha(\mathcal{L}_H(Z_J) \parallel \mathcal{L}_u(Z_J))\right)$$

By the marginal assumption and $|J| \leq m+1$,

$$\exp\left((\alpha-1)D_\alpha(\mathcal{L}_H(Z_J) \parallel \mathcal{L}_u(Z_J))\right) \leq \exp\left((\alpha-1)(m+1)d_\alpha(\theta)\right)$$

for $u \in \{t^-, t^+\}$. Therefore each component satisfies

$$\mathbb{E}_Q \left[L^\alpha \mathbf{1}\{\widehat{R}^{(n)} \text{ is in component } c\} \right] \leq 2(\pi_{\min}^{0,\pm})^{1-\alpha} \exp\left((\alpha-1)(m+1)d_\alpha(\theta)\right)$$

Counting components as in Proposition A.39 and taking logs yields the stated bound, with the factor of 2 absorbed into C_α . \square

COROLLARY A.42. Fix $\alpha > 1$ and integers $n \geq 1$ and $m \geq 0$. Work in the setting of Proposition A.41, but replace Assumption A.40 with the stronger requirement that for every transcript component c and for $(w_0^{(c)}(z_J) \mathcal{L}_0(Z_{J(c)})(dz_J))$ -a.e. z_J , the conditional selection event $\{(\tau, I) = c\}$ is a down-set in the omitted coordinates. Assume there exists a non-high type $t^- \in \mathcal{T}_0$ with $\pi_{t^-}^0 > 0$ such that for every index set $J \subseteq \{1, \dots, n\}$, every z_J , and every down-set $D \subseteq \mathbb{R}^{|J|}$,

$$\mathbb{P}_H(Z_{-J} \in D \mid Z_J = z_J) \leq \mathbb{P}_{t^-}(Z_{-J} \in D \mid Z_J = z_J)$$

Finally, assume there exists $d_\alpha(\theta) < \infty$ such that for every $J \subseteq \{1, \dots, n\}$,

$$D_\alpha(\mathcal{L}_H(Z_J) \parallel \mathcal{L}_{t^-}(Z_J)) \leq |J| d_\alpha(\theta)$$

Then the truncated-report Rényi divergence bound of Proposition A.41 holds with the selection term $\log(1/\pi_{\min}^{0,\pm})$ replaced by $\log(1/\pi_{t^-}^0)$. An analogous statement holds for up-sets by reversing the ordering and inequalities.

PROOF. Follow the proof of Proposition A.41. Under the down-set transcript condition and the one-sided ordering, Step 2 gives $w_H^{(c)}(z_J) \leq w_{t^-}^{(c)}(z_J)$ and hence $w_0^{(c)}(z_J) \geq \pi_{t^-}(z_J) w_H^{(c)}(z_J)$, yielding the factor $\pi_{t^-}(z_J)^{1-\alpha}$ in place of $\min\{\pi_{t^-}(z_J), \pi_{t^+}(z_J)\}^{1-\alpha}$. Bayes' rule gives $\pi_{t^-}(z_J) = \pi_{t^-}^0 \ell_{t^-,J}(z_J)$ for $\mathcal{L}_0(Z_J)$ -a.e. z_J , so the component integral becomes $\exp((\alpha-1)D_\alpha(\mathcal{L}_H(Z_J) \parallel \mathcal{L}_{t^-}(Z_J)))$. The marginal Rényi bound and the component count proceed exactly as before. \square

Proposition A.41 provides a verifiable route for handling the endogenous selection term in Assumption A.38. Under two-sided transcript events and ordered sandwiching, it bounds the truncated-report Rényi divergence with a *selection penalty* that is constant in the truncation horizon n (namely $\log(1/\pi_{\min}^{0,\pm}) + O_\alpha(1)$), without needing to control $\Lambda_{\text{sel}}(n, k)$ directly. Since $\kappa_{\text{eff}} \asymp n_{\text{eff}}(\theta)/\gamma \rightarrow \infty$ as $\gamma \downarrow 0$ when $n_{\text{eff}}(\theta) > 0$, this contribution is negligible on the κ_{eff} scale in Theorem 4.5.

A.5.3 *Proof of Theorem 4.5.* Theorem 4.5 (restated). Fix θ with $n_{\text{eff}}(\theta) > 0$ and consider $\gamma \downarrow 0$. Let δ^γ be any sequence of policies and let (q_H^γ, q_0^γ) be the induced operating points under the selected best response. Assume short disclosure: $|R| \leq m(\gamma)$ a.s. with $m(\gamma) = o(1/\gamma)$. Maintain Assumption A.6 for some $\alpha > 1$, and assume selection control as in Assumption A.38. Then for every $c_H > 0$, if $\liminf_{\gamma \downarrow 0} q_H^\gamma \geq c_H$ then $-\log q_0^\gamma = o(\kappa_{\text{eff}})$ (equivalently $q_0^\gamma = \exp(-o(\kappa_{\text{eff}}))$).

PROOF. Fix $\alpha > 1$ and a policy δ^γ satisfying the assumptions of Theorem 4.5. Maintain Assumption A.6 and Assumption A.38. Let τ^\star be the selected best-response stopping time and let R be the induced report.

Fix $c_H > 0$ and suppose $\liminf_{\gamma \downarrow 0} q_H(\delta^\gamma) \geq c_H$. Then for all sufficiently small γ we have $q_H(\delta^\gamma) \geq c_H/2$. Define the truncation horizon

$$\bar{n}_\gamma \equiv \left\lceil \frac{4}{\pi_H c_H \gamma} \right\rceil$$

and the truncated report $\tilde{R}^{(\bar{n}_\gamma)}$ as in Appendix A.5.1.

Define the bounded statistic

$$f \equiv \delta^\gamma(R) \mathbf{1}\{\tau^\star \leq \bar{n}_\gamma\} \in [0, 1]$$

Since $\tilde{R}^{(\bar{n}_\gamma)}$ equals R on $\{\tau^\star \leq \bar{n}_\gamma\}$ and equals \perp otherwise, f is measurable with respect to $\tilde{R}^{(\bar{n}_\gamma)}$.

Applying Lemma A.30 with $P = \mathcal{L}_H(\tilde{R}^{(\bar{n}_\gamma)})$ and $Q = \mathcal{L}_0(\tilde{R}^{(\bar{n}_\gamma)})$ yields

$$\mathbb{E}_0[f] \geq \mathbb{E}_H[f]^{\alpha/(\alpha-1)} \exp\left(-D_\alpha(\mathcal{L}_H(\tilde{R}^{(\bar{n}_\gamma)}) \parallel \mathcal{L}_0(\tilde{R}^{(\bar{n}_\gamma)}))\right)$$

Since $q_0(\delta^\gamma) = \mathbb{E}_0[\delta^\gamma(R)]$ and $\delta^\gamma(R) \geq 0$, we have $q_0(\delta^\gamma) \geq \mathbb{E}_0[f]$.

A constant lower bound on $\mathbb{E}_H[f]$:

$$\mathbb{E}_H[f] = \mathbb{E}_H[\delta^\gamma(R) \mathbf{1}\{\tau^\star \leq \bar{n}_\gamma\}] \geq \mathbb{E}_H[\delta^\gamma(R)] - \mathbb{P}_H(\tau^\star > \bar{n}_\gamma) = q_H(\delta^\gamma) - \mathbb{P}_H(\tau^\star > \bar{n}_\gamma)$$

Lemma A.13 implies $\mathbb{E}_H[\tau^\star] \leq 1/(\pi_H \gamma)$, hence Markov's inequality gives

$$\mathbb{P}_H(\tau^\star > \bar{n}_\gamma) \leq \frac{1}{\pi_H \gamma \bar{n}_\gamma} \leq \frac{c_H}{4}$$

Therefore for all sufficiently small γ ,

$$\mathbb{E}_H[f] \geq \frac{c_H}{2} - \frac{c_H}{4} = \frac{c_H}{4}$$

Proposition A.39 gives

$$D_\alpha(\mathcal{L}_H(\tilde{R}^{(\bar{n}_\gamma)}) \parallel \mathcal{L}_0(\tilde{R}^{(\bar{n}_\gamma)})) \leq (m(\gamma) + 1)d_\alpha(\theta) + \frac{1}{\alpha - 1} \log \left(\sum_{k=0}^{m(\gamma)+1} \binom{\bar{n}_\gamma + 1}{k} \right) + \Lambda_{\text{sel}}(\bar{n}_\gamma, m(\gamma) + 1)$$

Since $\bar{n}_\gamma \asymp 1/\gamma$ and $m(\gamma) = o(1/\gamma)$, the first term is $o(\kappa_{\text{eff}})$. Moreover, for all sufficiently small γ we have $m(\gamma) + 1 \leq (\bar{n}_\gamma + 1)/2$, so

$$\sum_{k=0}^{m(\gamma)+1} \binom{\bar{n}_\gamma + 1}{k} \leq \exp\left((m(\gamma) + 1) \log\left(\frac{e(\bar{n}_\gamma + 1)}{m(\gamma) + 1}\right)\right)$$

and the combinatorial term is also $o(\kappa_{\text{eff}})$. Finally, since $\bar{n}_\gamma \leq n_\gamma$ for all sufficiently small γ and $n \mapsto \Lambda_{\text{sel}}(n, k)$ is nondecreasing, Assumption A.38 implies

$$\Lambda_{\text{sel}}(\bar{n}_\gamma, m(\gamma) + 1) = o(\kappa_{\text{eff}})$$

Thus

$$D_\alpha\left(\mathcal{L}_H(\tilde{R}^{(\bar{n}_\gamma)}) \parallel \mathcal{L}_0(\tilde{R}^{(\bar{n}_\gamma)})\right) = o(\kappa_{\text{eff}})$$

Combining the displays yields

$$q_0(\delta^\gamma) \geq \left(\frac{c_H}{4}\right)^{\alpha/(\alpha-1)} \exp(-o(\kappa_{\text{eff}})) = \exp(-o(\kappa_{\text{eff}}))$$

equivalently $-\log q_0(\delta^\gamma) = o(\kappa_{\text{eff}})$. \square

COROLLARY A.43. Fix θ with $n_{\text{eff}}(\theta) > 0$ and consider a sequence of environments with $\gamma \downarrow 0$. Let δ^γ be any sequence of acceptance policies such that under the selected best response $|R| \leq m(\gamma)$ almost surely. Assume the extra information from selection is controlled in the sense of Appendix A.5.

Fix any constant $c_H > 0$ with $\liminf_{\gamma \downarrow 0} q_H(\delta^\gamma) \geq c_H$ and define

$$\bar{n}_\gamma \equiv \left\lceil \frac{2}{\pi_H c_H \gamma} \right\rceil$$

If along the sequence $q_0(\delta^\gamma) = \exp(-\Theta(\kappa_{\text{eff}}))$, then necessarily $m(\gamma) = \Omega(1/\gamma)$.

PROOF. Suppose for contradiction that along a subsequence $m(\gamma) = o(1/\gamma)$. Fix $c_H > 0$ and recall $\bar{n}_\gamma = \lceil 2/(\pi_H c_H \gamma) \rceil$ from Corollary A.43. Let τ^* denote the selected best-response stopping time under δ^γ and define

$$f \equiv \delta^\gamma(R) \mathbf{1}\{\tau^* \leq \bar{n}_\gamma\} \in [0, 1]$$

which is measurable with respect to the truncated report $\tilde{R}^{(\bar{n}_\gamma)}$. By Lemma A.13 and Markov's inequality,

$$\mathbb{P}_H(\tau^* > \bar{n}_\gamma) \leq \frac{\mathbb{E}_H[\tau^*]}{\bar{n}_\gamma} \leq \frac{1}{\pi_H \gamma \bar{n}_\gamma} \leq \frac{c_H}{2}$$

Therefore $\mathbb{E}_H[f] \geq q_H(\delta^\gamma) - \mathbb{P}_H(\tau^* > \bar{n}_\gamma) \geq c_H/2$.

Applying the Rényi expectation bound (Lemma A.30) with $P = \mathcal{L}_H(\tilde{R}^{(\bar{n}_\gamma)})$, $Q = \mathcal{L}_0(\tilde{R}^{(\bar{n}_\gamma)})$, and f yields

$$\mathbb{E}_0[f] \geq \mathbb{E}_H[f]^{\alpha/(\alpha-1)} \exp\left(-D_\alpha\left(\mathcal{L}_H(\tilde{R}^{(\bar{n}_\gamma)}) \parallel \mathcal{L}_0(\tilde{R}^{(\bar{n}_\gamma)})\right)\right)$$

Since $q_0(\delta^\gamma) = \mathbb{E}_0[\delta^\gamma(R)] \geq \mathbb{E}_0[f]$ and $\mathbb{E}_H[f] \geq c_H/2$, it remains to bound the divergence term.

Under the sufficient truncated-report budget in Appendix A.5.1 (Proposition A.39),

$$\begin{aligned} D_\alpha\left(\mathcal{L}_H(\tilde{R}^{(\bar{n}_\gamma)}) \parallel \mathcal{L}_0(\tilde{R}^{(\bar{n}_\gamma)})\right) &\leq (m(\gamma) + 1)d_\alpha(\theta) + \frac{1}{\alpha - 1} \log\left(\sum_{k=0}^{m(\gamma)+1} \binom{\bar{n}_\gamma + 1}{k}\right) \\ &\quad + \Lambda_{\text{sel}}(\bar{n}_\gamma, m(\gamma) + 1) \end{aligned}$$

Since $\bar{n}_\gamma \asymp 1/\gamma$ and $m(\gamma) = o(1/\gamma)$, the first term is $o(\kappa_{\text{eff}})$. Moreover, for all sufficiently small γ we have $m(\gamma) + 1 \leq (\bar{n}_\gamma + 1)/2$, so

$$\sum_{k=0}^{m(\gamma)+1} \binom{\bar{n}_\gamma + 1}{k} \leq \exp\left((m(\gamma) + 1) \log\left(\frac{e(\bar{n}_\gamma + 1)}{m(\gamma) + 1}\right)\right)$$

and the combinatorial term is also $o(\kappa_{\text{eff}})$. Finally, since $\bar{n}_\gamma \leq n_\gamma$ for all sufficiently small γ and $n \mapsto \Lambda_{\text{sel}}(n, k)$ is nondecreasing, Assumption A.38 implies

$$\Lambda_{\text{sel}}(\bar{n}_\gamma, m(\gamma) + 1) = o(\kappa_{\text{eff}})$$

Therefore,

$$q_0(\delta^\gamma) \geq \left(\frac{c_H}{2}\right)^{\alpha/(\alpha-1)} \exp(-o(\kappa_{\text{eff}})) = \exp(-o(\kappa_{\text{eff}}))$$

contradicting $q_0(\delta^y) = \exp(-\Theta(\kappa_{\text{eff}}))$. \square

A.6 Gaussian AR(1) computations

This appendix collects Gaussian AR(1) calculations used in the paper. These calculations support the running example in Sections 3 and 5 and provide the main verification routes for the auxiliary conditions used in the short-report and robustness-check arguments (Appendices A.5 and A.3). It records a belief-state route to controlling the extra information created by selection in the ordered three-type setting and verifies that the posterior tail term in the robustness-check bound (12) is exponentially small. Appendix A.1.4 records a primitive sufficient condition for the Bayes-factor tail assumptions in Assumptions A.6 and A.8 in contractive location AR(1) models. Here we verify its translate inequalities for the Gaussian running example (Lemma A.47) and also record a sharper posterior-tail bound based on the Gaussian belief state (Lemma A.49). Finally, it records the spectral-gap computation that underlies the effective-sample-size rate $n_{\text{eff}}(\theta) = 1 - \phi$ in this example (Lemma A.44).

A.6.1 A staged Gaussian example. We work in the Gaussian AR(1) mean-shift model of Example 3.1. Fix $\phi \in [0, 1)$ and a finite type set \mathcal{T} with type-specific means $(\mu_t)_{t \in \mathcal{T}}$. Conditional on type $T = t$, the latent score $(Z_n)_{n \geq 1}$ follows the stationary Gaussian AR(1)

$$Z_{n+1} = \phi Z_n + (1 - \phi)\mu_t + \varepsilon_{n+1} \quad \varepsilon_{n+1} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, 1 - \phi^2) \text{ i.i.d.}$$

so $Z_n \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu_t, 1)$ marginally, and the researcher observes one-sided p -values $P_n = 1 - \Phi(Z_n)$.

We often specialize to the ordered three-type case $\mathcal{T} = \{N, H, L\}$ with $\mathcal{H} = \{H\}$ and means $\mu_N < \mu_H < \mu_L$. In this ordering, extremely small p -values can be more indicative of L than H , so the one-test likelihood-ratio region can take a “window” form rather than a one-sided threshold.

LEMMA A.44. Fix $\phi \in [0, 1)$ and a type $t \in \mathcal{T}$ in Example 3.1. Under t , the stationary AR(1) chain (Z_n) is reversible with respect to its stationary law $\mathcal{N}(\mu_t, 1)$. Moreover, its L^2 spectral gap equals

$$\text{gap}_{\text{AR1}}(\phi) = 1 - \phi$$

PROOF. Let $X_n \equiv Z_n - \mu_t$. Then X_n is stationary $\mathcal{N}(0, 1)$ and satisfies

$$X_{n+1} = \phi X_n + \sqrt{1 - \phi^2} \xi_{n+1}, \quad \xi_{n+1} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, 1)$$

Thus (X_n, X_{n+1}) is bivariate normal with mean 0, unit variances, and correlation ϕ , hence its joint density is symmetric in (x, y) , implying detailed balance and reversibility.

For the spectral gap: the transition operator P acts on $L^2(\mathcal{N}(0, 1))$ by

$$Pf(x) = \mathbb{E}[f(\phi x + \sqrt{1 - \phi^2} \xi)]$$

The probabilists’ Hermite polynomials $(H_k)_{k \geq 0}$ form an orthogonal basis of $L^2(\mathcal{N}(0, 1))$. A standard property of Gaussian regression gives

$$\mathbb{E}[H_k(X_{n+1}) \mid X_n = x] = \phi^k H_k(x)$$

so each H_k is an eigenfunction with eigenvalue ϕ^k . The largest eigenvalue is 1 (for constants), and the second largest (in absolute value) is ϕ (for $k = 1$). Thus the L^2 spectral gap is $1 - \phi$. \square

In the Gaussian AR(1) mean-shift example (Example 3.1), the belief state for the researcher’s POMDP collapses to the one-dimensional sufficient statistic (n, s_n) ; see Appendix A.2, Section A.2.3. This scalar structure is a natural route to bounding extra information from selection in concrete model/policy classes: the only way the researcher can correlate endogenous stopping and selective disclosure with the unreported past is through the belief trajectory, and in Gaussian AR(1) that trajectory is Markov in a scalar statistic. The following subsections verify the auxiliary conditions

used in the short-report and robustness-check arguments in the ordered three-type case. We first construct a calibrated one-test witness window (Lemma A.45), then record an exact monotone-shift property of Gaussian AR(1) (Proposition A.46) and use it to verify selection control and the marginal Rényi bound needed for the short-report budget (Proposition A.48). We finally record an explicit posterior-tail bound (Lemma A.49). The key structural requirement is that the endogenous transcript events are two-sided monotone (Definition A.11) in omitted coordinates conditional on the disclosed coordinates; this covers the common case where continuation is triggered by being in either tail of a scalar belief statistic.

A.6.2 A one-test Gaussian witness window.

LEMMA A.45. *Work in Example 3.1. Assume $\mathcal{H} = \{H\}$ is a singleton and denote the high-type mean by μ_H . Let $\Delta_{\min} \equiv \min_{t \in \mathcal{T}_0} |\mu_t - \mu_H|$ and assume $\Delta_{\min} > 0$. Define $\delta \equiv \Delta_{\min}/4$ and the (two-sided) witness window*

$$B_0 \equiv \{p \in (0, 1) : \Phi^{-1}(1 - p) \in [\mu_H - \delta, \mu_H + \delta]\}$$

Then Assumption A.2 holds with this B_0 , witness margin $\ell_0 = \Delta_{\min}^2/4$, and high one-test significance probability

$$p_H(B_0) = 2\Phi(\delta) - 1$$

PROOF. Fix a non-high type with mean $\mu \neq \mu_H$. The normal density ratio satisfies

$$\frac{f_{\mu_H}(z)}{f_{\mu}(z)} = \exp\left((\mu_H - \mu)\left(z - \frac{\mu_H + \mu}{2}\right)\right)$$

On $z \in [\mu_H - \delta, \mu_H + \delta]$, the exponent is bounded below by $|\mu_H - \mu|(|\mu_H - \mu|/2 - \delta)$, hence by $\Delta_{\min}(\Delta_{\min}/2 - \Delta_{\min}/4) = \Delta_{\min}^2/4$. Mapping z to $p = 1 - \Phi(z)$ yields the stated bound on B_0 . Finally, under the high type $Z_1 \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu_H, 1)$, so $\mathbb{P}_H(P_1 \in B_0) = \mathbb{P}(|Z_1 - \mu_H| \leq \delta) = 2\Phi(\delta) - 1$. \square

A.6.3 Exact attractiveness and down-set ordering.

PROPOSITION A.46. *Work in Example 3.1 with fixed $\phi \in [0, 1)$. Fix two types $t_1, t_0 \in \mathcal{T}$ with $\mu_{t_1} > \mu_{t_0}$. Let \mathbb{P}_t denote the law conditional on $T = t$. Then for every $n \geq 1$ and every index set $J \subseteq \{1, \dots, n\}$, conditional on $Z_J = z_J$ the vector Z_{-J} has the same conditional covariance under t_1 and t_0 , and its conditional mean satisfies*

$$\mathbb{E}_{t_1}[Z_{-J} | Z_J = z_J] - \mathbb{E}_{t_0}[Z_{-J} | Z_J = z_J] \geq 0 \quad \text{coordinatewise for every } z_J$$

Consequently, for every down-set $D \subseteq \mathbb{R}^{|-J|}$ (Definition A.10),

$$\mathbb{P}_{t_1}(Z_{-J} \in D | Z_J = z_J) \leq \mathbb{P}_{t_0}(Z_{-J} \in D | Z_J = z_J) \quad \text{for all } z_J$$

PROOF. Fix n and write Σ_n for the AR(1) correlation matrix with $(\Sigma_n)_{ij} = \phi^{|i-j|}$. Under type t , $Z_{1:n}$ is multivariate normal with mean $\mu_t \mathbf{1}_n$ and covariance Σ_n . Hence, conditional on $Z_J = z_J$, the conditional covariance of Z_{-J} is the same across components, and the conditional mean differs by

$$m_{t_1}(z_J) - m_{t_0}(z_J) = (\mu_{t_1} - \mu_{t_0}) \left(\mathbf{1}_{-J} - \Sigma_{-J,J} \Sigma_{J,J}^{-1} \mathbf{1}_J \right)$$

where $m_t(z_J) \equiv \mathbb{E}_t[Z_{-J} | Z_J = z_J]$. Let $K_n \equiv \Sigma_n^{-1}$. A standard block-matrix identity yields

$$\mathbf{1}_{-J} - \Sigma_{-J,J} \Sigma_{J,J}^{-1} \mathbf{1}_J = K_{-J,-J}^{-1} (K_n \mathbf{1}_n)_{-J}$$

For AR(1) with $\phi \in [0, 1)$, K_n is the tridiagonal precision matrix

$$K_n = \frac{1}{1 - \phi^2} \begin{pmatrix} 1 & -\phi & 0 & \cdots & 0 \\ -\phi & 1 + \phi^2 & -\phi & \ddots & \vdots \\ 0 & -\phi & 1 + \phi^2 & \ddots & 0 \\ \vdots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & -\phi \\ 0 & \cdots & 0 & -\phi & 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

Its row sums are nonnegative, so $K_n \mathbf{1}_n \geq 0$ entrywise. Moreover, K_n is symmetric positive definite with nonpositive off-diagonal entries and is strictly diagonally dominant, hence it is a (symmetric) nonsingular M -matrix. In particular, every principal submatrix (including $K_{-J, -J}$) has a nonnegative inverse:

$$K_{-J, -J}^{-1} \geq 0 \quad \text{entrywise}$$

Therefore $K_{-J, -J}^{-1} (K_n \mathbf{1}_n)_{-J} \geq 0$ entrywise, and since $\mu_{t_1} - \mu_{t_0} > 0$ we have $m_{t_1}(z_J) - m_{t_0}(z_J) \geq 0$ coordinatewise for all z_J .

Finally, if X is a random vector and $c \geq 0$ is coordinatewise nonnegative, then for any down-set D we have $\{X + c \in D\} \subseteq \{X \in D\}$. Applying this with $X \equiv Z_{-J} - m_{t_0}(z_J)$ and $c \equiv m_{t_1}(z_J) - m_{t_0}(z_J)$ yields the down-set probability inequality. \square

A.6.4 A marginal Rényi bound.

LEMMA A.47. *Work in Example 3.1 with fixed $\phi \in [0, 1)$. Fix two types $t_1, t_0 \in \mathcal{T}$ with mean gap $\Delta \equiv \mu_{t_1} - \mu_{t_0}$ and fix $\alpha > 1$. Then for every finite index set $J = \{j_1 < \cdots < j_k\} \subset \mathbb{N}$,*

$$D_\alpha(\mathcal{L}_{t_1}(Z_J) \parallel \mathcal{L}_{t_0}(Z_J)) \leq k \cdot \frac{\alpha}{2} \Delta^2 \cdot \frac{1 + \phi}{1 - \phi}$$

PROOF. In the Gaussian AR(1) model, $\varepsilon_1 \sim \mathcal{N}(0, 1 - \phi^2)$. For Gaussian translates, the Rényi divergence satisfies

$$D_\alpha(\mathcal{N}(u, \sigma^2) \parallel \mathcal{N}(v, \sigma^2)) = \frac{\alpha}{2\sigma^2} (u - v)^2.$$

Thus Proposition A.9 applies with $v_\alpha(\theta) = 1 - \phi^2$, yielding

$$D_\alpha(\mathcal{L}_{t_1}(Z_J) \parallel \mathcal{L}_{t_0}(Z_J)) \leq |J| \cdot \frac{\alpha}{2(1 - \phi^2)} \Delta^2.$$

Since $(1 - \phi^2)^{-1} \leq (1 + \phi)/(1 - \phi)$, this implies the stated bound. \square

A.6.5 *Verification of the selection-control term for short reports.* This subsection verifies Assumption A.38 in the ordered three-type Gaussian AR(1) example by checking the ordered-sandwiching sufficient condition in Proposition A.41. The transcript-event condition (Assumption A.40) is natural in Gaussian AR(1) because the belief state is one-dimensional and continuation rules are typically window-based in a scalar belief statistic. The ordered-sandwiching inequality (14) follows from the exact attractiveness property of Gaussian AR(1) (Proposition A.46).

PROPOSITION A.48. *Work in Example 3.1 with three types $\mathcal{T} = \{N, L, H\}$, $\mathcal{H} = \{H\}$, and means $\mu_N < \mu_H < \mu_L$, with fixed $\phi \in [0, 1)$. Fix $\alpha > 1$ and a horizon $n \geq 1$. Write $\pi_N^0 \equiv \pi_N/\pi_0$ and $\pi_L^0 \equiv \pi_L/\pi_0$ for the prior weights conditional on $T \in \mathcal{T}_0 = \{N, L\}$, and let $\pi_{\min}^0 \equiv \min\{\pi_N^0, \pi_L^0\}$.*

Assume an equilibrium in which $|R| \leq m$ almost surely for some $m \geq 0$. Consider the augmented truncated transcript $\widehat{R}^{(n)}$ from Appendix A.5.1 with components $c \equiv (t, I)$ and $J(c) = I \cup \{t\}$. Assume that Assumption A.40 holds for this equilibrium.

Then the truncated-report Rényi budget of Theorem 4.5 holds with

$$d_\alpha(\theta) \equiv \frac{\alpha}{2} \max\{(\mu_H - \mu_N)^2, (\mu_H - \mu_L)^2\} \cdot \frac{1 + \phi}{1 - \phi}$$

up to an additive constant C_α depending only on α . Moreover, the extra-information-from-selection term in the theorem's budget can be taken to be the constant

$$\Lambda_{3\text{type}} \equiv \log \frac{1}{\pi_{\min}^0}$$

In particular, $\Lambda_{3\text{type}}$ is constant in n , so selection contributes only an $O(1)$ additive term on the κ_{eff} scale as $\gamma \downarrow 0$.

PROOF. By Lemma A.47, for each $u \in \{N, L\}$ and each finite index set J ,

$$D_\alpha(\mathcal{L}_H(Z_J) \parallel \mathcal{L}_u(Z_J)) \leq |J| \cdot \frac{\alpha}{2} (\mu_H - \mu_u)^2 \cdot \frac{1 + \phi}{1 - \phi}$$

Thus the marginal condition in Proposition A.41 holds with

$$d_\alpha(\theta) \equiv \frac{\alpha}{2} \max\{(\mu_H - \mu_N)^2, (\mu_H - \mu_L)^2\} \cdot \frac{1 + \phi}{1 - \phi}$$

Proposition A.46 verifies the conditional down-set ordering required by Proposition A.41 (since $\mu_N < \mu_H < \mu_L$). In particular, for every J , every z_J , and every down-set D ,

$$\mathbb{P}_L(Z_{-J} \in D \mid Z_J = z_J) \leq \mathbb{P}_H(Z_{-J} \in D \mid Z_J = z_J) \leq \mathbb{P}_N(Z_{-J} \in D \mid Z_J = z_J)$$

which is (14) with $t^- = N$ and $t^+ = L$. Applying Proposition A.41 then yields the truncated-report budget with selection term $\Lambda_{3\text{type}} = \log(1/\pi_{\min}^0)$, up to an additive constant depending only on α . \square

A.6.6 Posterior tails.

LEMMA A.49. Work in Example 3.1 with three types $\mathcal{T} = \{N, H, L\}$ and means $\mu_N < \mu_H < \mu_L$, and fix $\phi \in [0, 1)$. Let $\pi_n(H) = \mathbb{P}(T \in \mathcal{H} \mid \mathcal{F}_n)$ be the posterior probability from Lemma A.24. Fix $\alpha > 1$ and write $\lambda \equiv (\alpha - 1)/\alpha$. Define the minimum mean gap to a non-high type by

$$\Delta_{\min} \equiv \min\{\mu_H - \mu_N, \mu_L - \mu_H\}$$

Then for every $n \geq 1$ and every $\varepsilon \in (0, 1)$,

$$\mathbb{P}_0(\pi_n(H) > \varepsilon) \leq C_{\pi, \alpha} \varepsilon^{-\lambda} \exp\left(-\frac{\lambda}{2\alpha} \Delta_{\min}^2 b_n\right)$$

where $C_{\pi, \alpha}$ is as in Assumption A.8 and $b_n = \mathbf{1}^\top \Sigma_\phi^{-1} \mathbf{1}$ is as in the discussion of the Gaussian AR(1) belief state (A.2.3). In particular, since $b_n \geq (1 - \phi)(n - 1)/(1 + \phi)$, Assumption A.8 holds in this example with $n_{\text{eff}}(\theta) = 1 - \phi$ and

$$C_\alpha(\theta) = \frac{\Delta_{\min}^2}{2\alpha(1 + \phi)}$$

Consequently, if $n = m(\gamma; c) = \lceil c/\gamma \rceil$ and $\varepsilon = \gamma/(2a)$ with $a \in [\rho, 1]$ and $\log(1/\gamma) = o(\kappa_{\text{eff}})$, then

$$\mathbb{P}_0\left(\pi_{m(\gamma; c)}(H) > \frac{\gamma}{2a}\right) = \exp(-\Omega(\kappa_{\text{eff}}))$$

PROOF. Fix $n \geq 1$ and write $p_u(z_{1:n})$ for the joint density of $Z_{1:n}$ under type $u \in \{N, H, L\}$. By Bayes' rule,

$$\pi_n(H) = \frac{\pi_H p_H(Z_{1:n})}{\pi_H p_H(Z_{1:n}) + \pi_N p_N(Z_{1:n}) + \pi_L p_L(Z_{1:n})}.$$

Hence for each $u \in \{N, L\}$,

$$\pi_n(H) \leq \frac{\pi_H p_H(Z_{1:n})}{\pi_u p_u(Z_{1:n})} = \frac{\pi_H}{\pi_u} \cdot \frac{p_H(Z_{1:n})}{p_u(Z_{1:n})},$$

so

$$\{\pi_n(H) > \varepsilon\} \subseteq \left\{ \frac{p_H(Z_{1:n})}{p_u(Z_{1:n})} > \frac{\pi_u}{\pi_H} \varepsilon \right\}.$$

With $\lambda = (\alpha - 1)/\alpha \in (0, 1)$, Markov's inequality gives

$$\mathbb{P}_u(\pi_n(H) > \varepsilon) \leq \left(\frac{\pi_H}{\pi_u \varepsilon} \right)^\lambda \mathbb{E}_u \left[\left(\frac{p_H(Z_{1:n})}{p_u(Z_{1:n})} \right)^\lambda \right].$$

We control the λ -moment of the Bayes factor by factoring it into a marginal term and one-step transition terms. Write $\Delta_u \equiv |\mu_H - \mu_u|$. Under type u , the marginal law is $Z_1 \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu_u, 1)$ and the one-step transition is

$$Z_{t+1} | Z_t \sim \mathcal{N}(\phi Z_t + (1 - \phi)\mu_u, 1 - \phi^2) \quad (t \geq 1).$$

Therefore

$$\frac{p_H(Z_{1:n})}{p_u(Z_{1:n})} = \frac{p_H(Z_1)}{p_u(Z_1)} \cdot \prod_{t=1}^{n-1} \frac{p_H(Z_{t+1} | Z_t)}{p_u(Z_{t+1} | Z_t)}.$$

For equal-variance Gaussian translates, the Chernoff coefficient satisfies

$$\mathbb{E}_{X \sim \mathcal{N}(u, \sigma^2)} \left[\left(\frac{d\mathcal{N}(u, \sigma^2)}{d\mathcal{N}(v, \sigma^2)}(X) \right)^\lambda \right] = \exp\left(-\frac{1}{2} \lambda (1 - \lambda) \frac{(u - v)^2}{\sigma^2} \right).$$

Applying this to the marginal term ($\sigma^2 = 1$) gives

$$\mathbb{E}_u \left[\left(\frac{p_H(Z_1)}{p_u(Z_1)} \right)^\lambda \right] = \exp\left(-\frac{\lambda}{2\alpha} \Delta_u^2 \right),$$

and applying it to each transition term ($\sigma^2 = 1 - \phi^2$ and mean shift $(1 - \phi)\Delta_u$) gives, for every t ,

$$\mathbb{E}_u \left[\left(\frac{p_H(Z_{t+1} | Z_t)}{p_u(Z_{t+1} | Z_t)} \right)^\lambda \right] = \exp\left(-\frac{\lambda}{2\alpha} \Delta_u^2 \cdot \frac{1 - \phi}{1 + \phi} \right).$$

Moreover, the displayed transition moment is constant (it does not depend on Z_t), so iterating conditional expectations yields

$$\mathbb{E}_u \left[\left(\frac{p_H(Z_{1:n})}{p_u(Z_{1:n})} \right)^\lambda \right] = \exp\left(-\frac{\lambda}{2\alpha} \Delta_u^2 \left(1 + (n - 1) \frac{1 - \phi}{1 + \phi} \right) \right).$$

The AR(1) identity $b_n = \frac{n(1-\phi)+2\phi}{1+\phi} = 1 + (n - 1) \frac{1-\phi}{1+\phi}$ (see (A.2.3)) gives

$$\mathbb{E}_u \left[\left(\frac{p_H(Z_{1:n})}{p_u(Z_{1:n})} \right)^\lambda \right] = \exp\left(-\frac{\lambda}{2\alpha} \Delta_u^2 b_n \right).$$

Substitute into the Markov bound to obtain, for $u \in \{N, L\}$,

$$\mathbb{P}_u(\pi_n(H) > \varepsilon) \leq \left(\frac{\pi_H}{\pi_u \varepsilon}\right)^\lambda \exp\left(-\frac{\lambda}{2\alpha} \Delta_u^2 b_n\right).$$

Since \mathbb{P}_0 is a mixture over $\{N, L\}$, a union bound yields

$$\mathbb{P}_0(\pi_n(H) > \varepsilon) \leq \mathbb{P}_N(\pi_n(H) > \varepsilon) + \mathbb{P}_L(\pi_n(H) > \varepsilon).$$

Using $\Delta_u \geq \Delta_{\min}$ and $\pi_u \geq \pi_0 \pi_{\min}^0$ for $u \in \{N, L\}$ yields the displayed bound in the lemma statement.

Finally, the explicit formula for b_n implies $b_n \geq (1 - \phi)(n - 1)/(1 + \phi)$. With $n = m(\gamma; c) = \lceil c/\gamma \rceil$, this gives $b_n = \Omega(\kappa_{\text{eff}})$. If $\varepsilon = \gamma/(2a)$ with $a \in [\rho, 1]$ and $\log(1/\gamma) = o(\kappa_{\text{eff}})$, then $\varepsilon^{-\lambda} = (2a/\gamma)^\lambda = \exp(o(\kappa_{\text{eff}}))$, and the exponential term is $\exp(-\Omega(\kappa_{\text{eff}}))$. \square

A.7 Generalizations

Theorems 4.3, 4.5, and 5.2 are stated under Assumption A.1 because it is a convenient baseline that directly covers the dependence structures emphasized in the main text. We prove more general versions of these results under weaker, modular conditions that separate (i) information accumulation along the evidence stream, (ii) the informational content of selectively disclosed reports, and (iii) concentration of significant-result counts under dependence. This modular view makes explicit which pieces of the standing assumptions (Appendix A.1.1) and which stopping-time tools (Appendix A.2) are actually used by each argument.

A.7.1 General lower bound beyond Assumption A.1. The proof of Theorem 4.3 uses only two ingredients. First, the acceptance decision is generated from the report by a Markov kernel, so data processing gives

$$\text{KL}(\mathcal{L}_H(A) \parallel \mathcal{L}_0(A)) \leq \text{KL}(\mathcal{L}_H(R) \parallel \mathcal{L}_0(R))$$

Second, the researcher faces per-test cost $\gamma > 0$ and acceptance probabilities lie in $[0, 1]$, so Proposition A.16 yields a universal effort bound $\mathbb{E}[\tau^\star(\delta)] \leq 1/\gamma$. Thus the lower bound holds under any environment in which the stopped reported history admits a KL budget of the form

$$\text{KL}(\mathcal{L}_H(R) \parallel \mathcal{L}_0(R)) \leq C_0(\theta) + D(\theta)\mathbb{E}[\tau^\star(\delta)]$$

for some finite constants $C_0(\theta)$ and $D(\theta)$ that are uniform over mechanisms. Assumption A.1 is one sufficient condition with $C_0(\theta) \equiv C_\nu(\theta)$ and $D(\theta) \equiv D_{\text{mix}}(\theta)$.

A.7.2 General sublinear impossibility beyond Assumption A.1. Theorem 4.5 isolates the additional ingredient needed to make a short-report impossibility quantitative under dependence and selective disclosure. It combines a mechanism-independent change-of-measure bound (Appendix A.5.3) with a modular short-report (truncated-report) Rényi budget (Appendix A.5.1) of the form

$$D_\alpha(\mathcal{L}_H(\tilde{R}^{(n)}) \parallel \mathcal{L}_0(\tilde{R}^{(n)})) \leq (m+1)d_\alpha(\theta) + \frac{1}{\alpha-1} \log\left(\sum_{k=0}^{m+1} \binom{n+1}{k}\right) + \Lambda_{\text{sel}}(n, m+1) + O(1),$$

where m is an almost-sure bound on the report size, $d_\alpha(\theta)$ is a marginal Rényi rate, and Λ_{sel} is an extra-information-from-selection term defined from the induced transcript. Together with the Rényi expectation inequality (Lemma A.30) and the universal time bound (Lemma A.13), this budget implies that if the truncated-report divergence is $o(\kappa_{\text{eff}})$ then achieving $q_0 = \exp(-\Theta(\kappa_{\text{eff}}))$ forces throughput to collapse ($q_H \rightarrow 0$). In particular, when q_H is bounded away from zero, Corollary A.43 truncates at $\bar{n}_\gamma \asymp 1/\gamma$ and shows that under $m(\gamma) = o(1/\gamma)$ and $\gamma \Lambda_{\text{sel}}(\bar{n}_\gamma, m(\gamma) + 1) \rightarrow 0$, short disclosure cannot support $\exp(-\Theta(\kappa_{\text{eff}}))$ false-positive decay at nonvanishing q_H .

A.7.3 *General robustness-check achievability beyond Assumption A.1.* Theorem 5.2 requires only that, under every non-high type, the count of significant results in B ,

$$S_n(B) \equiv \sum_{i=1}^n \mathbf{1}\{P_i \in B\}$$

satisfies a large-deviation bound at exponent proportional to an effective sample size index. A sufficient condition is a spectral-gap or mixing-time concentration inequality for bounded additive functionals of the evidence process. Assumption A.1(iii) is one convenient way to package this requirement, but the same conclusion holds under alternative mixing assumptions that deliver an inequality of the form

$$\mathbb{P}_t(S_n(B) \geq rn) \leq \exp(-c n_{\text{eff}}(\theta) n)$$

uniformly over non-high types whenever r exceeds the non-high mean significance rate by a fixed slack. When $n \equiv n_\gamma \asymp 1/\gamma$, this yields a robustness-check upper bound of order $\exp(-\Omega(\kappa_{\text{eff}}))$ with $\kappa_{\text{eff}} = n_{\text{eff}}(\theta)/\gamma$.

B EMPIRICAL APPENDIX

This appendix documents the data construction, estimation, and robustness analyses underlying Section 6. The organizing principle is auditability. We specify every empirical object targeted, every filtering rule defining the verified core, and the exact mapping from raw replication artifacts to the mixture, dependence, and counterfactual inputs used in the paper. The companion repository contains the version-controlled surface definitions, prompts, validators, and per-paper artifacts referenced throughout; the appendix is written so that each step can be verified by inspecting files on disk.

Throughout this appendix we label the three mixture types N (null), M (moderate), and E (extreme). Our baseline mixture fixes $\sigma = 1$ (unit variance). The evidence index is $|t|$ (the absolute t -statistic). The evidence window is $B = [1.96, \infty)$, and the false discovery rate is defined with respect to the null type only: $\text{FDR} = \pi_N Q_N(m) / \bar{Q}(m)$, treating extreme-type papers as true positives. The baseline counterfactual fixes $m^{\text{old}} = 50$ (the median of the author-reported regressions; see Section B.2.6) and calibrates λ from automated-workflow timing data.

B.1 Pipeline and workflow

This section documents the pipeline used to generate the specification-level data underlying Section 6. The organizing principle is mechanical auditability. A reader should be able to determine, from files on disk, the universe of specifications we committed to before results were observed, the numerical outputs produced by executing that universe, and the filtering and labeling steps that define the conservative verified core used in estimation. We therefore separate definition of the universe from its execution and verification. We also separate agentic coordination from numerical computation: language models are used to read replication packages, draft and edit code, and produce structured configuration artifacts, while all estimation and inference are carried out by explicit scripts in Python and R.

B.1.1 Surface definition, execution, and verification. The pipeline consists of a version-controlled definition layer and a paper-specific execution layer. The definition layer lives in `specification_tree/`, `prompts/`, and `scripts/`. The paper-specific layer lives in the extracted replication package directory `data/downloads/extracted/{PAPER_ID}/`. Post-run verification artifacts live in `data/verification/{PAPER_ID}/`. The estimation layer lives in `estimation/`.

A key contract is that the definition layer is fixed within a run. The typed surface definition, prompts, and validators do not evolve as the runner encounters new packages. When we discover a missing but legitimate specification family or a recurring resolution rule, it is incorporated only as an explicit, version-controlled change between runs. This ensures that the information available to the executor is stable within a run and that improvements to coverage are attributable to specific commits.

B.1.2 Typed namespaces and execution identifiers. The typed namespace defines the object space and the meaning of each executed row. Every executed object has a typed identifier `spec_id`. The top-level namespace determines how the object is interpreted and where it is allowed to appear. Estimate-like rows live in `baseline`, `design/*`, and `rc/*`, and these are the only rows permitted in `specification_results.csv`. Inference-only recomputations are typed as `infer/*` and are recorded separately in `inference_results.csv` when requested. Diagnostics, sensitivity objects, post-processing transforms, and concept changes are typed as `diag/*`, `sens/*`, `post/*`, and `explore/*` and are recorded, when executed, in separate tables rather than being mixed into the estimate table. This typing discipline is enforced by an explicit contract for table schemas and JSON payloads, defined in `specification_tree/CONTRACT.md`.

Each estimate-like row carries a stable identifier `spec_run_id` and a `baseline_group_id` that links the row to a baseline claim object defined pre-run. Each row also records a pointer field, `spec_tree_path`, that references a specific admissible object in the typed namespace. The contract requires that the runner store full model output and audit metadata in `coefficient_vector_json`, using reserved keys that keep the payload mechanically parseable across heterogeneous designs. For successful estimate-like rows these reserved blocks include the full coefficient vector, an inference description for the scalar uncertainty reported in the row, a software-environment block, and a deterministic hash of the pre-run surface used for the run.

Runner scripts import shared output helpers in `scripts/agent_output_utils.py` that implement the reserved-key JSON schema, deterministic surface hashing, and standardized software blocks, reducing paper-by-paper drift in how outputs are recorded.

The contract is not a narrative description; it is a mechanically checked interface. The validator `scripts/validate_agent_outputs.py` checks required columns, namespace rules, existence and validity of `spec_tree_path` pointers, surface membership of `spec_id` patterns at the baseline-group level, and consistency of the recorded surface hash. A normalization script `scripts/normalize_agent_outputs.py` exists to migrate legacy outputs into the reserved-key JSON schema when needed.

B.1.3 Specification surface and revealed search space. The most consequential paper-specific object is the specification surface. The surface is a machine-readable contract written to `SPECIFICATION_SURFACE.json` and an accompanying human-readable summary `SPECIFICATION_SURFACE.md`. The surface is constructed and reviewed before any models are run. It defines baseline claim objects (baseline groups), records the paper’s canonical baseline specifications, and commits ex ante to an executable universe of estimand-preserving variants together with a canonical inference choice for estimate rows. It also encodes the constraints, budgets, and seeded sampling rules that make large search spaces auditable.

Our surface is keyed to the paper’s revealed search space. The revealed surface is the minimum set of forks a reader can confirm the researcher had to navigate given what is disclosed in the main text and interpreted appendices. This is intentionally more conservative than the potential search space of all imaginable variants. The surface can include standardized stress tests beyond what a paper reveals, but those are treated as explicit expansions and are typed and labeled so that the distinction between disclosure-implied forks and protocol-added stress tests remains auditably sharp.

Two surface constraints illustrate the role of the revealed surface. First, control inclusion is a central axis that is often combinatorial. When the surface includes control-subset sampling, it bounds subset sizes by the control-count envelope revealed by the paper’s own main specifications and uses a seed recorded in the surface to generate a reproducible set of draws. Second, many estimators are bundles with multiple components, such as IV or doubly robust and DML procedures. For such bundles, the surface records whether covariate adjustment is linked across components and enforces joint variation when it is linked, preventing the runner from inventing a cross-product space that the paper did not reveal.

B.1.4 Verification layers and guardrails. Verification occurs in layers, with each layer producing an explicit artifact. Before any models are run, a surface builder agent, prompted by `prompts/03_spec_surface_builder.md`, produces a candidate surface. A separate surface verifier, prompted by `prompts/04_spec_surface_verifier.md`, then reviews and may edit `SPECIFICATION_SURFACE.json` before any execution. The verifier records its reasoning and any edits in `SPEC_SURFACE_REVIEW.md`. This stage concentrates discretionary judgment into a single pre-run object that is easy to audit: the approved surface is the definition of the executable universe for that paper.

Execution is then driven entirely by the approved surface. The runner agent, prompted by prompts/05_spec_searcher.md, executes only whitelisted specifications and saves its executable script to scripts/paper_analyses/{PAPER_ID}.py. It writes specification_results.csv and a narrative log SPECIFICATION_SEARCH.md to the extracted package directory. Every planned specification appears as a row, including explicit failure rows, so that the realized output can be audited against the pre-run budget. When the surface requests inference variants, the runner writes the corresponding typed side table rather than mixing those recomputations into the estimate table.

After execution, the pipeline enforces the contract mechanically by running scripts/validate_agent_outputs.py. This validator checks schema and typing invariants that are easy for humans to miss in large runs. Post-run verification then audits the realized outputs without running new regressions. The post-run verifier, prompted by prompts/06_post_run_verifier.md, checks for drift and incoherence and assigns conservative labels that govern downstream estimation. Verification artifacts are written to data/verification/{PAPER_ID}/. The key output is verification_spec_map.csv, which maps spec_run_id to a validity indicator and a core-test indicator, along with a category label and a short justification. The verifier also records baseline specifications in verification_baselines.json and writes a narrative VERIFICATION_REPORT.md summarizing issues.

The verified core used in all downstream estimation is defined as the subset of estimate-like rows that are valid and labeled as estimand-preserving core tests for a baseline group. This core is intentionally conservative. When the verifier cannot confirm that a row preserves the claim object implied by the surface, it is excluded from the core by default.

B.1.5 Estimation pipeline. The estimation pipeline lives in estimation/ and is driven by python estimation/run_all.py. It ingests per-paper execution outputs and verification maps, builds unified datasets and their verified and verified-core subsets in estimation/data/, fits the evidence mixture model and estimates within-paper dependence, and computes counterfactual disclosure requirements under a cost shift, writing machine-readable outputs to estimation/results/. For the paired-benchmark exercise in Sample A, the pipeline constructs an auditable mapping from benchmark claims to baseline groups in estimation/data/i4r_claim_map.csv and uses that map to define matched reproductions. Finally, the pipeline renders manuscript-ready tables and figures into the manuscript directories.

B.2 Samples, inference, and validation

B.2.1 Sample A: paired replications (independent benchmark). Sample A is built from the AEA-journal replication exercise in Brodeur et al. [2024]. For each paper we target the same canonical claim emphasized in the independent reanalysis protocol and record three claim-level statistics: the published (original-study) canonical claim statistic t_i^{orig} , the independent re-analysis statistic t_i^{ind} , and our automated baseline reproduction t_i^{auto} for the same claim. All objects are recorded as absolute t -statistics $|t|$ and as the derived evidence indices defined in Section B.2.7.

Mapping from the independent reanalysis protocol to our automated specification surface is nontrivial: each paper’s replication package has a different structure, and the canonical claim may correspond to a specific coefficient in a specific table. We resolve this mapping using a combination of verification baseline group labels (from the post-run verification agent), token-overlap scoring between the independent reanalysis claim description and our baseline group definitions, and manual overrides where the automated mapping is flagged for review. The mapping is recorded in estimation/data/i4r_claim_map.csv and is fully auditable.

B.2.2 Sample B: surface-defined specification sets (post-automation regime). Sample B consists of 103 papers for which we can ingest the public replication package and construct a standardized specification surface. This includes the 40 independent reanalysis papers in Sample A and an additional 63 papers with public data and code. For each paper the automated workflow executes the surface-defined robustness universe around a baseline claim object, spanning method variations, inference choices, sample restrictions, and covariate sets.

The full sample contains 5,793 specifications across 97 papers after filtering invalid rows (mean 59.7 specs/paper). The verified-core subset contains 5,569 specifications across 96 papers (mean 58.0 core specs/paper).

B.2.3 Units. We work with two linked units. At the claim level (i), we study one canonical claim per paper in Sample A ($n = 40$). At the specification level (i, s), we study specification s within paper i in the Sample B surface-defined specification set. The full specification-level dataset contains 5,793 specification–paper pairs across 97 papers; the verified-core subset contains 5,569.

B.2.4 Summary statistics. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for Samples A and B.

Table 1. Summary statistics. Panel A: Sample A (paired replications, $n = 40$ papers). Panel B: Sample B (surface-defined specification sets, $n = 103$ papers). “Core” restricts to the verified-core subset.

	Sample A (all specs)	Sample B (all specs)	Sample B (verified core)
<i>Sample size</i>			
Papers	38	97	96
Specifications	2,429	5,793	5,569
<i>Specifications per paper</i>			
Mean	63.9	59.7	58.0
Median	55.5	54.0	53.0
IQR	[50.2, 69.0]	[51.0, 64.0]	[50.0, 62.0]
<i> t distribution</i>			
Mean	3.58	6.33	6.38
Median	2.54	2.62	2.68
Std. dev.	3.72	17.48	17.17
IQR	[1.46, 4.00]	[1.41, 4.47]	[1.49, 4.57]
Frac. significant ($p < 0.05$)	67.3%	65.2%	66.4%
<i>Sample composition (papers by journal)</i>			
AEA Randomized Controlled Trials	1	1	—
AEJ: Applied	7	17	17
AEJ: Macro	2	2	2
AEJ: Policy	10	18	18
AER	16	55	55
AER: Insights	2	4	4

B.2.5 Variance decomposition. Table 2 decomposes the total variance of $|t|$ into between-paper and within-paper components using a one-way random effects model. The within-paper share of variance directly disciplines the potential scope for specification search to generate dispersed evidence within a single paper’s surface-defined universe.

Table 2. Variance decomposition of $|t|$ (Sample B, verified-core specifications). Between-paper and within-paper variance components from a one-way random effects model.

	Verified core
Observations	5,569
Papers	96
Mean $ Z $	6.375
Total variance of $ Z $	294.955
Between-paper variance ($\hat{\sigma}_b^2$)	192.697
Within-paper variance ($\hat{\sigma}_w^2$)	104.503
ICC ($\hat{\sigma}_b^2 / (\hat{\sigma}_b^2 + \hat{\sigma}_w^2)$)	0.648
Within-paper share (1 – ICC)	0.352

B.2.6 Author-reported specifications and m^{old} calibration. To calibrate the pre-shift disclosure baseline m^{old} , we count the number of regressions in each paper’s original replication code. Specifically, we parse all code files in the author-provided replication package (.do, .R, .py, .m) after stripping comments and count lines containing recognized regression commands—for Stata: reg, regress, reghdfe, areg, xtreg, ivregress, logit, probit, poisson, etc.; for R: lm, glm, felm, feols, plm, etc.; for Python: OLS, PanelOLS, IV2SLS, etc. Lines matching post-estimation commands (predict, margins, test, outreg2) are excluded. This count captures all regressions the authors ran and reported, including main results, robustness checks, placebo tests, and heterogeneity analyses.

This measure is distinct from the “baseline specifications” identified by the verification agent, which counts only the author’s headline results. The regression count is substantially larger because it includes the full set of specifications the authors chose to present, and thus provides a better proxy for the disclosure requirement m in the mechanism: the number of robustness checks an editor can condition on under unverifiable omission, even if additional private exploration occurred off the record.

Table 3 reports summary statistics for the author-reported regression counts across all 103 papers in Sample B. The median is 50 and the mean is 81, with substantial right-skew driven by a handful of papers with very large replication packages (the maximum is Wilson [2022], who ran 693 distinct regressions). Nine papers have zero detected regression commands, typically because the replication code uses a language or framework not covered by our parser (mainly custom Stata .ado files called indirectly). The pre-shift disclosure baseline $m^{\text{old}} = 50$ used in the main-text counterfactual (Section 6.3.5) is the median of this distribution. Results are robust to alternative calibration targets; Table 8 reports sensitivity across a range of m^{old} values.

Table 3. Author-reported regression counts (Sample B, $n = 103$ papers). Regressions are counted by parsing all code files in the replication package and matching recognized regression commands after stripping comments.

	N	Mean	Median	SD	Min	P25	P75	Max
Regressions in original code	103	81.1	50.0	104.6	0	19.5	107.5	693

B.2.7 Inference harmonization and evidence indices. Harmonized inference object. For each surface-approved specification we construct $(\hat{\beta}, \widehat{SE}, t, p)$ under transparent rules. We follow the original paper’s clustering level when it is explicit and implement heteroskedasticity-robust inference (HC1) otherwise. When the software stack does not expose the needed metadata, we record and flag the limitation.

Main evidence index: $|t|$ (absolute t -statistic). Our main evidence index is the absolute t -statistic $|t|$ for the focal coefficient under harmonized inference. This index has support on $[0, \infty)$, with $|t| = 0$ corresponding to a null and $|t| \approx 1.96$ corresponding to two-sided $p = 0.05$ under a normal approximation. We use $|t|$ throughout because it is a simple, audit-friendly object that is comparable across heterogeneous software stacks and aligns directly with the Gaussian AR(1) benchmark in Section 3.

Sign orientation. We orient t -statistics within each paper to harmonize sign conventions. Surface-defined specification sets can contain both positive and negative coefficients—sometimes for the same underlying hypothesis with an opposite sign convention. For each paper i , we compute an orientation sign as the sign of the within-paper median t -statistic and define the signed index $Z_{is} \equiv \text{sign}_i \cdot t_{is}$. The absolute evidence index $|t_{is}|$ is invariant to this orientation. For the verified core, we also construct a baseline-group orientation using the expected sign from the verification agent.

Outliers and numerical safeguards. For the baseline mixture estimation we trim the sample to $|t| \leq 10$, excluding extreme outliers that would destabilize likelihood-based estimation. Figures in the main text use raw (untrimmed) distributions. Sensitivity to the trimming threshold is reported in Section B.3.4.

B.2.8 Validation on Sample A (paired replications). Claim-by-claim results. Table 4 reports claim-by-claim results for the verified-comparable subset of Sample A. For each paper we select the within-paper specification whose estimand best matches the independent reanalysis target (the “matched reproduction”); see Section B.1.1 for details. Each row records the paper identifier, the original t -statistic, the independent benchmark $|t^{\text{ind}}|$, the matched reproduction $|t^{\text{match}}|$, the absolute difference, and the pairwise agreement classification: “exact” ($|\Delta t| < 0.1$), “close” ($0.1 \leq |\Delta t| < 0.5$), or “discrepant” ($|\Delta t| \geq 0.5$).

Table 4. Claim-by-claim validation results (Sample A; verified-comparable subset). Columns report the original t -statistic, independent re-analysis $|t^{\text{ind}}|$, matched reproduction $|t^{\text{match}}|$, absolute difference, and agreement status.

Paper ID	Claim	t^{orig}	$ t^{\text{ind}} $	$ t^{\text{match}} $	$ t^{\text{match}} - t^{\text{ind}} $	Status
120078-V1	Information reduces ethnic discrimination on Airbnb	2.45	2.38	2.86	0.48	close
120483-V1	Malaria immunity affects African slavery distribution	2.78	2.62	2.62	0.00	exact
120568-V1	Declining worker turnover patterns	5.23	5.08	4.06	1.02	discrepant
125201-V1	Mortality, temperature, public health in Mexico	2.45	2.32	2.21	0.11	close
125321-V1	Technology solving principal-agent: China pollution	3.45	3.31	3.67	0.36	close
125821-V1	School spending effects in Wisconsin	2.12	1.98	1.98	0.00	exact
126722-V1	Patient demand contributes to overuse of prescriptions	3.12	2.95	2.96	0.01	exact
128521-V1	Recessions, mortality in Lancashire Cotton Famine	2.34	2.19	2.20	0.01	exact
130141-V1	News shocks under financial frictions	2.89	2.72	2.59	0.13	close
131981-V1	Mental health costs of COVID lockdowns	3.45	3.28	2.29	0.99	discrepant
134041-V1	Beliefs about gender wage gap affect policy demand	3.23	3.08	2.69	0.39	close
136741-V1	Historical lynchings affect Black voting behavior	2.67	2.51	2.46	0.05	exact
138401-V1	Measles vaccination long-term effects	2.34	2.18	1.85	0.33	close
138922-V1	Sports club vouchers long-run effects	1.56	1.42	1.40	0.02	exact
139262-V1	Motivated beliefs and uncertainty resolution	2.45	2.31	2.31	0.00	exact
140161-V1	Checking and sharing alt-facts	2.56	2.41	2.45	0.04	exact
140921-V1	Assortative matching at top of distribution	4.21	4.15	3.28	0.87	discrepant
145141-V1	Welfare effects of shame and pride	3.78	3.65	3.25	0.40	close
146041-V1	Relative efficiency of skilled labor	2.67	2.54	2.51	0.03	exact
147561-V3	City chiefs increase tax compliance in DRC	2.89	2.73	2.89	0.16	close
149262-V2	Peer effects on student performance	2.78	2.65	2.55	0.10	close
149481-V1	Thank-you calls increase charitable giving	1.98	1.82	1.85	0.03	exact
149882-V1	Reshaping gender attitudes: India school experiment	1.78	1.62	1.15	0.47	close
150323-V1	Political turnover, bureaucratic turnover: Brazil	2.56	2.42	2.46	0.04	exact
151841-V1	Targeting entrepreneurs using community info	3.12	2.98	3.04	0.06	exact
157781-V1	Rebel on the Canal: trade and conflict in China	2.34	2.18	2.23	0.05	exact
158401-V1	Market access and quality upgrading: Uganda	2.45	2.32	2.34	0.02	exact
163822-V2	Digital addiction	3.56	3.42	5.46	2.04	discrepant
171681-V1	Deliberative competence in financial choice	2.12	1.98	1.92	0.06	exact
173341-V1	Vulnerability and clientelism	2.12	1.98	1.92	0.06	exact
174501-V1	Interaction, stereotypes, performance: South Africa	1.89	1.75	1.72	0.03	exact
180741-V1	Demand for moral commitment	2.67	2.54	2.62	0.08	exact
181166-V1	Technological change and job loss consequences	3.45	3.32	3.35	0.03	exact
181581-V1	Doctor supply and infant mortality	2.89	2.75	2.82	0.07	exact
184041-V1	Common-probability auction puzzle	4.23	4.08	4.02	0.06	exact

Agreement diagnostics. Figure 5 visualizes agreement between our matched reproductions and the independent re-analyses for canonical claims. The top row plots $|t^{\text{match}}|$ against $|t^{\text{ind}}|$ for the full Sample A and the verified-comparable subset, with a 45-degree reference line; the bottom row reports histograms of the difference $|t^{\text{match}}| - |t^{\text{ind}}|$. We classify agreement as “exact” ($|\Delta t| < 0.1$), “close” ($|\Delta t| < 0.5$), or “discrepant” ($|\Delta t| \geq 0.5$).




Fig. 5. Agreement diagnostics between matched reproductions and independent re-analyses (Sample A). Top row: scatter of $|t^{\text{match}}|$ versus $|t^{\text{ind}}|$ for the full sample (left) and verified-comparable subset (right). Bottom row: histograms of differences.

Discrepancy taxonomy. Table 5 lists the largest verified-comparable discrepancies between matched reproductions and independent re-analyses, sorted by $||t^{\text{match}}| - |t^{\text{ind}}||$. Common sources of residual discrepancy include: (i) differences in estimand mapping (e.g., different table/column selected as canonical), (ii) differences in clustering or robust standard error conventions, (iii) software-stack differences (Stata versus Python/R), and (iv) data-processing choices in the replication package.

Table 5. Largest discrepancies between matched reproductions and independent re-analyses (verified-comparable subset; top 10 by $||t^{\text{match}}| - |t^{\text{ind}}||$).

Paper ID	Claim	$ t^{\text{ind}} $	$ t^{\text{match}} $	$ t^{\text{match}} - t^{\text{ind}} $
163822-V2	Digital addiction	3.42	5.46	2.04
120568-V1	Declining worker turnover patterns	5.08	4.06	1.02
131981-V1	Mental health costs of COVID lockdowns	3.28	2.29	0.99
140921-V1	Assortative matching at top of distribution	4.15	3.28	0.87
120078-V1	Information reduces ethnic discrimination on Airbnb	2.38	2.86	0.48
149882-V1	Reshaping gender attitudes: India school experiment	1.62	1.15	0.47
145141-V1	Welfare effects of shame and pride	3.65	3.25	0.40
134041-V1	Beliefs about gender wage gap affect policy demand	3.08	2.69	0.39
125321-V1	Technology solving principal-agent: China pollution	3.31	3.67	0.36
138401-V1	Measles vaccination long-term effects	2.18	1.85	0.33

Filter sensitivity. Figure 6 shows how the $|t|$ distribution changes under progressively stricter comparability filters: the full Sample A ($n = 40$), excluding flagged papers (simulated data, incomplete verification), and an audit-passed subset (additionally excluding papers whose mapping is flagged for review). The qualitative pattern—automated distributions tracking the independent benchmark, with the original distribution shifted rightward—is stable across filters.




Fig. 6. Filter sensitivity for $|t|$ distributions in Sample A. Three panels: full sample, excluding flagged papers, and audit-passed subset. Each panel overlays independent and automated densities on the original-studies histogram.

B.3 Three-type evidence model: estimation and diagnostics

B.3.1 Baseline specification. We estimate the three-type evidence model on the verified-core specification-level data from Sample B, trimmed to $|t| \leq 10$ ($n = 4,958$ specifications across 96 papers). The baseline component family is the folded Gaussian with standard deviation fixed at $\sigma = 1$. If $X \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu, 1)$, the folded normal is the distribution of $|X|$, with density

$$f_k(x; \mu_k) = \varphi(x - \mu_k) + \varphi(x + \mu_k), \quad x \geq 0,$$

where $\varphi(\cdot)$ is the standard normal density. The folded normal is the natural distribution for our evidence index: if the true treatment effect implies $t \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu_k, 1)$, then $|t|$ follows this density. Each component has a single free parameter, the noncentrality μ_k .

The mixture density is

$$g(x) = \sum_{k=1}^3 \pi_k f_k(x; \mu_k), \quad \pi_k \geq 0, \quad \sum_k \pi_k = 1.$$

Estimation uses maximum likelihood via L-BFGS-B with 50 random initializations. Means are passed through a softplus transform during optimization, and mixture weights through a softmax. Components are labeled by sorting fitted means: $\hat{\mu}_N < \hat{\mu}_M < \hat{\mu}_E$.

We trim the data to $|t| \leq 10$, excluding approximately 11% of specifications with extreme t -statistics. Extreme values contribute outsized influence to likelihood-based estimation and destabilize the three-type separation; without trimming, the extreme component is driven to the upper bound ($\hat{\mu}_E = 10$) by a handful of outliers. Trimming at $|t| = 10$ retains the vast majority of the data while producing a stable, interpretable decomposition.

Why $\sigma = 1$. Under any type's null-like hypothesis, $t \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu_k, 1)$, so fixing $\sigma = 1$ preserves the structural interpretation: the three types differ only in the noncentrality parameter, not in dispersion. Relaxing this constraint (Panel C of Table 6) inflates the null component's variance to $\hat{\sigma}_N \approx 78$, effectively using it as a catch-all background distribution ($\hat{\pi}_N = 0.05$), while concentrating 80% of mass into a single moderate component. The resulting three types no longer have a clean interpretation as null, moderate, and extreme evidence: the unconstrained model sacrifices the location-shift structure for a marginal improvement in in-sample fit. We therefore fix $\sigma = 1$ throughout.

Table 6 reports the estimated parameters for our baseline specification alongside all alternatives.

Table 6. Mixture model comparison. The baseline specification is a $K = 3$ folded-Gaussian mixture with $\sigma = 1$ on $|t| \leq 10$ ($n = 4,958$). Panel A varies the number of components; Panel B compares distributional families; Panel C relaxes the variance constraint. Components sorted by ascending mean: N (null), M (moderate), E (extreme).

K	Family	σ	Sample	Weights $\hat{\pi}_k$			Means $\hat{\mu}_k$			AIC	BIC
				N	M	E	N	M	E		
<i>Panel A: Number of components</i>											
2	Folded	$\sigma = 1$	Full	0.86	0.14	—	2.2	6.7	—	20,783.4	20,802.9
3	Folded	$\sigma = 1$	Full	0.62	0.31	0.08	1.6	3.9	7.9	19,493.9	19,526.4
4	Folded	$\sigma = 1$	Full	0.21	0.57	0.15	0.0	2.4	4.8	19,319.2	19,364.8
<i>Panel B: Distributional family</i>											
3	Truncated	$\sigma = 1$	Full	0.53	0.39	0.09	1.3	3.6	7.7	19,600.3	19,632.8
<i>Panel C: Variance constraint</i>											
3	Truncated	Free	Full	0.05	0.80	0.14	0.0	1.8	9.3	27,749.9	27,802.9
3	Truncated	$\sigma \geq 1$	Full	0.82	0.05	0.13	1.8	10.0	10.0	27,757.2	27,810.2
<i>Panel D: Evidence window</i>											
3	Folded	$\sigma = 1$	Full	0.62	0.31	0.08	1.6	3.9	7.9	19,493.9	19,526.4

Panel A shows that adding a third component produces a large improvement ($\Delta\text{BIC} = 1,277$), while adding a fourth yields diminishing returns ($\Delta\text{BIC} = 162$). The $K = 4$ model splits the moderate component into two subgroups ($\hat{\mu}_{M_1} \approx 2.4$, $\hat{\mu}_{M_2} \approx 4.8$) without qualitatively changing the null or extreme components. Panel B confirms that the folded-normal family dominates the truncated-normal by $\Delta\text{BIC} = 106$: the folded normal is the exact distribution of $|t|$ when $t \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu, 1)$, while the truncated normal discards the reflected mass.

B.3.2 Goodness-of-fit diagnostics. Figure 7 reports PP and QQ plots for the baseline folded-Gaussian mixture fit. The PP plot compares the empirical CDF of $|t|$ against the fitted mixture CDF. The QQ plot compares empirical quantiles against fitted-mixture quantiles obtained by numerical inversion of the mixture CDF. Both diagnostics indicate a close fit across the full support, with only minor departures near $|t| = 0$ (where the empirical distribution is slightly heavier than the fitted null) and in the extreme right tail (reflecting the hard cutoff at $|t| = 10$).




Fig. 7. Mixture diagnostics: PP plot (left) and QQ plot (right) for the folded-Gaussian mixture fit on $|t|$ ($\sigma = 1$ fixed; $|t| \leq 10$; Sample B, verified-core specifications).

The diagnostics are robust to the choice of evidence window. Refitting the mixture at alternative trimming thresholds ($|t| \leq 15$ and $|t| \leq 20$) produces PP and QQ plots of comparable quality: the interior of the distribution is well captured regardless of how we handle the right tail.

B.3.3 Model selection: $K \in \{2, 3, 4\}$. Figure 8 overlays the fitted folded-normal mixture densities for $K = 2, 3$, and 4 on the same histogram ($|t| \leq 10$). The three-component model captures the salient features of the distribution: a large mass of low-evidence specifications near $|t| \approx 1-2$, a moderate-evidence cluster near $|t| \approx 4$, and a right tail of extreme evidence near $|t| \approx 7$. Figures 9 and 10 show the individual $K = 2$ and $K = 4$ fits with component breakdowns.




Fig. 8. K -sensitivity: fitted folded-normal mixture densities for $K = 2$ (dashed), $K = 3$ (solid), and $K = 4$ (dotted) overlaid on the verified-core $|t|$ histogram ($|t| \leq 10$).




Fig. 9. Two-component folded-normal fit ($K = 2$, $\sigma = 1$) on verified-core $|t| \leq 10$.




Fig. 10. Four-component folded-normal fit ($K = 4$, $\sigma = 1$) on verified-core $|t| \leq 10$.

B.3.4 Distributional robustness: folded vs. truncated normal. As a distributional robustness check, we compare the folded-normal family against the truncated normal. The truncated normal discards the mass below zero rather than reflecting it:

$$f_k^{\text{trunc}}(x; \mu_k) = \frac{\varphi(x - \mu_k)}{1 - \Phi(-\mu_k)}, \quad x \geq 0.$$

When $\mu = 0$ and $\sigma = 1$, the two families coincide (both reduce to the half-normal), so they impose the same null component. They differ only for the non-null components with $\mu > 0$, where the folded normal reflects mass from $(-\infty, 0)$. Panel B of Table 6 shows the folded normal dominates

by $\Delta\text{BIC} = 106$, though the estimated parameters are qualitatively similar. The folded normal is preferred on both theoretical grounds (it is the exact distribution of $|t|$ when $t \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu, 1)$) and information criteria.

Figures 11–12 show the $\sigma = 1$ and $\sigma \geq 1$ truncated-normal fits for visual comparison; Figures 13–15 display the truncated-normal fits for $K = 2, 3, 4$ with σ free.




Fig. 11. Truncated-normal fit with $\sigma = 1$ fixed.




Fig. 12. Truncated-normal fit with $\sigma \geq 1$ constraint.




Fig. 13. Truncated-normal fit ($K = 2, \sigma$ free) on $|t| \leq 10$.




Fig. 14. Truncated-normal fit ($K = 3, \sigma$ free) on $|t| \leq 10$.




Fig. 15. Truncated-normal fit ($K = 4, \sigma$ free) on $|t| \leq 10$.

B.3.5 Parametric bootstrap confidence intervals. Figure 16 reports parametric bootstrap confidence intervals for the mixture parameters $(\hat{\pi}_k, \hat{\mu}_k)_{k \in \{N, M, E\}}$ under the baseline folded-normal specification. We simulate $B = 500$ samples of the same size as the estimation sample from the fitted mixture, trim each to $|t| \leq 10$, re-estimate the $K = 3$ folded-normal mixture ($\sigma = 1$), and report 95% percentile confidence intervals.




Fig. 16. Parametric bootstrap inference for the three-type folded-normal mixture ($B = 500$, $\sigma = 1$, $|t| \leq 10$). Histograms show bootstrap distributions; black lines mark point estimates; dashed red lines mark 95% CIs.

B.3.6 Journal subgroup analysis. To assess whether the three-type structure is driven by a particular journal, we re-estimate the $K = 3$ folded-normal mixture ($\sigma = 1$ fixed, $|t| \leq 10$) separately on AER papers (55 papers, 3,146 specifications) and on all non-AER papers (41 papers across the AEJ and AER: Insights journals, 2,423 specifications). Figure 17 compares the mixing weights π_k and component means μ_k across the two subgroups against the full-sample benchmark. Both subgroups reproduce the three-type structure with qualitatively similar parameters, confirming that the mixture is not an artifact of compositional heterogeneity across journals.




Fig. 17. Journal subgroup analysis: mixing weights π_k (left) and component means μ_k (right) for the $K = 3$ folded-normal mixture ($\sigma = 1$, $|t| \leq 10$) estimated on AER papers, non-AER papers, and the full sample.

B.3.7 Posterior type assignment. Figure 18 shows the posterior probability $P(k | |t_i|)$ under the baseline folded-normal mixture ($K = 3$, $\sigma = 1$, $|t| \leq 10$) for each specification in the sample. Specifications are sorted by their $|t|$; the stacked bars show the posterior weight on each type (N , M , E) at the specification's evidence index.




Fig. 18. Posterior type assignment under the baseline folded-normal mixture ($K = 3$, $\sigma = 1$, $|t| \leq 10$). Each vertical slice is a specification (sorted by $|t|$); stacked bars show the posterior probability $P(k | |t|)$ for each type $k \in \{N, M, E\}$.

B.4 Dependence estimation

B.4.1 AR(1) dependence estimation. We estimate within-paper dependence using an AR(1) model along the specification traversal. For each baseline group g with $n_g \geq 3$ specifications, we order the specifications according to a chosen ordering and regress $|t_{g,s+1}|$ on $|t_{g,s}|$ to obtain a group-level persistence coefficient $\hat{\phi}_g$. The pooled estimate is a weighted average across groups, with weights proportional to n_g :

$$\hat{\phi} = \frac{\sum_g n_g \hat{\phi}_g}{\sum_g n_g}$$

Standard errors and 95% confidence intervals are obtained by percentile bootstrap (1,000 replications, resampling groups).

Because the AR(1) estimate depends on how specifications are ordered, we estimate $\hat{\phi}$ under six orderings:

- (1) Document order: the specification traversal order recorded during extraction.
- (2) Lexicographic path: alphabetical sort by the recorded `spec_tree_path` string.
- (3) Breadth-first: sort by namespace depth (ascending), breaking ties by document order.
- (4) Depth-first: sort by namespace depth (descending), breaking ties by document order.
- (5) By category: sort by the verified specification category, then document order.
- (6) Random: random permutation with a fixed seed per group (null baseline).

For each ordering we compute a pooled $R^2 = 1 - \sum_g \text{SS}_{\text{res},g} / \sum_g \text{SS}_{\text{tot},g}$ measuring goodness of fit of the AR(1) model. The preferred estimate is the ordering with the highest R^2 (excluding the random null). The effective-independence parameter is $\hat{\Delta} \equiv 1 - \hat{\phi}$; all orderings enter the counterfactual sensitivity analysis.

Figure 19 shows $\hat{\phi}$ with 95% bootstrap CIs for each ordering, with the preferred ordering highlighted and R^2 annotated, and Table 7 has the full results.




Fig. 19. AR(1) persistence $\hat{\phi}$ under six specification orderings, with 95% bootstrap CIs. The preferred ordering (highest R^2 , excluding random) is highlighted; R^2 values annotated at right.

Table 7. AR(1) dependence estimates under multiple specification orderings (Sample B; verified-core specifications). The preferred ordering is selected by highest pooled R^2 (excluding random).

Ordering	$\hat{\phi}$	$\hat{\Delta} = 1 - \hat{\phi}$	95% CI for $\hat{\phi}$	R^2
By category	0.151	0.849	[0.109, 0.195]	0.036
Document order	0.141	0.859	[0.097, 0.187]	0.019
Lexicographic path	0.148	0.852	[0.110, 0.190]	0.013
Breadth-first	0.141	0.859	[0.097, 0.187]	0.019
Depth-first	0.144	0.856	[0.101, 0.189]	0.019
Random (null)	-0.021	1.021	[-0.050, 0.006]	0.014

B.5 Counterfactual screening under a cost shift

This section describes the mapping from estimated primitives to the counterfactual operating points reported in Section 6.3.5. The inputs are (i) the $\sigma = 1$ fitted mixture (Table 6), (ii) the AR(1) dependence parameter $\hat{\phi}$ and implied $\hat{\Delta} = 1 - \hat{\phi}$ (Table 7), and (iii) the cost ratio $\lambda \approx 1/172$ calibrated from the timing data.

B.5.1 Effective sample size. Given a testing horizon of n specifications and the dependence proxy $\hat{\Delta}$, the effective sample size is $N_{\text{eff}} = \lceil \hat{\Delta} n \rceil$. Figure 20 plots $N_{\text{eff}} = \Delta n$ as a function of n for all five non-random orderings (document order, lexicographic path, breadth-first, depth-first, and by verification category), with the preferred ordering (by verification category, $\hat{\Delta} = 0.849$) highlighted in solid. The independence benchmark ($N_{\text{eff}} = n$) is overlaid for comparison.




Fig. 20. Effective sample size $N_{\text{eff}} = \Delta n$ as a function of the testing horizon n , for all five non-random AR(1) orderings (preferred ordering by verification category shown as solid black; others as dashed). The independence benchmark $N_{\text{eff}} = n$ is shown in gray.

B.5.2 Null-only FDR definition. For a disclosure rule requiring m passes out of N_{eff} effectively independent draws, the type- k qualification probability is

$$Q_k(m) = \Pr(\text{Bin}(N_{\text{eff}}, p_k(B)) \geq m).$$

The average qualification rate is $\bar{Q}(m) = \sum_k \pi_k Q_k(m)$. Under a fixed-capacity interpretation with throughput target $\bar{\rho}$, the editor accepts qualifying papers with probability $a = \min(1, \bar{\rho}/\bar{Q}(m))$.

The false discovery rate is defined with respect to the null type only:

$$\text{FDR}(m) = \frac{\pi_N Q_N(m)}{\hat{Q}(m)}.$$

This treats extreme-type papers (E) as true positives for the purpose of screening. The rationale is that extreme-type papers study real effects with large and stable evidence indices; their qualification is not a false discovery, even though their evidence indices are unusually large.

B.5.3 Regime comparison. Rather than fixing a raw testing horizon, we calibrate the effective sample size directly. Given $m^{\text{old}} = 50$ (the median number of specifications per paper in the replication sample), we binary-search for the effective sample size $N_{\text{eff}}^{\text{old}}$ such that $\text{FDR}(m^{\text{old}}, N_{\text{eff}}^{\text{old}}) = 0.05$. This yields $N_{\text{eff}}^{\text{old}} = 112$. The cost shift scales the effective sample size to $N_{\text{eff}}^{\text{new}} = \lceil N_{\text{eff}}^{\text{old}}/\lambda \rceil = 19,264$, where $\lambda \approx 1/172$ is calibrated from the timing data. For interpretation, the implied raw testing horizon is $n^{\text{old}} = N_{\text{eff}}^{\text{old}}/\hat{\Delta} \approx 132$ under the preferred dependence estimate ($\hat{\Delta} = 0.849$). Importantly, the dependence parameter $\hat{\Delta}$ does not affect the disclosure ratio $m^{\text{new}}/m^{\text{old}}$ —only λ does—but it governs the interpretation of the implied testing scope.

B.5.4 Main result. Under the baseline calibration ($\lambda \approx 1/172$, $m^{\text{old}} = 50$, $\sigma = 1$ folded-normal mixture), the old regime achieves $\text{FDR} = 0.05$ at $N_{\text{eff}}^{\text{old}} = 112$. The new regime requires $m^{\text{new}} = 6,994$ to restore the same FDR target—approximately a 140-fold increase.

Figure 21 shows the headline comparison: Panel A shows the disclosure multiplier $m^{\text{new}}/m^{\text{old}}$ for each baseline requirement; Panel B displays the FDR as a heatmap over m and λ , zoomed around the calibration point; star marks ($m^{\text{new}} = 6,994$, $\lambda \approx 1/172$).




Fig. 21. Counterfactual screening under a cost shift ($\lambda \approx 1/172$), calibrated so that $m^{\text{old}} = 50$ achieves $\text{FDR} = 0.05$ (null-only) in the old regime. Panel A: disclosure multiplier $m^{\text{new}}/m^{\text{old}}$ for each baseline; the new regime requires a 140-fold increase at $m^{\text{old}} = 50$. Panel B: FDR heatmap over m and λ , zoomed around the calibration point; star marks ($m^{\text{new}} = 6,994$, $\lambda \approx 1/172$).

B.5.5 Disclosure scaling and sensitivity. For each $m^{\text{old}} \in \{2, 3, 5, 10, 20, \dots, 100\}$, we independently calibrate the old regime so that $\text{FDR}(m^{\text{old}}, N_{\text{eff}}^{\text{old}}) = 0.05$ and find the smallest m^{new} such that $\text{FDR}(m^{\text{new}}, N_{\text{eff}}^{\text{new}}) \leq 0.05$ at $N_{\text{eff}}^{\text{new}} = \lceil N_{\text{eff}}^{\text{old}}/\lambda \rceil$.

Table 8 reports the baseline mapping; the ratio $m^{\text{new}}/m^{\text{old}}$ increases toward $1/\lambda \approx 172$ for large baselines. Figure 22 plots the full scaling relationship.

Table 8. Disclosure scaling under the baseline cost shift ($\lambda \approx 1/172$, null-only FDR). For each m^{old} , the old regime is independently calibrated so that $\text{FDR}(m^{\text{old}}) = 0.05$. The ratio $m^{\text{new}}/m^{\text{old}}$ approaches $1/\lambda$ for large baselines. Highlighted row: $m^{\text{old}} = 50$.

m^{old}	$n_{\text{eff}}^{\text{old}}$	m^{new}	$n_{\text{eff}}^{\text{new}}$	$m^{\text{new}}/m^{\text{old}}$
2	2	140	344	70.0
3	3	205	516	68.3
4	4	270	688	67.5
5	6	398	1,032	79.6
6	8	525	1,376	87.5
7	10	651	1,720	93.0
8	12	777	2,064	97.1
9	14	903	2,408	100.3
10	16	1,029	2,752	102.9




Fig. 22. Disclosure scaling: m^{new} vs. m^{old} (left) and ratio $m^{\text{new}}/m^{\text{old}}$ (right). Diamond marks the baseline $m^{\text{old}} = 50$.

Table 9 reports the comprehensive sensitivity analysis. Each column varies one dimension of the calibration—cost ratio λ , evidence window lower bound z_{lo} , upper bound z_{hi} , or the mixture model variant—while holding all other parameters at their baseline values ($\lambda \approx 1/172$, $B = [1.96, \infty)$, $\sigma = 1$ mixture). Each cell reports m^{new} for the given m^{old} and variant.

The baseline column ($\lambda \approx 1/172$) shows that $m^{\text{new}} = 7,004$ for $m^{\text{old}} = 50$, consistent with the headline result. The cost ratio has the largest effect: at $\lambda = 1/50$ the multiplier drops to $41\times$, while at $\lambda = 1/500$ it rises to $404\times$. The evidence window lower bound z_{lo} has a moderate effect, with m^{new} ranging from 6,725 ($z_{\text{lo}} = 3.0$) to 7,585 ($z_{\text{lo}} = 1.0$). The upper bound z_{hi} is essentially irrelevant because the $\sigma = 1$ mixture places negligible mass above $|t| = 10$.

B.5.6 Monte Carlo validation. Figure 23 reports a Monte Carlo validation of the binomial approximation used in the counterfactuals. We simulate 1,000 papers from the estimated mixture and dependence model: for each paper, draw a type $k \sim (\pi_N, \pi_M, \pi_E)$, then draw N_{eff} independent specifications from the corresponding component. We apply the threshold screening rule and compare the simulated FDR and throughput against the analytical formulas at each threshold m .




Fig. 23. Monte Carlo validation: simulated FDR (points) versus analytical FDR (solid line) as a function of the disclosure threshold m . Based on 1,000 simulated papers from the estimated mixture and dependence model.

Table 9. Comprehensive disclosure scaling: m^{new} under alternative parameterizations. Rows: baseline disclosure requirement m^{old} , superscripts mark empirical percentiles of specifications per paper in the analytic sample (P25–P90). Columns: sensitivity variants, each varying one dimension while holding others at baseline ($\lambda \approx 1/172$, $B = [1.96, \infty)$, $\sigma = 1$ mixture). Highlighted row: $m^{\text{old}} = 50$.

m^{old}	$\lambda = 1/172$	$\lambda = 1/50$	$\lambda = 1/100$	$\lambda = 1/250$	$\lambda = 1/500$	$z_{l_0} = 1.0$	$z_{l_0} = 1.5$	$z_{l_0} = 2.5$	$z_{l_0} = 3.0$	$z_{h_1} = 10$	$z_{h_1} = 15$	σ -free
2	78	26	48	110	210	143	111	44	56	78	78	105
3	148	48	89	210	407	279	213	153	136	148	148	201
5	419	130	249	602	1182	548	416	363	336	419	419	389
10	1020	309	602	1471	2910	1217	1116	980	938	1020	1020	1037
20 ^{P25}	2475	738	1452	3579	7106	2814	2603	2333	2287	2475	2475	2412
30	3922	1163	2297	5677	11290	4406	4085	3814	3731	3922	3922	3962
40	5431	1606	3177	7867	15659	5996	5663	5290	5214	5431	5431	5418
50^{P50}	7004	2067	4094	10150	20213	7585	7239	6831	6725	7004	7004	6962
60	8575	2527	5010	12430	24765	9174	8814	8371	8248	8575	8575	8596
70	10145	2986	5925	14709	29315	10761	10387	9908	9798	10145	10145	10138
80	11714	3445	6839	16987	33863	12480	12059	11479	11363	11714	11714	11769
90	13348	3922	7791	19359	38600	14067	13631	13048	12926	13348	13348	13309
100	14916	4381	8704	21636	43146	15785	15301	14650	14503	14916	14916	14939
108 ^{P75}	16222	4762	9465	23532	46934	17107	16578	15918	15773	16222	16222	16207
201 ^{P90}	31357	9180	18278	45513	90845	32561	31888	30914	30703	31357	31357	31310